SG 2901, LLC v. COMPLIMENTI, INC.

Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed June 30, 2021.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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No. 3D19-2131
Lower Tribunal No. 15-24515
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SG 2901, LLC.,
Appellant,
vs.
Complimenti, Inc.,
Appellee.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Mavel Ruiz,
Judge.
Arnaldo Vélez, P.A., and Arnaldo Velez, for appellant.
Billbrough & Marks, P.A., and Geoffrey B. Marks, for appellee.
Before EMAS, C.J., and LINDSEY, and BOKOR, JJ.
LINDSEY, J.
Appellant SG 2901, LLC appeals from a final judgment, entered after
a bench trial, ordering payment to Appellee Complimenti, Inc. for services
rendered in connection with renovations of a condominium unit. SG argues
that Complimenti acted as an unlicensed contractor, and therefore, the trial
court erred in enforcing the parties’ contract. Because the trial court’s
findings are supported by competent substantial evidence, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In September 2013, SG purchased a two-story condominium unit on
Brickell Avenue. Simeon Garcia is SG’s sole manager. It is undisputed that
Garcia hired Nuria Anor, Complimenti’s principal, to decorate the apartment.
Initially, Garcia’s plans were modest; he wanted to polish the floors and have
the unit ready for occupancy soon. Over time, however, Garcia’s plans
became more extensive and included significant renovations. According to
Anor’s testimony below, she told Garcia that for the type of work he wanted,
he would need licensed professionals. In response, Garcia told Anor to find
the necessary people because he traveled a lot.
As instructed, Anor gathered several licensed professionals to meet
with Garcia, including a licensed general contractor, a licensed architect, and
a licensed A/C contractor. Though Garcia disputed that such a meeting took
place, every other person at the meeting testified that it occurred. As set
forth in the order on appeal: “All testified that as a result of the meeting, they
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were hired by the Defendant, and were left with the impression, if not the
direct instruction, to deal with Plaintiff on all matters moving forward-
specifically with respect to payment. The Court finds that this meeting
occurred.” Anor also described other meetings she and Garcia had at the
unit with licensed professionals, and she testified that Garcia always had the
last word. Further, Garcia admitted that Anor would regularly send him
emails asking for authorization with respect to everything on the project.
After the renovations were complete, Garcia refused to pay Anor in full
because he was not satisfied with the quality of the work. 1 Complimenti, in
turn, sued SG for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, foreclosure of
construction lien, foreclosure of equitable lien, and promissory estoppel. SG
asserted as an affirmative defense that Complimenti was not a licensed
contractor and therefore barred by statute from enforcing the parties’
contract. SG also asserted a counterclaim to disgorge the payments Garcia
had already made, in addition to counterclaims for unjust enrichment and
breach of contract.
1
It is undisputed that Garcia paid Anor but withheld the full amount. When
asked about this by the trial judge, Garcia stated “I’ve never argued that, nor
have I ever argued with [Anor] that I’m not going to pay her. I just wanted the
finishing to be of the quality that she had promised me.”
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Following a three-day bench trial, the court entered final judgment in
favor of Complimenti. In its detailed, nine-page order, the trial court found
that the record evidence “conclusively establishes” that Garcia hired Antonio
Luvara, a licensed general contractor, and that “Complimenti was acting as
the owner representative, facilitating the project while the owner was out of
the country.” Accordingly, Complimenti was awarded a judgment in the
amount $181,377.38. SG timely appealed.
II. ANALYSIS
“We review a judgment rendered after a bench trial to ensure that the
trial court’s findings of fact are supported by competent, substantial
evidence.” Haas Automation, Inc. v. Fox, 243 So. 3d 1017, 1023 (Fla. 3d
DCA 2018) (citing Underwater Eng’g Servs., Inc. v. Util. Bd. of City of Key
West, 194 So. 3d 437, 444 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016); Emaminejad v. Ocwen Loan
Servicing, LLC, 156 So. 3d 534, 535 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015)). Pure legal
conclusions are reviewed de novo. Id.On appeal, SG raises two grounds for reversal. First, SG argues that
because Complimenti is not licensed as a contractor, it cannot enforce its
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contract with SG. SG also argues that Complimenti is not entitled to a lien.
