Pierre v. Jonassaint

Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed March 15, 2017.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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No. 3D15-948
Lower Tribunal No. 12-32231
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Winnie Pierre,
Appellant,
vs.
Abson Jonassaint,
Appellee.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Rosa C. Figarola
and Antonio Marin, Judges.
Jarbath Pena Law Group and Fritznie Jarbath, for appellant.
Christian Dunham, for appellee.
Before ROTHENBERG, SALTER and EMAS, JJ.
EMAS, J.
Appellant, Winnie Pierre, appeals a final judgment of dissolution of
marriage which, inter alia, dissolves her marriage from Abson Jonassaint, orders
child support, distributes marital property, and denies her requests for alimony and
attorney’s fees. Pierre also appeals the subsequent order denying her motion for
rehearing of the final judgment. We affirm in part and reverse in part, as further
explained herein.
Pierre raises several issues on appeal. First, she asserts that the trial court
erred in failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the allegations of fraud raised
by Pierre in her motion for rehearing. We find this argument without merit.
Although a court may grant relief from a final judgment based upon fraud, the law
in Florida provides that an evidentiary hearing is not required unless the allegations
of fraud are pleaded with sufficient specificity to raise a colorable claim of
entitlement to relief. Flemenbaum v. Flemenbaum, 636 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 4th DCA
1994). See also Rusniaczek v. Tableau Fine Art Grp., Inc., 139 So. 3d 355, 357
(Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (holding that “[i]n order to warrant an evidentiary hearing, a
rule 1.540(b)(3) motion must specify the essential facts of the purported fraud and
not merely assert legal conclusions.”) We find no abuse of discretion in the trial
court’s summary denial of Pierre’s motion for rehearing, as Pierre failed to plead
her allegations of fraud with sufficient specificity; Pierre’s motion merely asserted
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in conclusory fashion that Jonassaint misrepresented or misstated his income and
assets.
Pierre also asserts on appeal that the trial court erred in distributing marital
assets and liabilities without including the value of those items in the final
judgment, as is required by section 61.075, Florida Statutes (2015). On this point,
we agree with Pierre. Section 61.075(3) clearly provides:
In any contested dissolution action wherein a stipulation and
agreement has not been entered and filed, any distribution of marital
assets or marital liabilities shall be supported by factual findings in the
judgment or order based on competent substantial evidence with
reference to the factors enumerated in subsection (1). The
distribution of all marital assets and marital liabilities, whether equal
or unequal, shall include specific written findings of fact as to the
following:
(a) Clear identification of nonmarital assets and ownership interests;
(b) Identification of marital assets, including the individual valuation
of significant assets, and designation of which spouse shall be
entitled to each asset;
(c) Identification of the marital liabilities and designation of which
spouse shall be responsible for each liability;
(d) Any other findings necessary to advise the parties or the reviewing
court of the trial court's rationale for the distribution of marital assets
and allocation of liabilities.
The final judgment in this case provides only the following:
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t) Equitable Distribution. The parties have no jointly-owned real
property so there is none to divide. The parties partitioned their
personal property upon separation on July 18, 2011. Each party shall
retain the personal property currently in his/her possession.
i.) Retirement – During the marriage, the Husband
contributed marital income to his retirement plan
through his employment with Miami-Dade County
Public Schools. The Husband’s retirement plan shall be
subject to equitable distribution for the period from
April 1, 2001 when the parties married through July 18,
2011 when the parties informally separated their
property and began to lead independent lives.
ii.) Compensation for Lawsuit(s) – The Wife testified that
she received a settlement in a discrimination lawsuit
during the marriage. The Wife claimed not to
remember the exact amount of the settlement except
that “it was less than $1000.00”. The Wife shall
provide documented proof to the Husband of the total
amount that she received during the marriage as
proceeds from any and all lawsuits. The Wife shall pay
to the Husband one-half said proceeds. If the Wife fails
to produce documented proof, the Husband shall receive
a credit of $500.00 which shall be deducted from his
share of the total liabilities owed by the parties.
iii.) Liabilities – The parties acquired certain marital
liabilities which are subject to equitable distribution and
are listed in their respective financial affidavits. When
the parties separated on July 18, 2011, they had
accumulated $27,496.44 in marital debt which shall be
apportioned to each on an equal basis with each party
paying $13,748.22. However, any all debts
accumulated after July 18, 2011 shall be the sole
responsibility of the party who incurred the debt.
There is no question that this was a contested dissolution action. Thus, the
trial court was required to include specific written findings of fact in the final
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judgment “in order to facilitate effective appellate review of the trial court’s
property distribution scheme.” Patino v. Patino, 122 So. 3d 961, 963 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2013). The court’s reference to the parties’ respective financial affidavits is
inadequate to permit meaningful review, particularly because the total amount of
liabilities listed in the final judgment do not appear to correspond with either
party’s financial affidavit. In addition, the liabilities listed in those financial
affidavits are in several respects irreconcilable. Further, as to the distribution of
the parties’ assets, the final judgment specifies only two: the former husband’s
pension plan and lawsuit proceeds earned by the wife. Neither of these assets is
“clearly identified,” or valued as required by section 61.075(3). Thus, it is not
possible for this court to determine whether the trial court properly and equitably
distributed the parties’ assets and liabilities.
We reverse and remand for the trial court to amend the final judgment in a
manner that complies with section 61.075(3). See Patino, 122 So. 3d at 963(holding that a “failure to make sufficient findings regarding value of property and
identification of marital assets and debts constitutes reversible error and requires
remand for appropriate findings to be made.” (quoting Whelan v. Whelan, 736 So.
2d 732, 733 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999))).
As to the other points raised by Pierre on appeal, we find no abuse of
discretion by the trial court and affirm without further discussion.
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Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions.
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