Warren Lee Edwards v. State of Florida

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA
WARREN LEE EDWARDS, NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
Appellant, DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
v. CASE NO. 1D14-4995
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
_____________________________/
Opinion filed May 3, 2016.
An appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.
Brad Stetson, Judge.
Warren Lee Edwards, pro se, Appellant.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Angela R. Hensel, Assistant Attorney
General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
BILBREY, J.
Warren Lee Edwards appeals the final order of the circuit court imposing
sanctions upon him for filing multiple frivolous postconviction motions. See State
v. Spencer, 751 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 1999). As set forth below, we affirm and also
address Appellant’s numerous frivolous appeals.
We review a circuit court’s order prohibiting additional pro se filings by a
prisoner “for an abuse of discretion.” Ashe v. State, 106 So. 3d 956, 957 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2013). As stated in Golden v. Buss, 60 So. 3d 461 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011):
It is well-settled that courts have the inherent authority and duty to
limit abuses of the judicial process by pro se litigants. See In re
McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 184, 109 S. Ct. 993, 103 L. Ed. 2d 158
(1989) (preventing petitioner, who had filed 99 extraordinary writs,
from proceeding in forma pauperis when seeking future such writs,
because “part of the Court's responsibility is to see that [limited]
resources are allocated in a way that promotes the interests of
justice”); Peterson v. State, 817 So. 2d 838, 840 (Fla. 2002) (limiting
petitioner's ability to file in pursuance of court's “responsibility to
ensure every citizen's right of access to the courts”); Jackson v. Fla.
Dep't of Corrections, 790 So. 2d 398, 400 (Fla. 2001) (holding that
supreme court “has the inherent authority to limit [the] right [to
represent oneself] when pro se litigation becomes so disruptive that it
threatens to deny other litigants their rights”).
Golden, 60 So. 3d at 462.
The trial court’s inherent authority to limit abuses of process must be
exercised in light of the constitutional rights of citizens to access the courts, and in
particular a prisoner’s right to challenge the lawfulness of his or her detention
under a criminal sentence. The Third District Court of Appeal has explained:
We recognize that incarcerated persons must be provided with a full
panoply of procedural vehicles with which to challenge the lawfulness
of their incarceration. State v. Spencer, 751 So. 2d 47, 48 (Fla. 1999).
On the other hand, successive motions which have been heard,
considered, rejected and then raised again, are an abuse of process.
Conception v. State, 944 So. 2d 1069, 1072 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000).
Jefferson v. State, 159 So. 3d 939, 940 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015).
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Accordingly, a trial court’s exercise of its duty to limit abuses of court
processes in order to preserve the access to courts for all litigants must be
undertaken in consideration of the constitutional rights of the pro se litigant in each
case. Due process requires notice of the intended sanction to the pro se litigant and
an opportunity to show cause why the sanction should not be imposed. Spencer;
McGuire v. State, 979 So. 2d 262 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007).
In this case, the circuit court’s order dismissing Appellant’s most recent
postconviction motion included the directive to show cause why sanctions should
not be imposed. The circuit court specified that the judgment and sentence became
final upon affirmance by this Court, in 2001. The circuit court then referred to the
two-year limitation period for filing motions under rule 3.850, and the three
exceptions to that time limit. The circuit court made a specific finding that
Appellant’s motion did not qualify for the exception Appellant relied on, when
“facts on which the claim is predicated were unknown to the movant or the
movant’s attorney and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due
diligence.” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(b)(1). The circuit court found that Appellant
had not alleged at what date he discovered the possibility that he would be subject
to Community Control even if he were released after serving 85% of his sentence.
In addition, the circuit court found that even if such discovery had been within two
years of his sentence becoming final, “conditional release is ‘an application of
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long-standing statutory law,’ it is not a fact and it is not newly discovered. Dwyer
v. State, 981 So. 2d 606, 609 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).” Accordingly, the motion at
issue before the circuit court did not qualify for the exception to the two-year time
bar under rule 3.850. The circuit court’s order referred to a previous order
dismissing a previous postconviction motion in the same case, in which Appellant
was warned that further motions could result in sanctions. The circuit court then
copied its order to the Department of Corrections for administrative sanctions
against Appellant, and directed Appellant to show cause to the circuit court why
his ability to file additional pro se motions in the criminal case should not be
curtailed.
