Earl Germany and Deborah Germany v. William Dewayne Darby and Federated Mutual etc.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA
EARL GERMANY AND NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
DEBORAH GERMANY, FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
Appellant,
CASE NO. 1D14-54
v.
WILLIAM DEWAYNE DARBY
AND FEDERATED MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY, A
FOREIGN CORPORATION
DOING BUSINESS IN
FLORIDA,
Appellee.
_____________________________/
Opinion filed February 16, 2015.
An appeal from the Circuit Court for Gadsden County.
James O. Shelfer, Judge.
Louis K. Rosenbloum, Pensacola, and Jon D. Caminez of Caminez, Walker &
Brown, Monticello, for Appellant.
John D. Russell, Robin P. Keener, Catherine M. Verona of Stoler Russell Keener
Verona, Tampa, for Appellee.
OSTERHAUS, J.
After Earl Germany was involved in a work-related automobile accident with
an uninsured motorist in a company vehicle, he and his wife Deborah Germany
challenged the coverage limits of his employer’s uninsured and underinsured
motorist insurance (“UM”) coverage. They argued that Florida law, § 627.727(1),
Florida Statutes, didn’t allow the policy to have different limits of UM coverage
among insureds—a UM coverage limit of up to $500,000 for executives and their
families, but only up to $30,000 for all other insureds, including employees like Mr.
Germany. The trial court construed the statute to allow for different coverage limits
among insureds and the Germany’s appealed. We now affirm.
I.
The facts in this case are straightforward and undisputed. Mr. Germany
suffered injuries in a job-related car accident with an uninsured motorist in 2011. At
the time of the accident, Mr. Germany was driving an automobile owned and insured
by his employer Hinson Oil Company, Inc. during the course of his employment.
Hinson Oil’s auto insurance policy had an attached endorsement providing
uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage of up to $500,000 for Hinson Oil’s
executives, owners, and their family members, and up to $30,000 for all other
insureds, including Mr. Germany. Hinson Oil expressly elected these coverage limits
on the Florida Office of Insurance Regulation’s approved form, which were lower
than the limits of its bodily injury liability insurance.
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II.
We review questions of statutory construction de novo. Raymond James Fin.
Servs., Inc. v. Phillips, 126 So. 3d 186, 190 (Fla. 2013) (citing Maggio v. Fla. Dep’t
of Labor & Emp’t Sec., 899 So. 2d 1074, 1076 (Fla. 2005)). “In answering a statutory
interpretation question, this Court must begin with the actual language used in the
statute because legislative intent is determined first and foremost from the statute’s
text.” Id. at 190 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Turning to the text of § 627.727(1), the statute says that no motor vehicle
liability insurance policy providing for bodily injury liability coverage may be issued
without uninsured motor vehicle coverage unless an insured “makes a written
rejection of the coverage on behalf of all insureds” or selects “lower limits . . . on a
form approved by the office.” Id. Where the form is signed by a named insured, the
statute “conclusively presume[s] that there was an informed, knowing . . . election
of lower limits on behalf of all insureds.” Id. By its terms, the statute expressly
permits the election of “lower limits” by a named insured on behalf of all insureds.
It does not specify that there must be a single “limit” applicable to all insureds.
Because in this case, the employer selected lower coverage limits for all insureds
and did so in writing using the required form, it satisfied the statute’s requirements.
The Germanys advocate a different construction of § 627.727(1) based
on Varro v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 854 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). In Varro,
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the Second District concluded that § 627.727(1) “does not allow rejection of UM
coverage on behalf of only some insureds.” Varro, 854 So. 2d at 729 (emphasis
added). A couple things distinguish Varro from this case. First, UM coverage wasn’t
rejected for any employees in this case. Instead, Hinson Oil provided a level of UM
coverage to everyone, including the appellant: up to $500,000 for owners,
executives, and their families, which is less than the $1 million bodily injury liability
insurance limit; and up to $30,000 for all other insureds. In other words, it elected
“lower limits on behalf of all insureds” as the statute expressly allows. § 627.727(1),
Fla. Stat. Second, in Varro, 854 So. 2d at 728, the named insured did not make a
written rejection of UM coverage on the applicable form as called for by the statute:
“The rejection or selection of lower limits shall be made on a form approved by the
office.” § 627.727(1), Fla. Stat. The problem in Varro of a named insured failing to
execute the appropriate form doesn’t apply here.
Finally, Hinson Oil’s election of lower limits for some insureds doesn’t
violate the purpose of the UM statute “‘to provide for the broad protection of the
citizens of this State against uninsured motorists.’” Travelers Commercial Ins. Co.
v. Harrington, -- So. 3d --, No. SC12-1257, 2014 WL 5365846, at *3 (Fla. Oct. 23,
2014), reh’g denied (Jan. 7, 2015) (quoting Salas v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 272
So. 2d 1, 5 (Fla. 1972)). “‘[T]here is [no] blanket prohibition against an insurance
policy containing general conditions affecting coverage or exclusions on coverage
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as long as the limitation is consistent with the purposes of the UM statute.” Flores v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 819 So. 2d 740, 745 (footnote omitted) (citing Carguillo v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 529 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 1988)). Whereas the statute here
would have permitted Hinson Oil to wholesale reject UM coverage for all of its
insureds, Hinson Oil chose instead to provide UM coverage with meaningful, albeit
different, coverage limits for all insureds. Its decision to broadly provide coverage
comports with the State’s coverage goals; and, in fact, does so much more than if it
had chosen (lawfully under the statute) to provide no UM coverage at all. Thus,
nothing on the face of § 627.727, or as a policy matter, forbids Hinson Oil’s UM
coverage elections. Cf. Travelers Commercial Ins., -- So. 3d --, No. SC12-1257,
2014 WL 5365846, at *7 (noting that both insured and insurer are entitled to what
they bargained and paid for).
III.
For these reasons, the trial court’s order granting summary judgment is
AFFIRMED.
THOMAS and ROWE, JJ., CONCUR.
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