State of Florida v. Mildred Ann Adams

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA
STATE OF FLORIDA, NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
Appellant, DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
v. CASE NO. 1D14-2880
MILDRED ANN ADAMS,
Appellee.
___________________________/
Opinion filed June 8, 2015.
An appeal from the Circuit Court for Walton County.
Kelvin C. Wells, Judge.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Kristen Bonjour, Assistant Attorney General,
Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defender,
Tallahassee, for Appellee.
THOMAS, J.
The State appeals the trial court’s order granting Appellee’s motion for
judgment notwithstanding the jury verdict and reducing Appellee’s conviction for
burglary of an occupied structure to the lesser-included offense of trespass of an
occupied structure. We reverse the trial court’s order granting Appellee’s motion
for judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict.
Background
Appellee was charged with burglary of an occupied dwelling and petit theft.
The evidence presented at trial reflected that Appellee was a neighbor and friend of
the homeowners and their son, but their relationship had changed. All three
members of the household testified that Appellee was not permitted in their home
alone, had visited only four or five times in the two years before the incident, and
did not have permission to come into their home to take or borrow any of their
medication.
The homeowner’s son, who resided in the home with his parents, testified
that on the day of the incident, after returning home alone from a birthday party
and while in the bathroom, he heard a knock at the door. He did not respond, but
heard Appellee enter the home and call out his mother’s name. While still in the
bathroom, he heard footsteps toward the back of the house and Appellee calling
out his mother’s name again. He came out of the bathroom and found Appellee in
the kitchen, fumbling through a bowl where they kept medication, including his
father’s Lortab prescription. When he asked Appellee what she was doing, she
dropped everything in her hands and began to stutter, and said that she was looking
for the Tylenol that his mother had given her a few days earlier.
The homeowner’s son asked Appellee to leave and noticed that she had a
clenched fist as if she was holding something, and then put her fist in her pocket.
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After his parents returned home, it was discovered that his father’s Lortab
prescription bottle was empty. The son testified that the last time he had seen the
bottle, there were pills in it.
His mother testified that Appellee had not borrowed medicine from her since
the relationship went “sour,” but when Appellee previously borrowed medicine,
she would call and it would be brought out to her on the front porch or at the front
gate. She further testified that she managed her husband’s prescription medication
and thought there were ten Lortab pills left in her husband’s prescription bottle, but
acknowledged that the last time that she counted his pills was two months prior to
the incident. She denied that any other people had been in the house in the two-
month period, and she did not think her husband or son had taken the pills. Her
husband confirmed that his wife managed his prescription medication, as he could
not read or write, and gave them to him for pain, as needed. He further testified
that Appellee had never borrowed or asked him for permission to come to their
house to take medication before this incident.
The investigating officer testified that he questioned Appellee. Appellee
admitted going to the residence to borrow Tylenol. She knocked on the door, but
no one answered and the door was unlocked. She admitted to entering the
residence, going into the kitchen where they normally kept the medicine and
rummaging through it to find Tylenol, but the homeowner’s son came out of the
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bathroom and told her to leave. She told the officer that she apologized and left the
residence. The officer did not find any pills on her person, but did not search her
residence.
After the State rested its case, Appellee’s counsel moved for a judgment of
acquittal (JOA), arguing that there were no Lortab pills found on Appellee, and the
State had not rebutted her reasonable hypothesis of innocence that other people had
the opportunity to take the Lortab pills in the two-month period. The trial court
took the motion under advisement. Appellee did not put forth any evidence, and
the jury returned its verdict.
The jury found Appellee guilty as charged of burglary of an occupied
dwelling with specific findings that there was a person in the structure and the
structure was a dwelling, but the jury found Appellee not guilty of petit theft. At a
subsequent hearing, however, the trial court announced that it was revisiting its
prior ruling on Appellee’s motion for JOA notwithstanding the verdict, and finding
that the evidence was insufficient for a conviction of burglary. Accordingly, the
trial court reduced the conviction to the lesser-included offense of trespass of a
structure while occupied. The State objected, asserting that there was sufficient
evidence admitted to prove burglary of a dwelling while occupied.
