Judges: Jim Smith Attorney General
Filed Date: 7/14/1986
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
Mr. David La Croix City Attorney City of Sanibel Post Office Drawer Q Sanibel, Florida 33957
Dear Mr. La Croix:
This is in response to your request for an opinion on substantially the following question:
WHETHER s.
112.3143 , F.S., REQUIRES ABSTENTION BY A MEMBER OF THE CITY COUNCIL IN A SITUATION WHERE SUCH ABSTENTION WOULD PREVENT THE LEGISLATIVE BODY FROM TAKING ANY ACTION ON THAT MEASURE?
Section
No county, municipal, or other local public officer shall vote in his official capacity upon any measure which inures to his special private gain or shall knowingly vote in his official capacity upon any measure which inures to the special gain of any principal, other than an agency as defined in s.
112.312 (2), by whom he is retained. Such public officer shall, prior to the vote being taken, publicly state to the assembly the nature of his interest in the matter from which he is abstaining from voting and, within 15 days after the vote occurs, disclose the nature of his interest as a public record in a memorandum filed with the person responsible for recording the minutes of the meeting, who shall incorporate the memorandum in the minutes. . . .
This statute creates a voting disqualification for county, municipal, and other local public officers where the measure to be voted upon would inure to his special private gain or where knowingly such measure would inure to the special gain of any principal, as limited therein, by whom he is retained. See, Ch. 84-357, Laws of Florida, which enacted subsection (3) of s.
You state in your letter of inquiry that this statute causes potential problems, especially in smaller communities, in which a matter to be considered could possibly affect enough members of the city council to make it impossible to take action on that measure. You question in such an instance when multiple conflicts of interest would preclude the council from taking any action on a measure, whether the statute could be interpreted in a way so as not to require abstention by a city council member.
The primary rule of statutory construction is that the intent of the Legislature as gleaned from the statute is the law. Department of Legal Affairs v. Sanford-Orlando Kennel Club, Inc.,
In conclusion, I am therefore constrained to conclude that unless and until judicially determined otherwise, s.
Sincerely,
Jim Smith Attorney General
Prepared by:
Craig Willis Assistant Attorney General