Judges: Jim Smith, Attorney General Prepared by: Joseph C. Mellichamp, III, Assistant Attorney General
Filed Date: 9/10/1982
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
Mr. Randy Miller Executive Director Department of Revenue Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Dear Mr. Miller:
This is in response to your request for an opinion on substantially the following question:
TO WHICH ANNUAL PERIOD OF THE INSURANCE PREMIUM TAX SHOULD THE CORPORATE INCOME TAX CREDIT OF s
624.509 (4), F.S., BE APPLIED?
Under s
Under s
Section
In addition to the license taxes provided for in this chapter, each insurer shall also annually, and on or before March 1 in each year . . . pay to the Department of Revenue a tax on insurance premiums, risk premium for title insurance or assessments, including membership fees and policy fees and gross deposits received from subscribers to reciprocal or interinsurance agreements, and on annuity premiums or considerations, received during the preceding calendar year, the amounts thereof to be determined as hereinafter set forth . . . .
Section
Subsection (4) goes on to provide:
For purposes of this subsection, payments of estimated income tax under chapter 220 shall be deemed paid either at the time the insurer actually files its annual return under chapter 220 or at the time said return is required to be filed, whichever first occurs, and not at such earlier time as such payments of estimated tax are actually made.
Since corporate income tax returns are not normally due until one month after the insurance premium tax returns are due, the question arises as to whether the Legislature intended that the corporate income tax credit, of say 1982, could only be applied to the 1983 insurance premium tax, or whether the corporate income tax credit of 1982 could be applied to the 1982 insurance premium tax if the corporate income tax return were filed and paid earlier than March 1, the due date of the insurance premium tax.
It must be remembered that s
Likewise, it is clear that the Legislature intended to use the word ``paid' and not ``accrued,' as well as use the phrase ``in which' as opposed to ``for which.' Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, it fixes the legislative intent, and effect should be given to the plain meeting of its terms. Platt v. Lanier,
In conclusion, therefore, and unless or until legislatively or judicially clarified or determined otherwise, I am of the view that s
Sincerely,
Jim Smith, Attorney General
Prepared by: Joseph C. Mellichamp, III, Assistant Attorney General