T.R.-B. v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES

Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed January 26, 2022.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
________________
No. 3D21-1716
Lower Tribunal No. 17-15351
________________
T.R.-B.,
Appellant,
vs.
Department of Children and Families, et al.,
Appellees.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Vivianne del
Rio, Judge.
Jay & Campbell, PLLC, and Katie Jay (Stuart), for appellant.
Karla Perkins, for appellee Department of Children and Families; Sara
Elizabeth Goldfarb and Laura J. Lee (Tallahassee), for appellee Guardian
ad Litem.
Before FERNANDEZ, C.J., and HENDON, and BOKOR, JJ.
FERNANDEZ, C.J.
Appellant/petitioner below T.R-B. (“the petitioner”) appeals the trial
court’s final order denying her amended motion to intervene as an interested
party in her minor grandson’s underlying dependency proceeding. Because
the trial court erred in denying the petitioner’s motion, we reverse the order
on appeal and remand to the juvenile court for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
The petitioner is the maternal grandmother and custodian of D.W., the
minor child in the underlying dependency case. On May 26, 2017, Florida’s
Department of Children and Families (“DCF”) sheltered D.W. Immediately,
the petitioner sought custody of D.W. DCF initially objected to the trial court
placing D.W. with the petitioner due to the thirty-year-old criminal conviction
of petitioner’s husband, D.W.’s step-grandfather. Almost thirty years ago, the
step-grandfather was convicted of grand theft and cocaine
distribution/possession and served ten years in jail.
On October 22, 2018, D.W.’s mother’s parental rights were terminated,
and D.W has no legal father. Thereafter, the petitioner obtained a home
study. The home study was positive and indicated that the step-grandfather
had lived the past twenty years as an “upstanding citizen.” The home study
showed that the step-grandfather had a stable and respectable job for the
last twenty years and was able to financially care for his children with his
2
wife, the petitioner; he was a role model to his children and society; and D.W.
was very safe with him and was very well cared for and loved by the step-
grandfather. Thus, the home study found that the step-grandfather’s criminal
history should not be a deterrent for the adoption to proceed. The home
study further indicated that D.W. is bonded to the petitioner, his step-
grandfather, and petitioner’s family, namely: the petitioner’s mother (D.W.’s
great grandmother), the petitioner and her husband’s biological daughter
who lives with them and is approximately D.W.’s age (D.W.’s aunt), and the
petitioner and her husband’s biological son who lives with them and is fifteen-
year-old (D.W.’s uncle).
In August 2017, the trial court overruled DCF’s objection and awarded
custody of D.W. to the petitioner and the petitioner’s mother, C.G., who lives
with the petitioner and her family. The trial court found it was in D.W.’s best
interest to be placed in the custody of his grandmother (the petitioner). DCF
or GALP have never sought to remove D.W. from the petitioner’s home.
The petitioner then applied to adopt D.W. On August 27, 2020, DCF’s
Adoption Applicant Review Committee (“AARC”) denied the petitioner’s
application, mainly due to the petitioner’s husband’s criminal record. The
AARC also cited an alleged lack of a bond between the petitioner and D.W.
as another reason for denying the petitioner’s application. Instead, the AARC
3
approved the application submitted by D.M., a non-relative caregiver of
D.W.’s infant biological sibling, A.W. D.W. has never resided with D.M. 1
The petitioner claims that although DCF was aware that the petitioner
wanted to adopt D.W., DCF failed to provide her with notice of hearings and
meetings and/or ask for her input, as is required by section 39.4087, Florida
Statute (2021). Accordingly, on September 21, 2020, the petitioner filed a
formal complaint with the Family Resource Center listing the statutory
violations.
On December 28, 2020, the petitioner filed her petition in the family
court division to adopt D.W. In her adoption petition, the petitioner requested
that, pursuant to section 63.062(7), Florida Statute (2021), the trial court find
that DCF was unreasonably withholding its consent to her adoption of D.W.
