Mejias Gonzalez v. Marin Baez

Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed July 11, 2018.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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No. 3D17-2167
Lower Tribunal No. 17-17359
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Yuniel Mejias Gonzalez,
Appellant,
vs.
Claudia Marin Baez,
Appellee.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, William
Altfield, Judge.
Yuniel Mejias Gonzalez, in proper person.
Claudia Marin Baez, in proper person.
Before ROTHENBERG, C.J., and LOGUE and LUCK, JJ.
LOGUE, J.
The appellant, Yuniel Mejias Gonzalez, seeks review of the permanent
domestic violence injunction entered against him by the trial court. We affirm.
Under Florida law, “[a] trial court is afforded broad discretion in granting,
denying, dissolving or modifying injunctions, and unless a clear abuse of
discretion is demonstrated, an appellate court must not disturb the trial court’s
decision.” Carricarte v. Carricarte, 961 So. 2d 1019, 1020 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007)
(quoting Jackson v. Echols, 937 So. 2d 1247, 1249 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006)). The
abuse of discretion standard applies to instances in which the trial court’s ruling on
a request for a permanent injunction rests upon questions of fact. Carricarte, 961
So. 2d at 1020. “This is particularly true where the order relies on live testimony
or other evidence that the trial court is singularly well-suited to evaluate.” Id.(citation omitted).
At the hearing in this case, the appellee testified to the incidents set forth in
her petition for injunction. The appellee’s aunt, who was present when the
incidents occurred, testified and corroborated the appellee’s testimony. The trial
court also heard testimony from the appellant. The trial court expressly found the
appellee and her aunt to be credible and found the appellant not credible. The trial
court was well-suited to evaluate the testimony and, contrary to appellant’s
argument on appeal, nothing in the record demonstrates an abuse of discretion.
The appellant also argues that the appellee testified as to incidents that were
not listed in her petition for permanent injunction and relies upon Sanchez v.
Marin, 138 So. 3d 1165 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) and De Leon v. Collazo, 178 So. 3d
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906 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) as bases for reversal. However, in both Sanchez and De
Leon, the party against whom the injunction was sought objected to the testimony
relating to incidents that were not set forth in the petition. Here, appellant failed to
object to the allegedly improper testimony, and his counsel extensively cross-
examined the appellee as to her testimony. See Faddis v. Luddy, 221 So. 3d 758,
759-60 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (concluding that by not objecting below, the appellant
failed to preserve his argument that the trial court denied him due process by
considering testimony regarding prior incidents not alleged in the petition).
Sanchez and De Leon are therefore distinguishable and inapplicable.
Affirmed.
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