Adam Prins v. Robert Farley

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA
ADAM PRINS, NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
Petitioner, DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
v. CASE NO. 1D16-3435
ROBERT FARLEY,
Respondent.
___________________________/
Opinion filed January 17, 2017.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari – original jurisdiction.
John J. Joyce of Robinson, Kennon & Kendron, P.A., Lake City, for Petitioner.
Marie A. Mattox, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
B.L. THOMAS, J.
In this petition for writ of certiorari, the issue presented is whether Petitioner, an
elected city council member, suffered irreparable harm that cannot be cured on post-
judgment appeal, when the trial court denied a motion to dismiss a suit filed by
Respondent against Petitioner, based on the dismissal of Petitioner from his position as
city manager. We find that Petitioner would suffer irreparable harm from the trial
court’s ruling allowing the suit to proceed. See Crowder v. Barbati, 987 So. 2d 166,
167 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (quashing order denying motion to dismiss where absolute
privilege barred suit for defamation charge against sheriff). We therefore grant the
writ of certiorari and quash the order below, which departed from the essential
requirement of law, because the suit is barred by absolute privilege.
Petitioner campaigned for the Live Oak City Council and was elected, after
asserting that the upper levels of city management were excessively compensated.
Once elected, Petitioner criticized Respondent during a local flooding event. After
conversations with other council members, the city council discharged Respondent
from his position. Respondent then filed suit, alleging tortious interference by
Petitioner in seeking Respondent’s dismissal. Respondent alleged that Petitioner
started a rumor among the city council that Respondent would be fired, and further
asserted that Petitioner acted outside the scope of his official duty by misleading two
council members to vote to discharge Respondent.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the suit, arguing that because he acted within
the scope of his official public duties, the legal cause of action was barred by absolute
privilege. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, citing issues of fact relating to
the issue of absolute privilege, and ruling that Petitioner could raise the defense by a
motion for summary judgment.
We note first that Respondent’s complaint is, in essence, a retooled defamation
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claim. Lock v. City of W. Melbourne, Fla., 2015 WL 1880732, *27 (M.D. Fla.
April 24, 2015) (holding city council members absolutely immune from police chief’s
tortious-interference claim, because the claim was a retooled defamation action). And
absolute immunity protects public officials for statements made “in connection with an
employee’s discharge . . . if the official has responsibility for discharging the
employee.” Id. at *29 (citing Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 574-75 (1959)); see also
Hauser v. Urchisin, 231 So. 2d 6, 7-8 (Fla. 1970) (holding absolute immunity shielded
city commissioner from lawsuit for defamatory statements made to press regarding
former city prosecutor’s dismissal); Goetz v. Noble, 652 So. 2d 1203, 1205 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1995) (extending absolute immunity to bar suits against a government official
alleging tortious interference with a contract for “statements made in connection with
the performance of an official duty”). The Florida Supreme Court has previously
reasoned that officials should be absolutely immune from suit in cases such as this, as
it is “‘better to leave unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers than to subject
those who try to do their duty to the constant dread of retaliation.’” McNayr v. Kelly,
184 So. 2d 428, 431 n.12 (Fla. 1966) (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d
Cir. 1949)).
The United States Supreme Court has explained the policy underlying barring
suits against elected officials who act within the scope of their authority:
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‘In order to enable and encourage a representative of the public to
discharge his public trust with firmness and success, it is indispensably
necessary, that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he
should be protected from the resentment of every one, however powerful,
to whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion offense.’ II Works of
James Wilson (Andrews ed. 1896) 38.
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951). According to the Court, the principle
of legislators being “free from arrest or civil process for what they do or say in
legislative proceedings” is grounded in the English Parliament’s centuries-long
struggle for independence from the Crown. Id. at 372.
In order for the doctrine of absolute privilege to apply, however, the action taken
must fall within the scope of the official’s duties. Albritton v. Gandy, 531 So. 2d 381,
387 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). Although the scope of an official’s duties is liberally
construed and extends to “‘discretionary duties that are associated with a given
position,’” the action must be related to the official’s duties. See Lock, 2015 WL
1880732 at *28 (quoting Stephens v. Geoghegan, 702 So. 2d 517, 523 (2d DCA
1997)); see also Tenney, 341 U.S. at 374 (noting the doctrine of absolute immunity
should be liberally construed). In Albritton, a county commissioner had an emergency
medical technician fired for refusing to endorse him during his campaign. 531 So. 2d
at 387. This court held that the commissioner acted outside the scope of his official
duties, because only the county administrator possessed the authority to dismiss the
technician, not the county commission.
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Here, Petitioner’s comments, “‘[h]owever false or malicious,’” were protected
by absolute privilege, because the city council was authorized to dismiss Respondent as
city manager, and Petitioner’s alleged statements were made in connection with the
dismissal of Respondent. Lock, 2015 WL 1880732 at *28 (quoting Hauser, 231 So. 2d
at 8). Because “the ultimate check” on public officials is the electoral process, it is the
voters who must decide if Petitioner’s actions were justified, not a civil jury. Bogan v.
Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 52 (1998) (holding that absolute immunity also protects
local officials from suit).
Thus, we GRANT Petitioner’s petition for writ of certiorari and QUASH the
trial court’s order denying Petitioner’s motion to dismiss.
RAY and OSTERHAUS, JJ., CONCUR.
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