Judges: Jim Smith, Attorney General Prepared by: Anne Curtis Terry, Assistant Attorney General
Filed Date: 8/26/1983
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
Honorable Bob Graham Governor State of Florida The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida, 32301
Dear Governor Graham:
This is in response to your request for an opinion on substantially the following question:
IS THE GOVERNOR AUTHORIZED BY STATUTE TO SUSPEND AN ELECTED MUNICIPAL OFFICER WHO HAS HAD AN INFORMATION FILED AGAINST HIM FOR THE COMMISSION OF A FELONY?
For the following reasons, your question is answered in the affirmative.
Section 7, Art. IV, State Const., does not address the issue of suspension of an elected municipal officer who has had an information returned against him for the commission of a felony. However, s
When a method for removal from office is not otherwise provided by the State Constitution or by law, the Governor may by executive order suspend from office an elected or appointed public official, by whatever title known, who is indicated or informed against for commission of any felony, or for any misdemeanor arising directly out of his official conduct or duties, and may fill the office by appointment for the period of suspension, not to extend beyond the term. (e.s.)
Neither the title or body of Ch. 80-333 defines `public official' as used therein nor excepts municipal officers, whether they be elected or appointed, from the operation of this statute. The body of this act expressly provides that an elected or appointed public official `by whatever title known' who is informed against for commission of any felony may be suspended by executive order of the Governor. The term `an' indicates an intent to include any public official, unless such an officer is excepted from the operation of the statute. See, Black's Law Dictionary, defining `an' as an indefinite article equivalent to `one' or `any'; seealso, 3A C.J.S. An at p. 444. Moreover, the clause which follows the term `public official' — `by whatever title known' — emphasizes the intended breadth of this provision. The use by the Legislature of such broad and comprehensive terms — any elected public official by whatever title known — indicates a legislative intent to include everything embraced within the generality of such comprehensive terms. Moreover, where a statute is couched in broad, general and comprehensive terms as is s
In summary, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, s
Section
In summary, it is my opinion that s
Sincerely,
Jim Smith, Attorney General
Prepared by: Anne Curtis Terry, Assistant Attorney General