Siegle v. Lee County

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING
MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
OF FLORIDA
SECOND DISTRICT
RONALD K. SIEGLE, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
v. ) Case No. 2D15-3293
)
LEE COUNTY, a political subdivision of )
the State of Florida, )
)
Respondent. )
)
Opinion filed March 2, 2016.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Circuit
Court for Lee County; John E. Duryea,
Judge.
Mark A. Ebelini of Knott Ebelini Hart, Fort
Myers, for Petitioner.
James L. Holloway, III, Assistant County
Attorney, Fort Myers, for Respondent.
VILLANTI, Chief Judge.
Ronald K. Siegle seeks second-tier certiorari review of a circuit court order
affirming a hearing examiner's order that found that the presence of shipping containers
on his commercial property violated the Lee County Land Development Code. In
reaching her decision, the hearing examiner ruled that she did not have the authority to
consider Siegle's equitable defense of laches to a code enforcement proceeding. The
circuit court affirmed, finding that the hearing examiner's authority was limited to
determining only whether a violation existed and that the hearing examiner was
prohibited from entering an order excusing a violation where one clearly existed.
Alternatively, the circuit court found that laches could never be a defense to a code
enforcement proceeding as a matter of law. Because the circuit court departed from the
essential requirements of the law in each of these rulings, we grant the petition, quash
the circuit court's order, and remand for further proceedings.
Siegle owns a piece of commercial property in Lee County, on which he
runs a business that repairs large equipment and engines. Siegle took possession of
the property in 2002, prior to which it had been used as a newspaper distribution facility.
In furtherance of his business, Siegle placed twenty-seven large shipping containers on
the property, in which he stores the parts he needs to have on hand to be able to make
timely repairs for his customers. Siegle testified that the prior owner had similar
shipping containers on the property before Siegle took possession of it.
In 2014, the County cited Siegle for violating section 34-3050 of the Lee
County Land Development Code, which prohibits "[t]he use of trucks, truck trailers, or
shipping containers for storage of merchandise, produce, or commodities for periods of
48 hours or more." Siegle raised a number of defenses to the code enforcement action,
including laches. Siegle contended that the shipping containers had been on the
property for approximately twelve years, that they were open and obvious even to a
casual passer-by on heavily traveled Highway 41, and that the County's failure to take
some action to enforce the code during those twelve years should preclude
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enforcement at this point. Additionally, Siegle presented evidence that County building
officials had been on his property on at least three occasions during those twelve years,
and he alleged that their failure to take any action to enforce the code provision at that
point should be considered as part of his laches defense.
After hearing all the evidence and considering written briefs from the
parties, the hearing examiner issued a written decision concluding that the defense of
laches was "inapplicable" to the code enforcement proceeding because a hearing
examiner "does not have equitable power or the authority to grant equitable relief" in
code enforcement proceedings. The hearing examiner cited to section 34-145 of the
Lee County Land Development Code as barring her consideration of Siegle's equitable
defenses.1 After considering the County's evidence, the hearing examiner found Siegle
in violation of the Code and imposed penalties.
Siegle appealed the hearing examiner's decision to the circuit court,
specifically challenging the ruling that the hearing examiner did not have the authority to
consider equitable defenses. After considering briefing and oral argument, the circuit
court affirmed the hearing examiner's decision, concluding that the hearing examiner did
not have authority under section 34-145 to consider a defense of laches to a code
enforcement proceeding. The circuit court further held that even if such authority
1
This section provides, in pertinent part:
(f) Equitable jurisdiction. Unless specifically provided, the
Hearing Examiner does not have the authority to render
decisions based on equitable law in any proceeding under
section 34-145(a) through (d).
§ 34-145, Lee Cty. Land Dev. Code.
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existed, the hearing officer's decision was proper because laches was not an available
defense to a code enforcement proceeding as a matter of law. Siegle challenges both
of these rulings in his petition to this court.2
On the threshold issue of whether the hearing examiner had the authority
under section 34-145 to consider Siegle's equitable defenses to the code enforcement
proceeding, we agree with Siegle that the circuit court departed from the essential
requirements of the law. The hearing examiner and the circuit court both concluded that
section 34-145(f) did not grant the hearing examiner the authority to render a decision
based on equitable law. However, that interpretation ignores the final clause of the
section. The full provision reads:
(f) Equitable jurisdiction. Unless specifically provided, the
Hearing Examiner does not have the authority to render
decisions based on equitable law in any proceeding under
section 34-145(a) through (d).