On January 11, 2021, DCF asked the court for unsupervised weekly
visitation between D.W. and A.W. to be supervised by D.M., the approved
adoptive applicant, which the trial court granted on January 12, 2021. 2 The
petitioner alleges neither she nor her counsel were notified. On January 20,
2021, the petitioner filed her Amended Petition for Adoption by Relative. On
1
The petitioner filed an administrative appeal of the AARC’s decision, which
has been stayed since the time the petitioner filed the adoption petition.
2
DCF later agreed to stay the visitation order until the petitioner’s motion to
intervene could be heard by the court.
4
January 29, 2021, the petitioner filed her “Motion to Intervene as an
Interested Party and to Stay 01/12/2021 Visitation Order.”
On February 17, 2021, after the petitioner moved to have the family
adoption case transferred to the juvenile division, the trial court in the family
division transferred the adoption case to the Unified Children’s Court Division
and ordered that a “juvenile adoption case” be created and assigned through
the Office of the Clerk of the Courts, Juvenile Division.
In March 2021, the petitioner moved to waive DCF’s consent to
adoption. In preparation for the hearing before the trial court on this motion,
in April 2021, the petitioner gave notice in the adoption proceeding to the
GALP for the virtual depositions of the certified guardian ad litem and the
GALP assistant circuit director. On April 29, 2021, the GALP filed an
emergency motion to quash notice of taking deposition and motion for
protective order and requested an emergency hearing. The GALP filed this
motion in the dependency case, in which the GALP was a party but in which
the petitioner was not. The GALP argued that the petitioner intended to
depose the GALP’s employees in the adoption matter to which the GALP
was not a party but to which the trial court retained exclusive jurisdiction. In
addition, it argued only parties may take depositions, and the petitioner was
not a party to the dependency action, only a participant.
5
On May 3, 2021, the petitioner filed her “Emergency Motion to Stay
Hearing.” The trial court denied the stay. The next day, the trial court held
the hearing on the GALP’s motion to quash the petitioner’s notice of
deposition. The trial court acknowledged that on June 8, 2021, it would
address the issue of whether DCF unreasonably withheld consent for the
petitioner to adopt D.W., decided to give both parties more time to research
the deposition issue, and thus rescheduled the hearing to May 18, 2021.
Over the petitioner’s objection, the trial court directed her to file her response
in the dependency action to the GALP motion to quash.
Thereafter, at the May 18, 2021 hearing, the trial court found that
adoption proceedings initiated under Chapter 39 are exempt from the
jurisdiction of section 63.087, as that section dealt with the termination of
parental rights pending adoption, which was not the case here. The court
found that section 39.812(5) applied. The court stated it was aware a hearing
was set for June 8, 2021 on the petitioner’s motion as to whether DCF
unreasonably withheld its consent to the petitioner adopting D.W. The
petitioner’s attorney corrected the trial court because the June 8 hearing
was, instead, set as a hearing on the petitioner’s motion to intervene in the
dependency proceeding.
6
The GALP reiterated that it requested the protective order because the
petitioner was not a party to the dependency proceeding. The trial court
asked DCF why it would grant the protective order if the petitioner’s motion
on DCF unreasonably withholding its consent was going to be heard on June
8, and the information the petitioner needed to prove her case would be
obtained by taking the GALP’s deposition. The trial court noted that the
deposition would assist the petitioner in her presentation of evidence to show
that DCF unreasonably withheld its consent. DCF replied to the court that
the petitioner was not a party to the dependency case and thus could not
depose a party because she was merely a participant. In response, the
petitioner’s attorney contended that although the petition for adoption was
filed in the family court, it was transferred to the dependency court in
February 2021. Thus, the petition was correctly in the juvenile division and
correctly before this trial court.
