Judges: Robert A. Butterworth Attorney General
Filed Date: 1/11/1995
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
Mr. Patrick G. Gilligan Ocala City Attorney 7 East Silver Springs Boulevard, Suite 405 Ocala, Florida 34470
Dear Mr. Gilligan:
On behalf of the City of Ocala, you have asked substantially the following question:
Is the City of Ocala authorized by section
In sum:
Section
The City of Ocala is contemplating the enactment of a utility tax ordinance on electricity pursuant to section
According to your letter, the language of section
Section
(1)(a) A municipality may levy a tax on the purchase of electricity, metered or bottled gas (natural liquefied petroleum gas or manufactured), and water service. The tax shall be levied only upon purchases within the municipality. . . . (2) Services competitive with those enumerated in subsection (1) or subsection (9),1 as defined by ordinance, shall be taxed on a comparable base at the same rates. . . . (e.s.)
Your question is whether the language in subsection (2) emphasized above requires that any ordinance passed by the City of Ocala to impose a public service tax on one utility must also simultaneously impose such a tax against all competitive services or whether a tax may be imposed on competitive services, to be actually implemented at a later date.
The Florida Constitution2 and Florida case law3 reveal that the State, through the legislative branch of government, possesses an inherent power to tax, and a municipality may exercise the taxing power only to the extent to which such power has been specifically granted to it by general law. It is within the prerogative of the Legislature in the exercise of its sovereign power to determine the subjects of taxation and exemptions from taxation. However, this right is subject to the controlling limitations set forth in the constitution.4
The general law, section
This conclusion results from an interpretation of the language of Article
Counties, school districts, and municipalities shall, and special districts may, be authorized by law to levy ad valorem taxes and may be authorized by general law to levy other taxes, for their respective purposes, except ad valorem taxes on intangible personal property and taxes prohibited by this constitution. (e.s.)
The mandatory nature of the statutory language is abrogated by application of this constitutional provision to the requirement expressed in section
In Belcher Oil Company v. Dade County,
(1) The several cities and towns in this state are hereby given the right, power, and authority, by nonemergency ordinance, to impose, levy and collect on each and every purchase of electricity, metered or bottled gas (natural liquefied petroleum gas or manufactured), water service, telephone service and telegraph service in their corporate limits, a tax . . . in an amount not to exceed ten per cent of the payments received by the seller of such utility service. . . . In the event any such ordinance imposes such a tax on the purchase of one of the utility services described herein and a competitive utility service or services are purchased in the city or town, then such ordinance shall impose a tax in like amount on the purchase of the competitive utility service or services whether privately or publicly owned or distributed. . . . (e.s.)
The Court interpreted the effect of Article VII, section 9(a), of the 1968 Constitution on what appeared to be the mandatory language contained in this statute and determined that, in light of the constitutional limitation, the statute did not impose an absolute obligation on a municipality to tax but made such a right permissive. Similarly, the language of section
Therefore, it is my opinion that the City of Ocala may adopt a utility tax ordinance that imposes such a tax on certain utility services without implementing the utility tax on competitive services until a later date.
Sincerely,
Robert A. Butterworth Attorney General
RAB/tgk