Stephens v. Whittaker

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FIFTH DISTRICT
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
JUDITH K. STEPHENS,
Appellant,
v. Case No. 5D16-1631
MICHAEL L. WHITTAKER,
Appellee.
________________________________/
Opinion filed April 28, 2017
Appeal from the Circuit Court
for Seminole County,
Melanie Chase, Judge.
Lora S. Scott, of The Law Office of
Lora S. Scott, LLC, Orlando, for Appellant.
Sandra K. Ambrose, of Sandra K. Ambrose,
P.A., Lake Mary, for Appellee.
PER CURIAM.
Judith K. Stephens (“Former Wife”) appeals the final judgment dissolving her
marriage to Michael L. Whittaker (“Former Husband”) following a bench trial. Former Wife
raises four errors on appeal. First, Former Wife asserts that the trial court erred in failing
to make specific findings of fact relating to the equitable distribution of the marital home.
Second, she asserts that the trial court erred in its distribution of the marital credit card
debt. Third, she argues that the court improperly denied her claim for alimony without
making the requisite findings of fact pursuant to section 61.08, Florida Statutes (2015).
Finally, Former Wife claims that the court erred in denying her request for an award of
attorney’s fees without making specific factual findings under section 61.16, Florida
Statutes (2015), regarding the parties’ respective need and ability to pay. We affirm.
Pursuant to section 61.075(3), Florida Statutes (2015), a trial court is required to
identify the marital assets and marital liabilities, including the valuation of significant
assets, the designation of which spouse shall be entitled to each asset, and which spouse
shall be responsible for each liability. We review the court’s valuation and distribution of
marital assets for an abuse of discretion. Coleman v. Bland, 187 So. 3d 298, 299 (Fla.
5th DCA 2016) (quoting Bardowell v. Bardowell, 975 So. 2d 628, 629 (Fla. 4th DCA
2008)).
In this case, the trial court identified the parties’ home as a marital asset and found
that Former Husband’s expert valued the home shortly before trial at $274,000.
Moreover, from our review of the record, the court used this value when it found that the
parties’ equity in the home was $154,000. The court thereafter distributed one-half of this
equity ($77,000) to each party, subject to Former Husband’s entitlement to receive certain
credits against Former Wife’s interest in the home for his payment of her portion of the
property taxes, insurance, homeowner’s association fees, repairs, maintenance costs,
and other fees associated with the home. While we agree that it would have been
preferable for the court to have explicitly found in the final judgment that the value of the
marital home was $274,000, we find no abuse of discretion in the court’s distribution of
the marital home and the determination of credits.
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As to the distribution of the credit card debt, Former Wife makes the vague and
conclusory assertion that the trial court erred in ruling that each party is to be responsible
“for their own credit cards,” but she fails to make any argument to support her assertion.
Although the various credit cards were in the parties’ respective individual names, neither
party disputes the court’s classification of the credit card debt as a marital debt. We note
that the trial court did err in failing to place a value on this marital liability in its final
judgment, thereby failing to demonstrate that its distribution of the marital property was,
in fact, equitable. See Serbousek v. Lucas, 191 So. 3d 539, 541-42 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016)
(remanding for valuation of marital credit card debt to facilitate appellate review as to
whether marital assets and liabilities were distributed equally). However, because Former
Wife did not raise this error in her initial brief, we find that she has abandoned the issue.
See Davis v. State, 153 So. 3d 399, 400 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (“An appellant who presents
no argument as to why a trial court’s ruling is incorrect on an issue has abandoned the
issue . . . .” (quoting Prince v. State, 40 So. 3d 11, 13 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010))). Because
the vague and conclusory assertion raised by Former Wife regarding the court’s
distribution of the credit card liability is legally insufficient, we affirm on this issue without
further discussion.
Finally, on Former Wife’s argument that the trial court erred in failing to award to
her alimony and attorney’s fees and not making statutorily mandated factual findings, the
court instead found that the parties agreed that, due to their respective incomes and
financial circumstances, there was “no need and no ability for ongoing alimony
payments,” and they further agreed that neither party was entitled to an award of
attorney’s fees from the other. Based upon our review of the record and Former Wife’s
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initial brief, we conclude that Former Wife has failed to establish error in either of these
findings and has otherwise waived, abandoned, or failed to preserve for review her claims
for retroactive or permanent alimony and attorney’s fees.
AFFIRMED.
PALMER, ORFINGER, and LAMBERT, JJ., concur.
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