At the end of the hearing, the court found that the petitioner at that
point in time was not a party. The court found that the petitioner could
become a party on June 8 if the court found at that hearing that DCF
unreasonably withheld its consent to adoption. Thus, the court granted the
GALP’s motion for protective order because the petitioner was not a party
who could conduct discovery. The court stated it was relying on section
7
39.812(5) because DCF’s consent was required once a TPR was entered.
In addition, the trial court ruled that D.W. and his sibling, A.W., would have
weekly visitation. That same day, the petitioner voluntarily dismissed her
adoption petition because the trial court had ruled that the juvenile rules
applied to adoption proceedings arising from dependency proceedings.
Thus, the petitioner had no way to amend her petition because the juvenile
rules did not provide for amendments.
Thereafter, the petitioner filed her “Verified Petition for Adoption of
Minor Child” on June 1, 2021, adding DCF and the GALP as parties. In the
petition, the petitioner asked the court to find that DCF had abused its
discretion by withholding its consent to the adoption of D.W. On June 3,
2021, the petitioner filed her amended motion to intervene as an interested
party and to stay the January 12, 2021 visitation order.
On June 4, 2021, the GALP filed its “Motion to Review the
Appropriateness of the Department’s Adoptive Selection and Memorandum
of Law in Support of the Maternal Grandmother’s Motion to Waive the
Department’s Consent.” The GALP now supported the petitioner’s adoption
and stated it was in D.W.’s best interest that the petitioner adopt D.W. The
GALP also stated it was in the best interest of the child that the court waive
DCF’s consent, as it was being unreasonably withheld. It argued this was
8
because the AARC denial was largely based on the petitioner’s husband’s
criminal history. The GALP contended that although his criminal history
might have been a statutory disqualifier under section 39.0138(3), according
to section 39.0138(8)(b), placement could be appropriate if the person
showed they had been rehabilitated. The GALP contended that the step-
grandfather’s offense was almost thirty years old, and since then, he served
his time, met conditions of probation, started a family, maintained
employment, and served as a positive role model in the lives of his children
and was an upstanding member of society. In addition, the GALP asserted
that D.W. had been in the petitioner and her husband’s home for the past
three years, and nobody from DCF had expressed to the court or any person
that the step-grandfather posed any danger to D.W., based on the step-
grandfather’s criminal history. The GALP argued that DCF had not moved to
modify the child’s placement and instead waited while D.W. remained with
the petitioner, and the bond with cousins and caregivers was strengthened.
The GALP argued that DCF’s withhold of consent penalized the family and
D.W., whose best interest would not be served if he was not adopted by his
grandmother, the only family he had known.
On June 8, 2021, the trial court heard the petitioner’s amended motion
to intervene. The petitioner argued that she had the ability to seek
9
intervention for status in the dependency case. The petitioner argued that
pursuant to I.B. v Department of Children and Families, 876 So. 2d 581, 584
(Fla. 5th DCA 2004), and Sullivan v. Sapp, 866 So. 2d 28, 33 (Fla. 2004),
the legal test to seek party status is whether the interested person has an
interest in the underlying subject matter of the case and whether that
interested person is going to lose or gain, here, because of the ruling in the
underlying dependency case. The petitioner stated that she met the I.B. test
because I.B. made it clear that when there is a corresponding adoption
petition that has been filed, the dependency court can allow an interested
person to intervene. In addition, the petitioner argued that she had a
fundamental liberty interest in maintaining her family, thus she should be
permitted to intervene.
The court denied the motion, finding that the petitioner was a
participant but did not grant the petitioner party status in the dependency
case. The court later entered its order on July 21, 2021 denying the
petitioner’s amended motion to intervene. In addition, the court did not hold
a hearing on the petitioner’s motion on whether DCF’s consent was
unreasonably withheld because the petitioner withdrew the motion. The
petitioner has now appealed the denial of her motion to intervene.
10
The petitioner contends, in part, that the trial court erred in concluding
she may not intervene in D.W.’s dependency proceeding. 3 We agree with
the petitioner.
