City of Miami v. Nationstar Mortgage

Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed September 30, 2015.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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No. 3D15-1253
Lower Tribunal No. 12-47638
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City of Miami,
Petitioner,
vs.
Nationstar Mortgage LLC, etc.,
Respondent.
A Case of Original Jurisdiction – Prohibition.
Victoria Mendez, City Attorney, Kerri L. McNulty and Daniel S. Goldberg,
Assistant City Attorneys, for petitioner.
Albertelli Law and Matthew L. Schulis, for respondent.
Before WELLS, EMAS and FERNANDEZ, JJ.
EMAS, J.
Petitioner, City of Miami (“the City”), seeks the issuance of a writ
prohibiting the trial court from continuing to exercise jurisdiction over an
injunction motion, filed by Respondent Nationstar Mortgage, LLC (“Nationstar”).
Nationstar sought to enjoin the City from enforcing a demolition order. For the
reasons that follow, we deny the petition for writ of prohibition.
The relevant facts are not in dispute:
Nationstar was the holder of a note and mortgage on residential property
located in the City of Miami. In December 2012, Nationstar filed an action1 to
foreclose the mortgage and served the borrower and property owner, Mariecarmen
G. Alcazar.
In October 2014, during the pendency of the foreclosure action2, the City
posted a Notice of Violation regarding the structure located on the subject
property. The Notice declared that the City had determined the structure was
unsafe, was in need of repair, and was subject to demolition if repairs were not
timely made. The structure was not brought into compliance as required by the
Notice of Violation and, in December 2014, a notice of hearing was published,
scheduling a hearing to be held by the City’s Unsafe Structures Panel on January
28, 2015. The notice of hearing was sent to Nationstar, in which Nationstar was
1 For the sake of simplicity, all references are to Nationstar. However, the action
was initially filed by Metlife Home Loans; Nationstar subsequently became the
holder of the note and was substituted as the party-plaintiff.
2 The foreclosure action remains pending below.
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listed as an “interested party.” The hearing was held as scheduled, and a
Nationstar representative attended the hearing. An information sheet, explaining
the procedures (consistent with the Code provisions) to be followed at the hearing,3
was provided to, and signed by, the Nationstar representative.
3 This information sheet advised the Nationstar representative, in pertinent
part:
The Unsafe Structures Panel hearings are being conducted in
accordance to Chapter 10, Article VI of the City of Miami code. The
purpose of these hearings is to give the appellant the opportunity to
contest the decision of the Building Official or his designee, which
resulted in the structures being declared unsafe. . . . .
The Panel will hear testimony from the Building official or his
designee, the owner and other parties interested and their respective
witnesses.
...
The Panel after all of the evidence has been presented may order the
securing, repair and or demolition of the structure(s) upon application
of the standards set forth in the City Code. The Panel may affirm,
modify or rescind the decisions of the Building Official as recited in
the Notice of Violation.
Any person aggrieved by a decision of the Unsafe Structure Panel
may seek judicial review in accordance with the Florida Rules of
Appellant (sic) Procedure. The Order must be appealed within 30
days from the date issued.
(Emphasis added.)
3
Following the hearing, the Unsafe Structures Panel issued a final order of
demolition (“the Demolition Order”), directing the structure be demolished if
repairs to bring the structure into compliance were not made within 180 days. The
Demolition Order was entered against Mariecarmen Alcazar, the property holder of
record. A copy of the Demolition Order was sent to Alcazar, and to Nationstar as
an interested party.4 The City advised Nationstar that once it (Nationstar) acquired
title to the property it would have the right to seek an extension of the Demolition
Order’s 180-day time period to permit Nationstar to bring the structure into
compliance and avoid demolition.
Nationstar did not appeal the Demolition Order. Instead, on May 4, 2015,
Nationstar filed, in the foreclosure action, an emergency motion for temporary
injunction, seeking to enjoin the City (a non-party to the foreclosure) from
enforcing the Demolition Order. A copy of the motion was sent to the City.
The City filed a response asserting that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to
consider the motion or to grant any relief that would impede or enjoin enforcement
of the Demolition Order, because Nationstar failed to seek its appellate remedy as
4 The Order provided in pertinent part:
The City of Miami Unsafe Structures Panel is Quasi-Judicial. The
decision and specified compliance date(s) are final and binding. Any
person aggrieved by a decision of the City of Miami Unsafe
Structures Panel may seek judicial review of that decision in
accordance with the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure.
4
expressly provided by the City of Miami Code. Nationstar responded that because
it was not the owner of the property or structure, but merely an “interested party”
to the Unsafe Structures Panel proceeding, it was not authorized to appeal the
Demolition Order nor limited to the appellate remedy expressly provided by the
City of Miami Code.
The trial court held an initial hearing on the motion, but deferred ruling and
entered an order scheduling an evidentiary hearing for a date certain, at which
hearing the court was to determine the merits of the motion for injunctive relief.
The City thereafter filed the instant petition for writ of prohibition, and we entered
a stay of further proceedings on the motion for injunctive relief, pending our
resolution of this petition.
Because the issue raised in this petition requires us to construe provisions of
the City’s Code of Ordinances, our standard of review is de novo. See Dixon v.
