State v. Baron C. Rogers

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FIFTH DISTRICT
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellant,
v. Case No. 5D17-3117
BARON CANARD ROGERS,
Appellee.
________________________________/
Opinion filed June 29, 2018
Appeal from the Circuit Court
for Brevard County,
Nancy Maloney, Judge.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General,
Tallahassee, and Kaylee D. Tatman,
Assistant Attorney General, Daytona
Beach, for Appellant.
James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and
Darnelle Paige Lawshe, Assistant Public
Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
PALMER, J.
The State of Florida appeals the downward departure sentences imposed on
Baron Canard Rogers (the defendant). We reverse.
The State charged the defendant with dealing in stolen property and giving false
verification of ownership when conducting a transaction with a pawnbroker. He pled guilty
to the charges. The trial court initially sentenced the defendant to two terms of seven
years of imprisonment; however, during a subsequent hearing, the trial court re-
sentenced the defendant, imposing downward departure sentences.
The State contends that the trial court reversibly erred in imposing downward
departure sentences, asserting that the reasons for imposing the sentences are either not
legally valid or not supported by substantial competent evidence. We agree.
A downward departure sentence will be affirmed on appeal if the reason given by
the trial court for departing is permissible and supported by substantial competent
evidence. State v. Centeno, 192 So. 3d 705, 706 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016)(citing State v. Burt,
183 So. 3d 1117, 1118 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015)).
Here, the trial court announced its reasons for departure as follows:
All right, for the reasons that were just articulated I'm going to
downward depart, and that is the undiagnosed mental illness
that your mother testified to that you had had since you were
a child. The fact that it was a non—violent felony involving
property, that there was no injury or opportunity for injury to
other persons.
....
Okay. I'm going to find that it was -- the isolated incident that
the Defendant has expressed remorse here in the courtroom
in that all he did was hurt his family by his stupidity. I'm going
to find that there's no redeeming value in sending you to
prison and the cost to our society is too great.
....
[T]he other point, that the need for the payment of restitution
to the victim outweighs a need for a prison sentence.
None of these reasons justify the imposition of the downward departure sentences.
As for the trial court's statutory reasons for departure, the trial court erred in
concluding that departure sentences were warranted based on the fact that the
defendant's crimes were isolated incidents for which he showed remorse. Section
921.0026(2)(j) of the Florida Statutes (2017) authorizes the imposition of a departure
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sentence when the "offense was committed in an unsophisticated manner and was an
isolated incident for which the defendant has shown remorse." Importantly, all three
elements must be articulated by the trial court to justify departure on this ground. State v.
Milici, 219 So. 3d 117, 121–22 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017); State v. Lindsay, 163 So. 3d 721,
724 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015). Here, the trial court failed to articulate that the defendant
committed his crimes in an unsophisticated manner; therefore, this reason for departure
is invalid.
Next, the trial court erred in imposing the downward departure sentences based
on the fact that the need for the payment of restitution to the victim outweighed the need
for a prison sentence. See § 921.0026(2)(e), Fla. Stat. (2017). In order to satisfy the terms
of the statute, "the defendant must present some evidence of the victim's need." State v.
Wheeler, 180 So. 3d 1117, 1119 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015). In this case, the defendant failed
to present any evidence regarding the loss sustained by the victim; therefore, this ground
for departure is not supported by the evidence.
The trial court's finding that departure was warranted based on the defendant's
undiagnosed mental illness is also invalid. Section 921.0026(2)(d) of the Florida Statutes
(2017) authorizes the imposition of a departure sentence when a defendant "requires
specialized treatment for a mental disorder that is unrelated to substance abuse or
addiction or for a physical disability, and the defendant is amenable to treatment." Here,
the defendant did not present evidence on any of these elements. See Lee v. State, 223
So. 3d 342, 359 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017).
Furthermore, the trial court's non-statutory reasons also fail to support departure.