An appellate court reviews an order on a motion to intervene under an
abuse of discretion standard. Merrick Park, LLC v. Garcia, 299 So. 3d 1096,
1103 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019). In Florida, adoptions after a termination of parental
rights proceed under Chapter 63, Florida’s adoption statute, and section
39.812, Florida Statutes (2021), relating to adoptions after parental rights
have been terminated. Section 63.037, Florida Statutes (2021), exempts
these adoptions after the parental rights of each parent have been
terminated from certain provisions in chapter 63, but not all. In addition,
section 39.812 gives the dependency court continuing jurisdiction over the
minor child until the child is adopted. § 39.812(4), Fla. Stat. (2021). “The
petition for adoption must be filed in the division of the circuit court which
3
The petitioner’s remaining points on appeal are meritless. First, with respect
to the petitioner’s point referencing the May 18, 2021 trial court order that
granted the GALP’s motion for protective order, DCF and GALP are correct
that this order is not within the scope of this Court’s review, as this Court’s
review is limited to the order on appeal, which is the trial court’s final order
denying petitioner’s amended motion to intervene. Second, the petitioner
contends that the trial court erred in consolidating the adoption case with the
dependency case. However, there is no order in the record consolidating the
adoption proceeding with the dependency proceeding. The adoption
proceeding was correctly transferred to the dependency court, as the
petitioner requested, thus there is no merit to this point on appeal.
11
entered the judgment terminating parental rights, . . . .” § 39.812(5), Fla. Stat.
(2021). A copy of the supporting home study and a “copy of the consent
executed by the department must be attached to the petition, unless waived
pursuant to section 63.062(7).” See also § 39.812(5). The court shall waive
DCF’s consent “upon a determination by the court that such consent is being
unreasonably withheld and if the petitioner has filed with the court a favorable
preliminary adoptive home study.” § 63.062(7), Fla. Stat. (2021).
Rule 8.535(d) of the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure, although not
giving much guidance to the court on how to conduct a withhold of consent
hearing, provides the following:
(d) Withholding Consent to Adopt.
(1) When a petition for adoption and a favorable home study
under section 39.812(5), Florida Statutes, have been filed and
the department's consent has not been filed, the court shall
conduct a hearing to determine if the department has
unreasonably withheld consent.
(2) In reviewing whether the department unreasonably withheld
its consent to adopt, the court shall determine whether the
department abused its discretion by withholding consent to the
adoption by the petitioner. In making this determination, the court
shall consider all relevant information, including information
obtained or otherwise used by the department in selecting the
adoptive family, pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Chapter
65C.
(3) If the court determines that the department unreasonably
withheld consent to adopt, and the petitioner has filed with the
court a favorable home study as required by law, the court shall
12
incorporate its findings into a written order with specific findings
of fact as to how the department abused its discretion in
withholding its consent to adopt, and the consent of the
department shall be waived.
Under Rule 8.535(d), the petitioner in the case before this Court was required
to file a petition for adoption and a favorable home study to obtain a hearing
on DCF’s withhold of her consent to adopt D.W. She complied with these
requirements. Although she filed the petition for adoption in the circuit court
family division, on February 17, 2021, the petitioner’s adoption case was
transferred to the juvenile division where the dependency action was being
heard and was assigned to the same judge hearing the dependency action.
Thus, all statutory requirements were met for the petitioner to have the
consent issue addressed by the trial court.
The petitioner contends that to prepare for the hearing before the trial
court on the petitioner’s motion to determine if DCF unreasonably withheld
its consent to her adopting D.W., the petitioner wanted to depose two GALP
employees. The GALP moved for a protective order contending that the
petitioner was not a party to the dependency proceeding. The trial court
agreed and granted the GALP’s motion. The petitioner then filed her motion
to intervene in the dependency proceeding to be able to depose the GALP
employees, but the trial court denied this motion.
