State of Florida v. John Kelly Meachum

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA
STATE OF FLORIDA, NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
Appellant, DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
v. CASE NO. 1D15-3444
JOHN KELLY MEACHUM,
Appellee.
_____________________________/
Opinion filed July 13, 2016.
An appeal from the Circuit Court for Bay County.
Elijah Smiley, Judge.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Julian E. Markham, Assistant Attorney
General, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Laurel Cornell Niles, Assistant Public
Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
ROWE, J.
The State appeals an order granting John Kelly Meachum’s motion to
suppress evidence obtained during a vehicle search.1 Because we agree that the court
erred in granting the motion, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
1
We have jurisdiction. Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(c)(1)(B).
Facts
On August 3, 2014, three officers of the Panama City Police Department were
on patrol in an area known to have a high rate of narcotics, prostitution, and other
criminal activity. Around 2:40 a.m., the officers, who were in a single police cruiser,
observed a vehicle parked in a parking space of a motel, with the engine running and
one occupant inside. The patrol car, driven by Corporal Nichol, pulled up and parked
perpendicular to the vehicle, but several parking spaces away. Officer Kevin
Doheny and Sergeant Richard Blaich exited the patrol car, and Sergeant Blaich went
to the rear of the vehicle to obtain tag information, while Officer Doheny approached
the driver’s side to speak to the occupant, John Kelly Meachum. Upon request by
Officer Doheny, Meachum provided his driver’s license, which Officer Doheny
handed to Corporal Nichol. While Corporal Nichol was at the patrol car conducting
an electronic warrant search, Officer Doheny asked Meachum what he was doing at
the motel. Meachum initially stated that he was staying in room 150, but after he
was asked if he had a room key, Meachum stated he was picking up a friend from
that room. Sergeant Blaich went to room 150 to verify whether the occupants knew
Meachum.
From that point, the parties dispute whether and when Meachum’s license was
returned, and whether Meachum consented to a search of the vehicle. Officer
Doheny testified that after the warrant search, which he estimated took about two
2
minutes, he immediately returned Meachum’s license. Officer Doheny testified that
after returning the license, he requested Meachum’s consent to search the vehicle,
and Meachum consented, exiting the vehicle without being instructed to do so.
Meachum, on the other hand, testified that he was directed out of the vehicle while
Officer Doheny still had his license, and was brought to the back of the vehicle
during the search, to which he was not asked to consent. As a result of the search,
the officers located a crack pipe containing a rock of crack cocaine. Meachum was
then arrested and charged with possession of cocaine and paraphernalia.
In its order granting the motion to suppress, the court stated that the encounter
between Meachum and the officers was not consensual, but rather constituted an
illegal detention. The court based this conclusion exclusively on the following facts:
that the patrol car was occupied by three officers, that one officer went to the rear of
the vehicle to obtain tag information while another approached and requested
Meachum’s driver’s license to conduct a warrant search, and that one of the officers
went to the hotel room to conduct further investigation. Having concluded that the
encounter was an illegal detention, the court declined to further analyze the
circumstances of the search. On appeal, the State argues the trial court erred when
it concluded the encounter between the officers and Meachum was not consensual.
We agree.
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Analysis
When reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, we defer to the trial court’s
findings of facts which are supported by competent, substantial evidence, and review
de novo the application of the law to those facts. Dellhall v. State, 95 So. 3d 134,
150 (Fla. 2012).
While any seizure of a person must be supported, at a minimum, by a
reasonable, articulable suspicion of past, present, or impending criminal activity, not
all contact between citizens and law enforcement constitutes a seizure for Fourth
Amendment purposes. 2 See, e.g., United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 549
(1980). To the contrary, where the contact with law enforcement does not involve
the use of physical force or a show of authority to which the defendant succumbs,
the interaction is considered a consensual encounter. Caldwell v. State, 41 So. 3d
188, 195 (Fla. 2010) (“A seizure under the Fourth Amendment will only occur when
the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way
restrained the liberty of a citizen.”). Consensual encounters do not require any
suspicion of criminal activity, and “police officers do not violate the prohibition on
unreasonable searches and seizures simply by approaching individuals on the street
2
“There are essentially three levels of police-citizen encounters:” 1) consensual
encounters, during which an individual is free to terminate the interaction; 2)
temporary detention, which requires reasonable suspicion of criminal activity; and
3) arrest, which must be supported by probable cause. Popple v. State, 626 So. 2d
185, 186 (Fla. 1993).
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and asking them to answer a few questions.” Id. at 196; see also Brown v. State, 577
So. 2d 708 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) (noting that an officer needs no founded suspicion
to approach a parked vehicle and talk to its occupants).
Distinguishing between a consensual encounter and a seizure is a fact-
intensive inquiry that is not dependent on any one factor; rather, courts apply a
totality of the circumstances analysis from the perspective of a reasonable
person. Caldwell, 41 So. 3d at 199-200. Although the presence of multiple officers
may be a factor in the analysis, courts have repeatedly held that the mere presence
of multiple officers is not inherently coercive, absent other circumstances suggesting
a defendant is not free to leave. See State v. Baldwin, 686 So. 2d 682, 685 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1996) (holding that two officers’ initial contact with Baldwin was consensual
where “the record [was] devoid of any suggestion of the officers’ use of threatening,
coercive, or intimidating language or demeanor”); State v. Triana, 979 So. 2d 1039,
1044 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (“The fact that four officers were present during the
encounter with Mr. Triana does not necessarily indicate coercion.”); see also United
States v. Thomas, 430 F.3d 274, 280 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting that the presence of
multiple officers is not in itself coercive absent other threatening
circumstances); United States v. Durades, 929 F.2d 1160, 1166 (7th Cir. 1991)
(holding that the presence of several officers was not per se coercive).
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Here, the trial court made no findings that the officers blocked Meachum’s
egress from the parking lot, used their lights or sirens, drew their weapons, ordered
Meachum to hand over his license or exit the vehicle, or otherwise engaged in
conduct that would communicate to a reasonable person that he was not free to
depart. Apart from the presence of multiple officers, the trial court’s ruling rested
solely on the fact that one officer conducted a warrant search of Meachum’s license
and another conducted “further investigation of others.” However, these actions by
the officers did nothing to foreclose Meachum from terminating the
encounter. See Tedder v. State, 18 So. 3d 1052, 1055 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (“In the
absence of any signs of coercion, the officer’s retention of Tedder’s driver’s license
while asking additional questions . . . did not in itself transform the consensual
encounter into a detention.”); see also Golphin v. State, 945 So. 2d 1174, 1193 (Fla.
2006) (holding that an officer’s questioning and retention of an individual’s driver’s
license during a warrant search does not transform an otherwise consensual
encounter into an unlawful seizure). Accordingly, we find that the court’s limited
findings were “insufficient to raise an inference of submission to police
authority.” Triana, 979 So. 2d at 1044.
Because we conclude the trial court’s ruling was in error, we reverse the order
granting the motion to suppress, and remand for the trial court to resolve the factual
disputes as to the circumstances surrounding the search of the vehicle. See State v.
6
Moore, 791 So. 2d 1246, 1250 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (remanding for “additional
factual findings and a redetermination, in light of those factual findings, of the legal
issues raised in the motion to suppress”).
REVERSED and REMANDED.
WETHERELL and OSTERHAUS, JJ., CONCUR.
7