Marlon L. Sapp v. State

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FIFTH DISTRICT
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
MARLON L. SAPP,
Appellant,
v. Case No. 5D17-2487
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
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Opinion filed February 9, 2018
Appeal from the Circuit Court
for Brevard County,
John M. Harris, Judge.
Marlon L. Sapp, Orlando, pro se.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General,
Tallahassee, and Douglas T. Squire,
Assistant Attorney General, Daytona
Beach, for Appellee.
PER CURIAM.
Marlon Sapp appeals an order prohibiting any future pro se filings in the circuit
court. We affirm the imposition of the order but reverse and remand for a corrected order
limited to filings related to Sapp’s current incarceration and related judgment, conviction,
and sentence.
Sapp is serving a twenty-five-year prison sentence. Since his incarceration, he has
filed at least thirty-six pro se cases against various defendants. 1 The trial court issued an
1 The trial court classified Sapp’s claims in the thirty-six cases as “vague baseless
civil rights claims against numerous judges, law enforcement officers, police departments,
order to show cause as to why Sapp should not be prohibited from filing any further pro
se pleadings in the thirty-six pending cases and in any future cases seeking affirmative
relief, without representation by a Florida Bar certified attorney. Sapp responded that it
was not his intent to waste the court’s finite resources, he believed he had legitimate
bases for his claims, and his claims were not frivolous.
The trial court proceeded to issue an “Order Barring Plaintiff from Filing Pro Se
Pleadings and Actions Seeking Affirmative Relief in the Above Cases and Future Cases”
referencing the same thirty-six cases as the order to show cause. The court found that
Sapp’s response to the order to show cause lacked merit, his filings constituted an abuse
of procedure, and his claims were all “baseless as a matter of law.” The order also
prohibited Sapp from filing pro se pleadings in “any of his other cases which have ever
been pending” and in “any future cases in which [Sapp] seeks affirmative relief as a
plaintiff.”
A trial court’s order prohibiting further pro se filings from a litigant is reviewed for
abuse of discretion. Brinson v. State, 215 So. 3d 1260, 1261 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017). “When
a pro se litigant files frivolous law suits or pleadings in a lawsuit, the court has the authority
to restrain such a litigant from abusing the legal system and prevent him from abusing,
annoying, or harassing those against whom such suits or pleadings have been filed.”
Balch v. HSBC Bank, USA, N.A., 128 So. 3d 179, 181 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013); see also
Jackson v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 790 So. 2d 398, 402 (Fla. 2001) (“[T]he constitutional right
of access to courts does not ‘guarantee inmates the wherewithal to transform themselves
the Office of the State Attorney, etc.” and noted that Sapp alleged the “exact same
allegations” in most of the lawsuits.
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into litigating engines.’” (quoting Jackson v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 790 So. 2d 381, 387 (Fla.
2000))).
Sapp relies on Brinson to argue that the circuit court’s order was overbroad
because it prohibits future pro se filings unrelated to his current pending cases. 215 So.
3d 1260. In Brinson, the defendant filed eight postconviction collateral attacks to his
judgment, conviction, and sentence. Id. at 1261. This Court held that it was within the trial
court’s discretion to prohibit future pro se filings related to the defendant’s conviction and
sentence, whether related to his criminal case “or in any other case.” Id. However, this
Court also held that the trial court abused its discretion in issuing a blanket order
prohibiting the defendant “from filing any pro se pleadings, motions, or petitions in any
case in the Seventh Judicial Circuit, St. Johns County, even if completely unrelated to”
the defendant’s judgment, conviction, or sentence. Id. We concluded that the order
prohibiting further pro se filings was overbroad, particularly because the order to show
cause only provided that the ban would apply to the defendant’s challenges to his
conviction and sentence, and it did not provide that it would apply in cases unrelated to
his criminal conviction. Id.While we recognize that the prohibition against further pro se filings is a drastic
step, the prohibition is warranted in Sapp’s case. Sapp has filed over thirty-six civil actions
against a host of defendants. The Florida Supreme Court has held that it is sometimes
appropriate to “sanction petitioners who abuse the legal process by requiring them to be
represented by counsel in future actions.” Lussy v. Fourth Dist. Court of Appeal, 828 So.
2d 1026, 1027 (Fla. 2002). This Court has also deemed it appropriate to prohibit future
pro se appeals and impose restraints on pro se litigants “when one person, by his
activities, upsets the normal procedure of the court so as to interfere with the causes of
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other litigants.” Platel v. Maguire, Voorhis & Wells, P.A., 436 So. 2d 303, 304 (Fla. 5th
DCA 1983). Requiring representation by counsel in future cases does not equate to the
complete denial of access to courts. Id. Additionally, such a restraint is within the
judiciary’s “inherent power to prevent abuse of court procedure.” Id.Because Sapp has filed numerous frivolous cases in the lower court, the trial court
properly exercised its “inherent power to prevent abuse of court procedure” by prohibiting
further pro se filings in the circuit court. See id. However, in accordance with Brinson, we
reverse and remand for correction of the order to limit the prohibition to cases and causes
of action relating to Sapp’s current incarceration and associated judgment, conviction,
and sentence.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; REMANDED.
COHEN, C.J., BERGER and WALLIS, JJ., concur.
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