Curran F. Lane v. State

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FIFTH DISTRICT
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
CURRAN FRITZ LANE,
Appellant,
v. Case No. 5D16-3679
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
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Opinion filed August 4, 2017
Appeal from the Circuit Court
for Marion County,
Anthony M. Tatti, Judge.
Henry G. Gyden, of Gyden Law Group,
Tampa, and Warren Hope Dawson, of
Dawson & Associates, Tampa, for
Appellant.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General,
Tallahassee, and Allison L. Morris,
Assistant Attorney General, Daytona
Beach, for Appellee.
ORFINGER, J.
Curran Fritz Lane timely appeals the denial of his motion to withdraw plea, arguing
that his plea was involuntary because he was unaware of a valid defense to the alleged
violation of probation. We conclude Lane is entitled to an evidentiary hearing and reverse.
After Lane was originally placed on sexual offender probation with electronic
monitoring, an affidavit of violation of probation was filed, alleging that he violated his
probation when his electronic monitor failed to record his location for twenty-six minutes.
Lane admitted the violation at his arraignment. He explained that he was only outside the
range of the GPS because when he came home from work, he found that continuous rain
from Tropical Storm Colin caused his pool and backyard to overflow with water,
threatening to enter the home through the back doors. Lane claimed that he placed the
GPS unit on the counter to keep it dry while he went outside to prevent the home from
flooding. Despite this explanation, the trial court revoked Lane’s probation and sentenced
him to eighty-six months in state prison. Lane timely filed a motion to withdraw his plea
pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.170(l), claiming, among others, that his
plea was involuntary as his counsel had not explained to him that he had an available
defense because his violation had to be willful and substantial. The trial court denied the
motion without an evidentiary hearing.
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.170(l) applies to motions to withdraw a plea
made after sentencing and provides:
A defendant who pleads guilty or nolo contendere without expressly
reserving the right to appeal a legally dispositive issue may file a
motion to withdraw the plea within thirty days after rendition of the
sentence, but only upon the grounds specified in Florida Rule of
Appellate Procedure 9.140(b)(2)(A)(ii)(a)–(e) except as provided by
law.
Lane’s claim, that his plea was involuntary, is a recognized ground under rule
9.140(b)(2)(A)(ii).
Once a sentence has been imposed, a defendant must demonstrate manifest
injustice or prejudice in order to withdraw a guilty plea. “This is a more stringent standard
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than a motion to withdraw a plea filed before sentencing; the burden falls on the defendant
to prove that withdrawal is necessary to correct the manifest injustice.” Powell v. State,
929 So. 2d 54, 55 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006). A defendant who files a facially sufficient motion
to withdraw a plea is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the issue unless the record
conclusively refutes the allegations. Puentes v. State, 58 So. 3d 912, 921 (Fla. 3d DCA
2011); Woodly v. State, 937 So. 2d 193, 196 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006); Snodgrass v. State,
837 So. 2d 507, 508 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). If the trial court does not hold an evidentiary
hearing, the allegations of the defendant's motion must be taken as true, except to the
extent that they are conclusively rebutted by the record. Snodgrass, 837 So. 2d at 508.
Here, Lane stated a colorable claim for relief under Florida law, which requires that
pleas be voluntarily and knowingly entered. The trial court erred in denying Lane’s motion
without holding an evidentiary hearing because nothing in the record conclusively shows
that Lane was not entitled to relief on this claim. See e.g., Panchu v. State, 1 So. 3d
1243, 1245-46 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (holding that defendant was entitled to evidentiary
hearing where she stated colorable claim in rule 3.170(l) motion that her plea was not
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently entered when she alleged that she received no
advice or inadequate advice as to available defenses to her charges); Daniel v. State,
865 So. 2d 661, 661 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (reversing denial of rule 3.170(l) motion to
withdraw plea that alleged counsel misadvised him regarding sentencing, and remanding
for evidentiary hearing because record failed to show that defendant was not entitled to
relief).
We find no merit in Lane’s remaining claims of error. We affirm, in part, and
reverse, in part, the trial court’s order denying Lane’s rule 3.170(l) motion to withdraw his
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plea. On remand, the trial court must hold an evidentiary hearing on Lane’s claim of
failure to advise of an available defense.
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; and REMANDED.
WALLIS and EDWARDS, JJ., concur.
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