When the court bases a departure on a non-statutory factor,
the factor must be permissible and supported by competent,
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substantial evidence. State v. Bowman, 123 So. 3d 107, 109
(Fla. 1st DCA 2013). To be permissible, the non-statutory
mitigator must be consistent with legislative sentencing
policies. Id. “The mitigating factors specifically listed by the
legislature focus on the nature of the crime, the conduct of the
defendant or the mental capacity, condition, or attitude of the
defendant. Further, the first purpose of sentencing is to
punish, not rehabilitate. Finally, the legislative sentencing
policy is to ensure that violent criminals are incarcerated.”
State v. Chestnut, 718 So. 2d 312, 313 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998).
Lee, 223 So. 3d at 359–60.
The trial court concluded that departure was permissible because, during the
commission of the defendant's crimes, there was no injury or opportunity for injury to other
persons. This conclusion does not support the imposition of the downward departure
sentences because personal injury was already taken into account during sentencing by
virtue of the computations performed in preparing the defendant's Criminal Punishment
Code worksheet. See State v. Chapman, 805 So. 2d 906, 908 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (citing
to section 921.0024, Florida Statutes, which provides that victim injury is a consideration
when calculating scoresheets).
The trial court further erred in departing downward based on the fact that the
defendant's crimes were non-violent felonies involving property. The defendant argued
below that this departure reason was proper based on the language of section 921.185
of the Florida Statutes (2017). That statute reads:
921.185. Sentence; restitution a mitigation in certain
crimes
In the imposition of a sentence for any felony or misdemeanor
involving property, but not injury or opportunity for injury to
persons, the court, in its discretion, shall consider any degree
of restitution a mitigation of the severity of an otherwise
appropriate sentence.
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Section 921.185 does not justify the downward departure sentences in this case because
the trial court did not impose a sentence which used restitution to mitigate the severity of
the defendant's "otherwise appropriate sentence." Instead, the court merely entered an
order directing the defendant to pay $463.77 in restitution. Cf. Noel v. State, 127 So. 3d
769, 770 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013), rev. on other grounds, 191 So. 3d 370 (Fla. 2016)
(upholding sentencing judge's decision to mitigate the length of a guidelines sentence
provided the defendant made payment of restitution to the victims).
Lastly, the trial court erred in concluding that departure was warranted because
there was no redeeming value in sending the defendant to prison. We held this reason to
be invalid in State v. Thompkins:
We are left with the last non-statutory ground—that there is
no redeeming value to sending Thompkins to prison. This too
is an invalid ground. “In evaluating a non-statutory mitigator,
a court must determine whether the asserted reason for a
downward departure is consistent with legislative sentencing
policies.” State v. Knox, 990 So. 2d 665, 669 (Fla. 5th DCA
2008) (citations omitted); see also Chestnut. The stated policy
of the Criminal Punishment Code is to punish miscreants for
their crimes. § 921.002(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2011) (“The primary
purpose of sentencing is to punish the offender.”); Moore v.
State, 882 So. 2d 977, 985 (Fla. 2004) (“The Legislature
expressed that the primary purpose of sentencing is to be
punishment.” (citation omitted)); State v. McKnight, 35 So. 3d
995, 997 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010); Chestnut, 718 So. 2d at 313
(“Further, the first purpose of sentencing is to punish, not
rehabilitate.”). Whether there is any redeeming value to the
criminal in sending him to prison is largely of secondary
concern. See § 921.002(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2011); State v. Hall,
47 So. 3d 361, 364 n. 5 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (“Rehabilitation is
a secondary goal, and it is a stated policy that a defendant's
sentence should increase with the length and nature of the
defendant's prior record.” (citing § 921.002(1)(b), (d)));
Chestnut, 718 So. 2d at 314 (“It is obvious that prison will
always be detrimental to one's future even if it is essential to
his appropriate punishment. But the consequence of no prison
for violent criminals seems a far worse societal problem.”).
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113 So. 3d 95,100 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013).
Because the trial court failed to set forth valid reasons for departure, the
defendant's departure sentences are reversed and this matter is remanded for re-
sentencing. On remand, the trial court may still impose downward departure sentences
provided that they are supported by valid reasons. Otherwise, the trial court must impose
sentences that comport with applicable statutes. See State v. Lindsay, 163 So. 3d 721,
725 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015).
REVERSED and REMANDED.
EVANDER and EISNAUGLE, JJ., concur.
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