§ 34-145(f), Lee Cty. Land Dev. Code (emphasis added). The identified subsections
cover appeals from administrative actions (§ 34-145(a)), variances (§ 34-145(b)),
"special exceptions" (§ 34-145(c)), and zoning matters (§ 34-145(d)). Under their plain
language, none of these subsections deal with code enforcement proceedings.
Therefore, the hearing examiner is not precluded by this section from considering any
applicable equitable defenses in a code enforcement proceeding.
Our interpretation of the plain language of section 34-145(f) is reinforced
by the canon of statutory construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius, under which
2
Siegle raised several other defenses to this enforcement action before
the hearing examiner; however, he does not address those defenses in his petition to
this court.
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"the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another." State v. Hearns, 961 So. 2d
211, 219 (Fla. 2007); see also Young v. Progressive Se. Ins. Co., 753 So. 2d 80, 85
(Fla. 2000). Pursuant to this canon, when a statute or code provision lists the areas to
which it applies, it will be construed as excluding from its reach any areas not expressly
listed. See Thayer v. State, 335 So. 2d 815, 817 (Fla. 1976). Applying this canon here,
the exclusion of code enforcement proceedings from section 34-145(f) means that the
prohibition on consideration of equitable defenses simply does not apply to those
proceedings. The County's decision to list the specific categories of proceedings to
which equitable defenses do not apply indicates its intent to permit consideration of
equitable defenses in all proceedings other than those listed. Therefore, the circuit
court's conclusion that the hearing examiner could extend the code language limiting
equitable defenses to proceedings not specifically listed in section 34-145(f) constitutes
a departure from the essential requirements of the law. On this basis, we must grant
Siegle's petition and quash the order on review.
As an alternative basis for affirming the hearing examiner's decision, the
circuit court ruled that laches could not be a defense to a code enforcement proceeding
as a matter of law. This ruling also constituted a departure from the essential
requirements of the law because it contradicts binding precedent on this issue.
We recognize that courts in a number of states have held that laches is
not an available defense in a code enforcement action, generally on the theory that
code enforcement is a governmental function performed for the benefit of the general
public and that laches should not be permitted to infringe on the performance of that
type of function. See, e.g., Town of W. Hartford v. Rechel, 459 A.2d 1015, 1019 (Conn.
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1983) (holding specifically that "[a] zoning commission 'is not estopped by laches from
enforcing its zoning laws' " (quoting Bianco v. Darien, 254 A.2d 898, 902 (Conn.
1969))); Lyublinskiy v. Srinivasan, 887 N.Y.S.2d 119, 120 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009) ("A
municipality, it is settled, is not estopped from enforcing its zoning laws either by the
issuance of a building permit or by laches." (quoting In re Parkview Assocs. v. City of
New York, 519 N.E.2d 1372, 1374 (N.Y. 1988))); Baird v. City of Melissa, 170 S.W.3d
921, 927 (Tex. App. 2005) ("The equitable doctrines of estoppel and laches are not
available against a city when it is enforcing zoning ordinances, even if the facts might
otherwise support their application, because the city is discharging a governmental
function."); Salt Lake Cty. v. Kartchner, 552 P.2d 136, 138 (Utah 1976) ("Ordinarily a
municipality is not precluded from enforcing its zoning regulations, when its officers
have remained inactive in the face of such violations. The promulgation of zoning
ordinances constitutes a governmental function. This governmental power usually may
not be forfeited by the action of local officers in disregard of the ordinance."); Vill. of
Hobart v. Brown Cty., 678 N.W.2d 402, 410 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004) ("[A] municipality
cannot be estopped from seeking to enforce a zoning ordinance violation."). No Florida
court has followed this line of reasoning.
In contrast, other states have concluded that laches may be asserted
against zoning authorities in some cases—particularly when the municipality or zoning
body has taken some affirmative action to permit the violating condition or to allow it to
continue. For example, in City & County of San Francisco v. Pacello, 149 Cal. Rptr. 705
(Cal. Ct. App. 1978), the court held that the city could not allow one city department to
give the defendant permission to use his property in a certain manner and then turn
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around eight and a half years later and have a different city department claim that such
use was a zoning violation. Similarly, the court allowed the defense of laches to go
forward in Springtime, Inc. v. Douglas County, 187 S.E.2d 874, 877 (Ga. 1972), when
the county had notice of the defendant's intended construction plans, issued a building
permit for the work, and allowed the work to go forward for four months before instituting
a zoning violation action. See also City of Chicago v. Grendys Bldg. Corp., 281 N.E.2d
708, 711 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972) (finding that doctrines of laches and estoppel would bar
enforcement of zoning ordinance when there were affirmative acts by city officials that
induced the actions of the defendant); Bd. of Zoning Appeals v. Beta Tau Hous. Corp.,
499 N.E.2d 780, 782 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (affirming the application of the doctrine of
laches to preclude the city from enforcing a zoning ordinance against a fraternity house
when it had prior notice that the property was to be used as a fraternity house and
approved the use); Twp. of Yankee Springs v. Fox, 692 N.W.2d 728, 734 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2004) ("Laches can be applied to bar an attempt to abate a zoning ordinance
violation."). In these cases, it is generally not the governmental delay standing alone
that permits relief, but instead the affirmative action of government officials together with
the delay.