13
DCF and GALP argue that the trial court had no legal authority to grant
the petitioner’s motion to intervene, thus it did not err in denying the motion.
However, as the petitioner contends, Florida law indicates otherwise.
First, the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure provide that a party “shall
include the petitioner, the child, the parent(s) of the child, the department,
and the guardian ad litem . . . when the program has been appointed.” Fla.
R. Juv. P. 8.210(a); see also § 39.01(58), Fla. Stat. (2021). Participants are
defined as “any person who is not a party but who should receive notice of
hearings involving the child.” Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.210(b); see also § 39.01(57),
Fla. Stat. (2021) (participants in a shelter proceeding, dependency
proceeding, or termination of parental rights proceeding include foster
parents, the child’s legal custodian, identified prospective parents, actual
custodians of the child, “and any other person whose participation may be in
the best interest of the child.”).
Further, Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.230 provides that “[a]nyone
claiming an interest in pending litigation may at any time be permitted to
assert a right by intervention, . . . .” In general, the intervention rule should
be liberally construed. Grimes v. Walton Ct., 591 So. 2d 1091, 1093-94 (Fla.
1st DCA 1992). Intervention is a matter of the trial court’s discretion. De
Sousa v. JP Morgan Chase, N.A., 170 So. 3d 928, 929 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015).
14
The petitioner contends that pursuant to I.B. v Department of Children
and Families, 876 So. 2d 581, 584 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) and Sullivan v. Sapp,
866 So. 2d 28, 33 (Fla. 2004), the legal test in order to seek party status is
that it “ ‘must be in the matter in litigation, and of such a direct and immediate
character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal
operation and effect of the judgment.’ ” I.B., 876 So. 2d at 584 (quoting
Sullivan, 866 So. 2d at 33). The petitioner here meets that test.
In I.B., DCF sought to declare the minor child dependent after he and
his mother tested positive for cocaine. Id. at 582. The child was placed with
the appellants/foster parents, who were planning to adopt the child. DCF also
contacted the mother’s cousin who lived in Tennessee and was also
interested in adopting the child. Id. DCF requested that Tennessee conduct
a home study on the mother’s cousin. Id. The guardian submitted a positive
report on the foster parents. Id. Thereafter, the trial court entered an order
terminating parental rights to the child and ordered DCF to proceed with the
goal of adoption. Id.
DCF then moved to change placement from the foster parents to the
Tennessee relatives. Id. at 583. A few days later, the foster parents filed their
petition to adopt the child. The foster parents did not have DCF’s consent for
this adoption. Id. After a hearing, the trial court denied DCF’s motion for a
15
change of placement, noting the child had had only one contact with the
Tennessee relatives. The trial court ordered DCF to provide visitation for the
relatives and the child. Id. Afterwards, DCF filed its case plan update and
noted that the adoption applications from both the foster parents and the
relatives had been submitted to its adoption review committee and a decision
was pending. DCF’s adoption review committee then selected the
Tennessee relatives as the adoptive parents. Id.
The foster parents moved to intervene in the dependency action. Id.
At the hearing on the foster parents’ motion, the trial court denied the
intervention. Id. The trial court ruled that the decision to select the suitable
adoptive parents was one for DCF, not for the trial court, and that the foster
parents lacked standing to challenge DCF’s decision. Id. at 584. The trial
court did not take any evidence at this hearing, did not hear from the foster
parents or the guardian, and did not consider the child's best interests in
removing him from his home with the foster parents where he had lived for
sixteen months. Id. at 583-84. On appeal, the Fifth District Court of Appeal
reversed. The Court stated:
As a threshold matter, we conclude the foster parents clearly
have standing to intervene in these proceedings.FN1. The nature
of the interest that entitles a party to intervene “must be in the
matter in litigation, and of such a direct and immediate character
that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal
16
operation and effect of the judgment.” Sullivan v. Sapp, 866 So.