For the reasons that follow, we reject these arguments.2
SG relies on section 489.128(1), Florida Statutes (2020), which makes
contracts entered into by unlicensed contractors unenforceable:
(1) As a matter of public policy, contracts entered
into on or after October 1, 1990, by an unlicensed
contractor shall be unenforceable in law or in equity
by the unlicensed contractor.
SG maintains that Complimenti acted as a contractor, as defined in
section 489.105(3), Florida Statutes (2020), which provides in pertinent part
as follows:
(3) “Contractor” means the person who is
qualified for, and is only responsible for, the project
contracted for and means, except as exempted in
this part, the person who, for compensation,
undertakes to, submits a bid to, or does himself or
herself or by others construct, repair, alter, remodel,
add to, demolish, subtract from, or improve any
building or structure, including related improvements
to real estate, for others or for resale to others; and
whose job scope is substantially similar to the job
scope described in one of the paragraphs of this
subsection.
The trial court relied on Full Circle Dairy, LLC v. McKinney, 467 F.
Supp. 2d 1343, 1346 (M.D. Fla. 2006), which sets forth a two-pronged
2
SG also argues that the trial court should have awarded judgment in its
favor on its counterclaims. We reject this argument without further
discussion.
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analysis of the definition above. “First, the individual must ‘construct, repair,
alter, remodel, add to, demolish, subtract from or improve’ a structure . . . .”
Id. Second, “the individual who engages in such an undertaking must have
a job scope that is ‘substantially similar’ to a job scope described in
subsections (a) through (q) of § 489.105(3), which includes ‘general
contractor’, ‘roofing contractor’ and ‘specialty contractor’.” Id.
The trial court found that the “record evidence presented in this matter
conclusively establishes that the licensed General Contractor, Antonio
Luvara, hired by the Defendant, was the ‘person qualified for, and solely
responsible for, the project contracted for’ and that any individual who[]
performed any service in connection with the project was hired and approved
by the Defendant directly.” The court further found that “the record evidence
establishes, by the greater weight of the evidence, that Complimenti’s job
scope was specifically limited to providing design/decorating services and
acting as the point of contact in a representative or agency capacity on
Defendant’s behalf. Any hiring and/or contracting of work done at the
property - licensed or not - was done and approved directly by SG himself
and or the licensed General Contractor, Mr. Antonio Luvara.”
We agree with Complimenti that these findings are supported by
competent substantial evidence, and therefore, the trial court did not err in
concluding that Complimenti was not a “contractor” as defined in section
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489.105(3). Consequently, section 489.128(1), which prohibits an
unlicensed contractor from enforcing a contract, is not applicable.
SG also argues that the trial court erred in concluding that Complimenti
was entitled to a lien. We disagree. The trial court relied on section
713.03(1), which provides that “[a]ny person who performs services as . . .
interior designer . . . has a lien on the real property improved for any money
that is owing to him or her for his or her services used in connection with
improving the real property or for his or her services in supervising any
portion of the work of improving the real property, rendered in accordance
with his or her contract and with the direct contract.”
Here, the trial court found, based on the testimony below, that
Complimenti’s services were those of an interior designer. 3 Because the
court’s findings are supported by competent substantial evidence, we also
affirm as to Complimenti’s entitlement to a lien.
III. CONCLUSION
The lower court’s thorough final judgment, which contains factual
findings based on credibility determinations derived from live witness
3
The court also determined that the services were provided for residential
application, and therefore, no license was necessary. See § 481.229(6)(a)
(exempting from licensure “[a] person who performs interior design services
or interior decorator services for any residential application”).
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testimony, is supported by competent substantial evidence. We therefore
affirm in all respects.
Affirmed.
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