Florida law on the issue is sparse. Nevertheless, there are two cases that
are instructive on the issue, one of which was binding on the circuit court. In Monroe
County v. Carter, 41 So. 3d 954, 957 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010), the Third District recognized
laches as an available defense to a code enforcement proceeding but reversed
because the property owner had failed to prove the elements of the defense. It is clear
from the opinion that the Third District would have permitted the defense of laches to
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preclude the code enforcement proceeding had the defendant presented sufficient
evidence of when the county gained knowledge of the violating condition.
In addition, this court discussed the issue of laches as a defense to code
enforcement actions in Sarasota County v. National City Bank of Cleveland, 902 So. 2d
233, 235 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). There, this court held that the statute of limitations did
not apply in administrative code enforcement proceedings, although it would apply in
judicial code enforcement proceedings. This court then addressed laches and similar
equitable defenses in dicta, stating:
[W]e do not rule out the possibility that an administrative
enforcement proceeding could be barred by some legal
theory relating to delayed enforcement. The record in this
proceeding does not allow us to determine whether some
theory of laches, estoppel, or due process might bar an
enforcement proceeding.
Id. However, we declined to address the "difficult legal issue" of "under what
circumstances . . . a local government [may] seek administrative enforcement for code
violations of long-standing duration." Id. This language indicates that this court would
be open to accepting laches as a defense to code enforcement actions in at least some
types of circumstances.
Here, Siegle made the circuit court aware of the Third District's decision in
Carter, which was clearly premised on laches being—upon proof of appropriate facts—a
valid defense to a code enforcement proceeding. That decision was binding on the
circuit court in the absence of authority to the contrary from this court or the supreme
court. See Pardo v. State, 596 So. 2d 665, 666 (Fla. 1992) (noting that in the absence
of interdistrict conflict, district court decisions bind all Florida trial courts). No such
contrary binding authority exists, and what authority does exist, including this court's
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dicta in National City Bank, indicates agreement with Carter that laches is an available
defense in code enforcement proceedings upon proper proof. And while the circuit
court attempted to distinguish Carter in its decision, it did so only by misreading the
code provision relating to the hearing examiner's authority to consider equitable
defenses. For these reasons, the circuit court's ruling that laches could not be a valid
defense to a code enforcement proceeding constituted a departure from the essential
requirements of the law.
The final question is the scope of proceedings to be had on remand in
light of our quashal of the circuit court's decision. When considering a petition for a writ
of second-tier certiorari, this court is limited to determining whether the circuit court
departed from the essential requirements of the law. We cannot examine the record
and determine in the first instance whether Siegle presented sufficient evidence to
establish his asserted defense. See, e.g., Miami-Dade Cty. v. Omnipoint Holdings, Inc.,
863 So. 2d 195, 199 (Fla. 2003) (holding that on second-tier certiorari review, "[t]he
district court may not review the record to determine whether the underlying agency
decision is supported by competent, substantial evidence"); Broward Cty. v. G.B.V. Int'l,
Ltd., 787 So. 2d 838, 844 (Fla. 2001) (noting that when reviewing a case on second-tier
certiorari, the appellate court may only quash the order on review if it departs from the
essential requirements of the law and "has no power in exercising its jurisdiction in
certiorari to enter a judgment on the merits of the controversy . . . nor to direct the
[circuit court] to enter any particular order or judgment" (quoting Tamiami Trail Tours,
Inc. v. R.R. Comm'n, 174 So. 451, 454 (Fla. 1937))); Snyder v. Douglas, 647 So. 2d
275, 279 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (same).
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Accordingly, we hold only that a Lee County hearing examiner has the
authority to consider equitable defenses to a code enforcement proceeding and that
laches may be—upon proper proof—a defense to a code enforcement action. On
remand, the circuit court shall reconsider Siegle's appeal in light of the correct law.
Petition granted; order quashed; case remanded for reconsideration in
light of this opinion.
CASANUEVA and MORRIS, JJ., Concur.
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