2d 28, 33 (Fla.2004).
Here “the matter in litigation” was the placement for adoption of
the foster parents' child, the child they wanted to adopt and had
cared for the past sixteen months. The foster parents would
directly gain or lose by the court's rulings. Thus, the foster
parents have sufficient interest to warrant intervention in the
litigation. See In the Interest of Z.J.S., 787 So.2d 875 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2001); In the Interest of C.G., 612 So.2d 602 (Fla. 4th DCA
1992).
Even if the foster parents were not properly intervenors in these
proceedings, they were already “participants” under Florida Rule
of Juvenile Procedure 8.210(b) since they were the child's foster
parents. Under this rule, participants may be granted leave by
the court to be heard without the necessity of filing a motion to
intervene. See N.S. v. Department of Children and Families, 857
So.2d 1000 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003).
Id. at 584-85 (footnote 1 cited to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.230).
Thus, I.B. makes it clear that under the facts of petitioner’s case, when there
is a corresponding adoption petition that has been filed, the dependency
court can allow the adoption petitioner to intervene because she has a clear
interest in the underlying subject matter of the dependency case.
Further, the petitioner also has a “sufficient interest to warrant
intervention in the litigation.” I.B., 876 So. 2d at 584. The petitioner is the
maternal grandmother of D.W., has had custody of D.W. for four years, thus
he has lived with them over half of his life. In addition, there is an ongoing
adoption petition, and the parental rights of the minor child have been
17
terminated, just as in I.B. The “matter in litigation” in the case before us is
the placement for adoption of D.W., who is the child the petitioner wants to
adopt and has cared for the past four years. The petitioner will directly gain
or lose by the trial court’s denial of her motion to intervene. Thus, the trial
court in the dependency proceeding had jurisdiction to grant the motion to
intervene so the petitioner could present her case on DCF’s unreasonable
withhold of consent and participate in a meaningful way. See also Berenyi v.
Department of Children and Families, 257 So. 3d 1182 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018)
(noncustodial grandparents who filed petition to adopt their minor grandson
were granted intervenor status in dependency action, as well as in the foster
parents’ adoption action, after grandparents filed motion to intervene in the
dependency case; this Court found that “the Grandparents were ‘legally
interested parties’ entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard regarding
the [foster parents’] petition to adopt the Child.”; this Court further found that
the grandparents had “established their interest in adopting the Child,
including their submission of a home study attached to their own verified
petition to adopt the Child.”); B.B. v. Department of Children and Families,
854 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (paternal grandmother of minor twins
granted custody of the twins and the minor children lived with the
grandmother for three months; the parental rights of the twins’ parents were
18
terminated, and court ordered that a cousin of the twins be considered as
suitable to adopt the twins, and if she could not, then DCF was to give the
grandmother the chance to adopt the minor children; thereafter, the cousin
was unable to adopt the twins. DCF did not take action to allow the
grandmother to obtain custody of the twins, so appellant filed a motion to
intervene in the dependency proceeding, which was denied as premature by
the trial court. The grandmother then filed an adoption petition, which was
also denied by the trial court, stating it lacked jurisdiction, DCF had identified
another adoptive home for the twins; and DCF had not consented to
appellant’s adoption of the twins. The appellate court held that “[t]he
dependency court never loses jurisdiction after a TPR trial, and continues to
retain exclusive jurisdiction throughout the adoption process…”; the court
further stated that a circuit court has “ ‘inherent and continuing jurisdiction to
entertain matters pertaining to child custody and to enter any order
appropriate to a child's welfare.’ ” Thus, the court held that at the hearings
on both the motion to intervene and petition for adoption, the trial court had
jurisdiction to allow appellant to “participate in a meaningful way in
proceedings involving the ultimate placement of her grandchildren.” The
appellate court reversed and remanded the case, instructing the court that
the grandmother be allowed to adopt if certain safety conditions were met.);
19
Hausmann ex rel. Doe v. L.M., 806 So. 2d 511 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)
(grandparents would be allowed to intervene in adoption proceedings of their
daughter's minor child, where the grandparents filed their own adoption
petition before that of the prospective adoptive parents, the grandparents
had custody of the child for a period of time (less than six months), and the
grandparents challenged whether consents given by the child's parents were
invalid because of abandonment).