Analysis
The appropriate standard of review on a motion for JOA is de novo. Pagan
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v. State, 830 So. 2d 792, 803 (Fla. 2002). A judgment of conviction comes to an
appellate court clothed “with the presumption of correctness and a defendant's
claim of insufficiency of the evidence cannot prevail where there is substantial
competent evidence to support the verdict and judgment.” Terry v. State, 668
So. 2d 954, 964 (Fla. 1996). This court’s review is limited to whether the evidence
the State presented in their case-in-chief was legally sufficient. Robinson v. State,
936 So. 2d 1164, 1166 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). An appellate court may not reweigh
the evidence or assess the credibility of a witness. See Tibbs v. State, 397 So. 2d
1120, 1125 (Fla. 1981).
We reject Appellee’s contention that the circumstantial evidence standard
applies to this case. “If the State presents both direct and circumstantial evidence,
courts do not apply the special standard of review applicable to circumstantial
evidence cases.” Mosley v. State, 46 So. 3d 510, 526 (Fla. 2009) (citing Pagan v.
State, 830 So. 2d 792, 803 (Fla. 2002)). “As this court has recognized, ‘Direct
evidence is that to which the witness testifies of his own knowledge as to the facts
at issue. Circumstantial evidence is proof of certain facts and circumstances from
which the trier of fact may infer that the ultimate facts in dispute existed or did not
exist.’” Id. at 526, n.14 (quoting Baugh v. State, 961 So. 2d 198, 203 n.5 (Fla.
2007)). Here, there was direct evidence presented that Appellee entered the home,
including testimony from the homeowner’s son and Appellee’s own admission to
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the officer that she entered the home to take Tylenol. Accordingly, the special
standard is not applicable to this case.
To prove the crime of burglary, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that Appellee entered the home and, at the time of entering, had the intent to
commit theft in that structure. § 810.02, Fla. Stat. (2012). The State provided
sufficient evidence as to the first element of burglary, including the testimony of
the homeowner’s son that he heard Appellee come into the house after knocking on
the door, yelling his mother’s name, and he found her in their kitchen rummaging
through a bowl where his parents kept medicine. Additionally, Appellee admitted
to the officer that she entered the home. Moreover, although the trial court did not
explain the basis for changing its ruling at the subsequent hearing, the trial court
had to have concluded that the State presented sufficient evidence as to this
element, as the lesser-included offense of trespass also required the State to prove
that Appellee entered the home. As such, the issue on appeal is whether the State
provided competent, substantial evidence as to the second element.
“Whether one had intent is generally a question given to a jury, for
reasonable men may differ in determining intent when taking into consideration the
surrounding circumstances.” State v. Herron, 70 So. 3d 705, 706 (Fla. 4th DCA
2011) (citing Washington v. State, 737 So. 2d 1208, 1216 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)).
“Therefore, if a rational trier of fact could find the existence of the elements of the
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crime beyond a reasonable doubt, a conviction should be sustained.” Id. (citing
Pagan, 830 So. 2d at 803).
In this case, the State presented sufficient evidence on which a rational trier
of fact could find the existence of an intent to take the Tylenol without the
homeowners’ permission, and the trial court should have sustained the conviction
for burglary. The State provided evidence that Appellee admitted to the
investigating officer that she entered the home to take Tylenol and also told the
homeowner’s son that she was in the home looking for Tylenol. The State also
introduced evidence that Appellee did not ever have permission to enter their home
alone or take their medication. The State further presented evidence that when
Appellee had borrowed medication in the past, it was handed to her outside, but
that Appellee had not borrowed headache medicine in the two years prior to the
incident. This was sufficient evidence to present to the jury and upon which a
rational trier of fact could find the existence of every element of burglary beyond a
reasonable doubt.
In fact, even were we to apply the circumstantial evidence rule to this case,
we would reverse. See Sustakoski v. State, 992 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008)
(holding that evidence was sufficient to contradict defendant’s hypothesis of
innocence that he lacked intent as principal to burglary). Accordingly, we reverse
with directions to reinstate the jury’s verdict.
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REVERSED and REMANDED with directions.
MARSTILLER and BILBREY, JJ., CONCUR.
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