Judges: Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General Prepared by: Martin S. Friedman Assistant Attorney General
Filed Date: 9/21/1977
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
QUESTIONS:
1. Assuming funds are available in the Department of Criminal Law Enforcement budget and in light of s. 117.07, F. S., and s.
2. Assuming funds are available in the department budget and in light of s.
SUMMARY:
The Department of Criminal Law Enforcement is not authorized by law to pay judgment for compensatory or punitive damages rendered against a special agent of the department in a civil suit arising prior to the enactment of s.
I note that the lawsuit upon which the judgment in question was based was filed prior to Florida's waiver of sovereign immunity by s.
Both questions involve the same legal principles; therefore, they will be considered together and answered accordingly.
One must start from the basic premise that public funds may be expended only as authorized by law. See Florida Development Commission v. Dickinson,
Section
As previously indicated, the action upon which the judgment in question is predicated took place prior to the effective date of Florida's waiver of sovereign immunity, s.
There is therefore no specific statutory authority under these circumstances for the Department of Criminal Law Enforcement to pay the judgments in question. Under certain circumstances there is statutory authority to indemnify a warden or a deputy sheriff or a sheriff for a judgment rendered in a civil suit against such person arising out of performance of his duties (s. 111.06, F. S.). Moreover, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services is authorized to compensate an officer, employee, or agent who has been held personally liable for the payment of a judgment rendered in a civil suit as a result of an act or omission within the scope of his employment or function in an amount equal to the amount of such judgment. [Section 111.08, F. S.] No such statutory provision has been made for special agents of the Department of Criminal Law Enforcement. By thus specifically authorizing payment of judgments under certain circumstances to certain state officers and employees, the Legislature impliedly rejected such authority under all circumstances for all state officers and employees or the special agents of your department. As hereinbefore noted, the express mention of one thing in a statute is the exclusion of another. Mitchell v. Cotton,
It might be noted that the Legislature, if it acknowledges or determines that there is a liability on the part of the state to discharge the state's moral obligation to the affected special agents of your department, may enact a general law granting such relief to such special agents as it may determine is justified in the attending circumstances and appropriate moneys for payment of any such claims bill out of the General Revenue Fund. Cf. Dickinson v. Bradley,
Considering the foregoing discussion, both of your questions are answered in the negative.
Prepared by: Martin S. Friedman Assistant Attorney General
In Re Advisory Opinion of Governor Civil Rights , 306 So. 2d 520 ( 1975 )
Interlachen Lakes Estates, Inc. v. Snyder , 304 So. 2d 433 ( 1974 )
Wanda Marine Corp. v. STATE, DEPT. OF REVENUE , 305 So. 2d 65 ( 1974 )
Thayer v. State , 335 So. 2d 815 ( 1976 )
Dickinson v. Bradley , 298 So. 2d 352 ( 1974 )
Dobbs v. Sea Isle Hotel , 56 So. 2d 341 ( 1952 )