Appellant responded to the circuit court’s order, and the circuit court
considered this response prior to entering the order now on appeal. The circuit
court noted its review of Appellant’s postconviction filings and found that
Appellant’s postconviction remedies had been exhausted. Relying on Lambrix v.
State, 124 So. 3d 890, 902 (Fla. 2013); Ferris v. State, 100 So. 3d 142, 144 (Fla.
1st DCA 2012) (Wetherell, J., concurring); Cassaday v. State, 683 So. 2d 1194
(Fla. 5th DCA 1996); and Isley v. State, 652 So. 2d 409, 410 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995),
the circuit court prohibited Appellant from filing any additional pro se motions,
pleadings, or petitions relating to his conviction and sentence.
Appellant then appealed to this Court the circuit court order prohibiting pro
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se filing in the circuit court. Upon this Court’s own motion, Appellant was ordered
to show cause why his filing of twenty-four previous appeals and petitions should
not subject him to sanctions by this Court.1 None of Appellant’s previous
invocations of this Court’s jurisdiction resulted in any relief in his favor, yet even
subsequent to this appeal, Appellant has filed an additional five appeals in this
Court.2 Appellant’s response to this Court’s order to show cause fails to provide
any ground upon which his multitude of pro se appeals should not be deemed an
abuse of processes and waste of the limited resources of this Court and the State.
Accordingly, the order on appeal was within the circuit court’s sound
1
Edwards v. State, 781 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001); Edwards v. State, 790
So. 2d 408 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001); Edwards v. State, 812 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 1st DCA
2002); Edwards v. State, 819 So. 2d 754 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002); Edwards v. State,
Case No. 1D02-3224; Edwards v. State, Case No. 1D02-3243; Edwards v. State,
858 So. 2d 1055 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003); Edwards v. State, 886 So. 2d 229 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2004); Edwards v. State, 903 So. 2d 939 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005); Edwards v.
State, Case No. 1D05-4629; Edwards v. State, 971 So. 2d 119 (Fla. 1st DCA
2007); Edwards v. State, Case No. 1D07-1693; Edwards v. State, 5 So. 3d 671
(Fla. 1st DCA 2009); Edwards v. State, 32 So. 3d 624 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010);
Edwards v. State, 34 So. 3d 4 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010); Edwards v. State, Case No.
1D09-5660; Edwards v. State, Case No. 1D09-5661; Edwards v. State, Case No.
1D11-1769; Edwards v. State, Case No. 1D13-2211; Edwards v. Crews, 124 So.
3d 422 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013); Edwards v. State, 127 So. 3d 505 (Fla. 1st DCA
2013); Edwards v. State, 128 So. 3d 134 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013); Edwards v. State,
139 So. 3d 981 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014); Edwards v. State, Case No. 1D14-2246.
2
Edwards v. Dep’t of Corr., 178 So. 3d 486 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015); Edwards v.
State, Case No. 1D15-3799; Edwards v. State, Case No. 1D15-5009; Edwards v.
Dep’t of Corr., __So. 3d__, 2016 WL 899852 (Fla. 1st DCA March 9, 2016);
Edwards v. State, Case No. 1D16-0318.
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discretion and is AFFIRMED. In addition, Appellant is prohibited from filing any
future appeals or petitions in this Court relating to Case Numbers 1997 CF 007651
and 1999 CF 008883, 4th Judicial Circuit in and for Duval County, unless the
documents are signed by an attorney in good standing with the Florida Bar. White
v. State, 104 So. 3d 1127 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012). The Clerk of this Court is directed
to reject any additional pro se filings by Appellant relating to Case Numbers 1997
CF 007651 and 1999 CF 008883, 4th Judicial Circuit in and for Duval County.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
RAY and JAY, JJ., CONCUR.
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