PATRICIA DAGAN v. STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING
MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
OF FLORIDA
SECOND DISTRICT
PATRICIA DAGAN, )
)
Appellant, )
)
v. ) Case No. 2D17-4828
)
STATE OF FLORIDA, )
)
Appellee. )
________________________________ )
Opinion filed April 17, 2019.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Polk
County; James A. Yancey, Judge.
Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender,
and Kevin Briggs, Assistant Public
Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General,
Tallahassee, and Susan D. Dunlevy,
Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, and
Helene S. Parnes, Assistant Attorney
General, Tampa (substituted as counsel
of record after brief was filed), for
Appellee.
ORDER RELINQUISHING JURISDICTION
NORTHCUTT, Judge.
Patricia Dagan has appealed her convictions and sentences on three
counts. However, the State correctly points out that the record does not contain a
written, judge-signed sentencing document reflecting the time-served sentences for
counts two and three. Rather, the only written memorialization of the court's oral
imposition of those sentences is a "memo of sentence," or "snapout," which is signed
only by the courtroom clerk.
Pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.110(l), we relinquish
jurisdiction for 30 days, during which the trial court shall render a proper sentencing
document for counts two and three that complies with the dictates of Florida Rule of
Criminal Procedure 3.986(a) ("The forms as set forth below . . . shall be used by all
courts." (emphasis added)). This document shall replace the snapout form that the trial
court employed for those two counts, forms that the Tenth Circuit has persisted in using
despite a cavalcade of opinions from this court decrying this practice and pointing out
specific problems with the circuit’s widespread use of the forms. See Hendrix v. State,
224 So. 3d 823, 824 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (holding that a snapout cannot serve as a
written competency order); Gray v. State, 198 So. 3d 780, 782–83 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016)
(holding that a snapout cannot serve as a written judgment or sentence); Phillips v.
State, 198 So. 3d 789, 790 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016), Zaborowski v. State, 126 So. 3d 405,
407 n.2 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013), Thar v. State, 8 So. 3d 1204, 1205 n.1 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009),
and Cochrane v. State, 997 So. 2d 1221, 1223 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (Altenbernd, J.,
concurring) (each noting this court's longstanding discouragement of the practice of
using snapouts); Woods v. State, 987 So. 2d 669, 672 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) ("If this court
had the power to do so, it would order the Tenth Judicial Circuit to cease and desist in
the use of this type of form final order."); Akridge v. Crow, 903 So. 2d 346, 350 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2005) (holding that snapouts are inadequate to serve as orders requiring the
recipient to appear for a hearing); Sutton v. State, 838 So. 2d 616, 617 n.1 (Fla. 2d DCA
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2003) (noting the mischief that snapouts can cause and remanding for determination of
the defendant's prison credit because the snapout did not have a place to note such
credit); Heath v. State, 840 So. 2d 307, 308–09 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (noting that case
law had discouraged but stopped short of prohibiting the use of snapouts); Gordon v.
State, 827 So. 2d 346, 347 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (urging the use of proper forms in lieu of
snapouts); Braswell v. State, 804 So. 2d 523, 523 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (holding that a
snapout is insufficient to serve as an order of revocation of probation); Monroe v. State,
784 So. 2d 1163, 1164 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (reiterating this court's prior admonition
regarding the use of snapouts as orders of revocation of probation); Richardson v.
State, 761 So. 2d 1232, 1233 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (reversing the defendant's sentence
because the circuit court's use of the "infamous" snapout created an ambiguity that
could have rendered the sentence illegal); Monroe v. State, 760 So. 2d 289, 290 (Fla.
2d DCA 2000) (explaining that the record contained no revocation order where trial
court used a snapout for that purpose); Wagner v. State, 744 So. 2d 1155, 1156 (Fla.
2d DCA 1999) (reversing the use of a snapout as a written order of violation of
probation); Grantham v. State, 735 So. 2d 525, 526 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (reversing the
trial court's use of a snapout as an order of revocation of probation); Peterson v. State,
730 So. 2d 830, 831 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (cautioning the Tenth Circuit against the use of
snapouts as sentencing documents); Donley v. State, 557 So. 2d 943, 945 (Fla. 2d DCA
1990) (reversing the use of a snapout as a written order of violation of probation).
Jurisdiction relinquished for thirty days, with directions.
SILBERMAN and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.
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