In opposition, DCF cites to J.L. v. G.M., 687 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 4th DCA
1997). In J.L., the maternal grandmother and maternal aunt and uncle were
not allowed to intervene in the dependency proceeding. Id. at 977. The case
does not provide facts on whether the maternal grandmother and maternal
aunt and uncle had filed a petition for adoption. The appellate court found
that granting party status to those relatives was “contrary to Florida's strong
public policy against unwarranted interference with the parenting decisions
of an intact family unit.” Id. at 978. Thus, it appears the child in that case was
not living with the relatives who had moved to intervene, the relatives were
not the custodians of the minor child, and the minor child’s parents’ parental
rights had not yet been terminated. Id. These are critical facts distinguishable
from facts in the case now before this Court.
20
DCF also cites In Interest of J.S., 404 So. 2d 1144 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981),
for the proposition that Chapter 39 does not provide the authority to allow a
grandparent to enter an ongoing dependency action solely in their capacity
as a grandparent. Id. at 1146. In that case, the grandparent was not the
custodian of the minor child. In addition, the child’s mother in that case still
had her parental rights; there had been no TPR. Id. Thus, we find In Interest
of J.S. to be inapplicable here.
It is true that the initial placement of D.W. with the petitioner was initially
over the objection of DCF and GALP. However, for four years, DCF did
nothing and left D.W. in the petitioner’s home with the step-grandfather.
Thus, the bonds between D.W. and his grandparents grew stronger over the
four years, over half D.W.’s life, as the petitioner points out. The GALP
currently supports the petitioner adopting D.W. and agrees with her that
DCF’s consent was unreasonable withheld.
The petitioner contends the child’s best interest is of foremost concern
in adoption proceedings. She further argues the trial court’s best interest
determination will be hindered if she is not meaningfully heard on the matter.
The petitioner’s point is well-taken as she will not have the ability to
adequately advocate her position on whether DCF unreasonably withheld its
consent if she is not a party in the dependency proceeding and cannot
21
conduct discovery to gather information to support her case. Being a
participant alone does not give her that ability. There is a need here for
intervention because the petitioner argues the AARC lacks transparency and
due process.
In construing sections 39.812(5) and 63.082(7), courts must avoid
construing a statute in a manner that would achieve an unreasonable result.
See In Interest of J.A., 561 So. 2d 356, 358 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (construing
Chapter 39 to “ ‘avoid any construction that would produce an unreasonable
… consequence.’ ”); Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984) (“[A] literal
interpretation of the language of a statute need not be given when to do so
would lead to an unreasonable or ridiculous conclusion.”). Here, to accept
DCF and the GALP’s argument on appeal would lead to an unreasonable
result because it would mean that the petitioner is not able to present
evidence to the trial court to support her motion that the court find that DCF
unreasonably withheld its request for her to adopt D.W. Without the ability to
depose GALP employees, the petitioner would not have the evidence she
needs to support her arguments.
As D.W.’s custodial caregiver for over the last four years, as the child’s
maternal grandmother, and as the petitioner in the adoption petition, the
petitioner has shown that she has a direct and immediate interest and will
22
either gain or lose by the dependency court orders. Thus, the trial court
abused its discretion in not granting the petitioner’s amended motion to
intervene. We reverse the order denying the petitioner’s amended motion to
intervene and remand to the trial court with instructions to grant the
petitioner’s motion to intervene, giving the petitioner party status in the
dependency proceeding for the purposes previously articulated herein.
Reversed and remanded with instructions.
23