City of Jacksonville, 774 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000).
We begin with the pertinent provisions of the City Code:
Chapter 10 of the City Code is entitled “Buildings.” Article VI contains
three sections addressing “Unsafe Structures.” These sections establish the process
which the City must follow before a structure is deemed unsafe and subject to
repair or demolition. As one might reasonably expect, these sections provide
requirements of notice, an opportunity to be heard, an opportunity to cure any
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violations, and a right to appeal an adverse determination. We are concerned here
with the latter provisions and who falls within the scope of the provision providing
for judicial review of a demolition order.
The Information Sheet and Demolition Order each provided that “[a]ny
person aggrieved by a decision of the City of Miami Unsafe Structures Panel may
seek judicial review of that decision in accordance with the Florida Rules of
Appellate Procedure.” Significantly, however, the relevant Code provision does
not contain that same language. Instead, it provides:
Judicial Review. Any owner or authorized representative aggrieved
by a decision of the unsafe structures panel may seek judicial review
of that decision in accordance with rule 9.110(c). Accordingly, any
order, requirement, decision, denial of a request for extension of time,
or determination of the unsafe structures panel shall be reviewed by
the filing of a notice of appeal in the circuit court appellate division of
the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Miami-Dade County, Florida,
within 30 days of the rendition of the order.
Section 10-101(n), City of Miami Code of Ordinances (2015).5
Although Nationstar acknowledges that it was an “interested party,”6 it
asserts that it was not an “owner or authorized representative” and therefore was
5 Nothing in the record provides an explanation for the relatively broad language
used in the Information Sheet and Demolition Order (each advising that “[a]ny
person aggrieved by a decision” may seek judicial review) given the much
narrower language contained in the express provisions of the City of Miami Code
(providing that “[a]ny owner or authorized representative aggrieved by a decision”
may seek judicial review).
6 Section 10-101(g)(6) of the City of Miami Code provides the following
definitions for both “owner” and “interested party”:
6
not authorized to appeal the Demolition Order as provided by section 10-101(n)
above. We agree. The City of Miami Code limits the right of appeal to “[a]ny
owner or authorized representative aggrieved by a decision of the unsafe structures
panel. . . .” §10-101(n). The Code further provides that an “owner shall be the
taxpayer as reflected in the most recently certified real property ad valorem tax roll
of Miami-Dade County.” The plain and unambiguous language compels the
conclusion that Nationstar was not an owner and therefore was not authorized by
the express provisions of the City of Miami Code to appeal the Demolition Order.
As the Florida Supreme Court has consistently reaffirmed:
When the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and
conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for
resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction; the
statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning.
Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984) (quoting A.R. Douglass, Inc., v.
McRainey, 137 So. 157, 159 (1931)).
For these purposes, the owner shall be the taxpayer as reflected in the
most recently certified real property ad valorem tax roll of Miami-
Dade County; provided however, where the records of the Dade
County Property Appraiser indicate that ownership has changed, the
owner shall be the taxpayer as reflected in those records. An interested
party shall be the owner and any other person or entity who has
previously requested real property ad valorem tax notices with respect
to the subject property in accordance with F.S. § 197.344, as the same
may be renumbered or amended from time to time.
(Emphasis added.)
7
Nationstar’s status as a non-owner distinguishes this case from our decision
in Frye v. Miami-Dade County, 2 So. 3d 1063 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009), relied upon by
the City. In Frye, this Court held that a failure of a party to exhaust the judicial
remedies provided by the Unsafe Structures Panel forecloses the possibility of
subsequent relief. Nationstar, while concededly an “interested party” to the
administrative proceedings, was not an owner and was not an actual party to the
proceedings of the Unsafe Structures Panel, and was therefore not authorized to
seek judicial review under the express provisions of the City of Miami Code.
Our conclusion is underscored by identical language contained in a related
provision of the City of Miami Code. Section 10-101(m) provides a mechanism for
seeking an extension of time to comply with a demolition order after that order has
been issued by the Unsafe Structures Panel. It provides in pertinent part:
Requests for extension of time. Any owner or authorized
representative may seek an extension of the timeframes set forth in an
order of the unsafe structures panel.
(Emphasis added.)
The City utilizes the exact same language in establishing who is authorized
to appeal a demolition order and who is authorized to seek an extension of time to
comply with a demolition order. Importantly, in the instant case the City advised
Nationstar that it could seek an extension of time to comply with the Demolition
Order once it acquired title to the property—i.e., the City did not consider
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Nationstar an “owner” for purposes of seeking an extension of time under the
Code. Given that the City did not consider Nationstar an “owner” for purposes of
seeking an extension of time to comply with the Demolition Order, it is difficult to
see how the City can reasonably argue that Nationstar was an “owner” for purposes
of seeking judicial review pursuant to the City of Miami Code.7
The petition for writ of prohibition is denied.
7 An agency’s contemporaneous construction of a statutory provision that it is
charged with enforcing is entitled to great deference. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc. v.
Johnson, 708 So. 2d 594, 596 (Fla. 1998). A court should not depart from such a
construction unless it is clearly unauthorized or erroneous. P.W. Ventures, Inc. v.
Nichols, 533 So. 2d 281, 283 (Fla. 1988).
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