Solares v. City of Miami

Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed May 27, 2015.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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No. 3D14-2237
Lower Tribunal No. 14-20667
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Graciela Solares,
Appellant,
vs.
City of Miami, etc., et al.,
Appellees.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Daryl E.
Trawick, Judge.
Carroll Law Firm, and Linda L. Carroll, for appellant.
Victoria Mendez, City Attorney, John A. Greco, Deputy City Attorney,
Warren Bittner, Deputy Emeritus, and Forrest L. Andrews, Assistant City
Attorney, for appellee City of Miami; Feigeles Avallone & Haimo LLP, and Julie
Feigeles; White & Case LLP, and Raoul G. Cantero, Evan M. Goldenberg, and
Christopher Swift-Perez, for appellee Skyrise Miami, LLC; Greenberg Traurig,
P.A., and Alan T. Dimond, Elliot H. Scherker, Brigid F. Cech Samole, and Jay A.
Yagoda, for appellee Bayside Marketplace, LLC.
Before SHEPHERD, C.J., and SUAREZ and LOGUE, JJ.
LOGUE, J.
Graciela Solares filed a lawsuit challenging the City of Miami’s extension of
a lease with Bayside Marketplace, LLC, and allowance of a sublease of a portion
of the property to SkyRise Miami, LLC, for development of a tower. Although the
trial court ruled against Solares on the merits, it also indicated that it doubted
Solares had standing. The City’s voters subsequently approved the extension and
sublease in a referendum. In her appeal to this court, Solares candidly and
commendably conceded she brought her claims in her capacity as a citizen and
taxpayer, but that she had no special injury, different from the injury to other
citizens or taxpayers, and that her claim was not based on the violation of a
provision of the Constitution that governs the taxing and spending powers.
For a court of law operating as one of the three branches of government
under the doctrine of the separation of powers, standing is a threshold issue which
must be resolved before reaching the merits of a case. Before a court can consider
whether an action is illegal, the court must be presented with a justiciable case or
controversy between parties who have standing. Ferreiro v. Philadelphia Indem.
Ins. Co., 928 So. 2d 374, 376 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (“The issue of standing is a
threshold inquiry which must be made at the outset of the case before addressing
[the merits].”).
In a line of cases that Solares did not address in her briefs, the Florida
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that citizens and taxpayers lack standing to
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challenge a governmental action unless they demonstrate either a special injury,
different from the injuries to other citizens and taxpayers, or unless the claim is
based on the violation of a provision of the Constitution that governs the taxing
and spending powers. Sch. Bd. of Volusia Cnty. v. Clayton, 691 So. 2d 1066, 1068
(Fla. 1997) (“The requirement that a taxpayer seeking standing allege a ‘special
injury’ or a ‘constitutional challenge’ is consistent with long established
precedent.”); N. Broward Hosp. Dist. v. Fornes, 476 So. 2d 154, 155 (Fla. 1985)
(“It has long been the rule in Florida that, in the absence of a constitutional
challenge, a taxpayer may bring suit only upon a showing of special injury which
is distinct from that suffered by other taxpayers in the taxing district.”) (citations
and quotations omitted); Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Joachim, 200 So. 238, 240
(Fla. 1941) (stating that a mere increase in taxes does not confer standing on a
taxpayer seeking to challenge a government expenditure); Rickman v. Whitehurst,
74 So. 205, 207 (Fla. 1917) (requiring that taxpayer suffer special injury before
standing is conveyed).
Applying the principles announced in these cases to her own admissions that
she had no special injury, Solares lacks standing. See Alachua Cnty. v. Scharps,
855 So. 2d 195, 198-99 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (holding a taxpayer with no “special
injury” lacked standing to challenge a resolution passed by a county which directed
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that a referendum be placed on a general election ballot, because no exception to
the “special injury” rule applied).
The arguments advanced by Solares do not change this result. First, we
cannot, as Solares does, simply ignore these controlling precedents. As judges
sitting on a District Court of Appeal, “[w]e are bound to follow the case law set
forth by the Florida Supreme Court. . . .” Carrithers v. Cornett’s Spirit of
Suwannee, Inc., 93 So. 3d 1240, 1242 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012); see also Hoffman v.
Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 440 (Fla. 1973) (“[A] District Court of Appeal does not
have the authority to overrule a decision of the Supreme Court of Florida.”); State
v. Lott, 286 So. 2d 565, 566 (Fla. 1973) (“[T]he District Courts of Appeal follow
controlling precedents set by the Florida Supreme Court.”).
Second, the Supreme Court has made clear that “unique circumstances” are
not an exception to the standing requirement. Clayton, 691 So. 2d at 1068. Third,
a city charter does not rise to the level of the Florida Constitution for purposes of
creating an exception to standing. Unlike the taxing and spending provisions of the
Constitution, a city charter cannot expand or contract the principle of standing
which ultimately sounds in the express separation of powers provision of Article
II, Section 3 of the Florida Constitution.
Fourth, cases recognizing the standing of property owners and residents to
challenge zoning decisions do not create an exception to the special injury
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requirement, they simply identify a type of special injury. Renard v. Dade Cnty.,
261 So. 2d 832, 837 (Fla. 1972) (“An aggrieved or adversely affected person
having standing to sue is a person who has a legally recognizable interest which is
or will be affected by the action of the zoning authority in question. The interest
may be one shared in common with a number of other members of the community
as where an entire neighborhood is affected, but not every resident and property
owner of a municipality can, as a general rule, claim such an interest.”).
Finally, the argument that Solares must have standing because otherwise no
one would have standing is the perennial argument of parties that lack standing. It
presents the same reoccurring question with the same reoccurring answer. Even if
one accepts the doubtful assumption that no one else has standing, Solares’s
argument in this regard has been rejected repeatedly by such authority as the
United States Supreme Court, as recently as 2013: “[t]he assumption that if
respondents have no standing to sue, no one would have standing, is not a reason
to find standing.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1142 (2013)
(citations and quotations omitted); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the
War, 418 U.S. 208, 227 (1974) (“The assumption that if respondents have no
standing to sue, no one would have standing, is not a reason to find standing.”). If
accepted, Solares’s argument would reduce standing to a nullity. Valley Forge
Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S.
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464, 489 (1982) (rejecting the argument that standing must be allowed to a party if
no one else has standing because “[t]his view would convert standing into a
requirement that must be observed only when satisfied”).
These United States Supreme Court cases interpreting standing under the
federal constitution while obviously not binding on a Florida court’s interpretation
of standing under the Florida constitution are nevertheless persuasive. Florida
courts often look to federal cases when resolving issues of standing. See e.g., Dep’t
of Educ. v. Lewis, 416 So. 2d 455, 459 (Fla. 1982) (citing to Flast v. Cohen, 392
U.S. 83, 88 (1968), for the proposition that taxpayers have standing to challenge
statute alleged to exceed specific constitutional limits on the taxing and spending
power).
Affirmed.
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