Kendall Young v. State

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FIFTH DISTRICT
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
KENDALL YOUNG,
Appellant,
v. Case No. 5D16-1610
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
________________________________/
Opinion filed May 12, 2017
Appeal from the Circuit Court
for Orange County,
Keith A. Carsten, Judge.
James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and
Thomas J. Lukashow, Assistant Public
Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General,
Tallahassee, and Pamela J. Koller,
Assistant Attorney General, Daytona
Beach, for Appellee.
LAMBERT, J.
Kendall Young, a juvenile offender, challenges the constitutionality of the ten-year
mandatory minimum provision of a ten-year prison sentence that he received for
committing the crime of robbery with a firearm, a first-degree felony punishable by up to
life imprisonment.1 Young does not contend that a ten-year prison sentence by itself is
unconstitutional,2 but asserts that pursuant to the United States Supreme Court opinions
in Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), and Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010),
the imposition of any mandatory minimum sentence upon a juvenile offender violates the
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment because such a
sentence precludes the trial court from making any individualized sentencing
considerations and fails to recognize that juveniles have diminished culpability and
greater prospects for reform. Young also raises a second argument, not presented to the
trial court, that Florida’s juvenile sentencing statutes, codified in sections 775.082,
921.1401, and 921.1402, Florida Statutes (2014), “supersede” the provisions of section
775.087(2), that require the imposition of the ten-year mandatory minimum prison
sentence in this case. We disagree with Young’s arguments and, therefore, affirm his
sentence.
In Graham, the United States Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment to
the United States Constitution forbids a sentence of life in prison without parole for a
juvenile offender who did not commit a homicide. 560 U.S. at 74. Two years later, in
Miller, the Court held that a mandatory life sentence without the possibility of parole for
juvenile offenders who commit homicides violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment. 132 S. Ct. at 2465. In response to both Graham
and Miller, the Florida Legislature enacted the aforementioned juvenile sentencing
1 § 812.13(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2014).
2Young has not challenged a separate, concurrent ten-year prison sentence that
he received in this case for committing the crime of possession of a firearm by a person
found to have committed a delinquent act.
2
statutes to comply with both cases. Notably, while section 921.1401 requires that the trial
court consider certain designated factors relevant to the offense and to the defendant’s
youth and attendant circumstances in determining whether to impose a sentence of life
imprisonment or a term of years equal to life imprisonment, the statutes do not prohibit
juvenile offenders from receiving lengthy prison sentences.3 See Peterson v. State, 193
So. 3d 1034, 1036 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016). What “they do require [is] that the juvenile
receives a review hearing after a designated number of years based on the crime for
which the juvenile was convicted to allow the sentencing court the discretion to modify
the sentence if the juvenile offender has demonstrated sufficient maturity and reform.” Id.
Depending upon the crime committed, the earliest that the Legislature has provided for a
judicial review hearing for a juvenile offender serving a lengthy sentence is fifteen years.
See § 921.1402(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2014).
Our review of the constitutionality of a sentence is de novo. Abrams v. State, 971
So. 2d 1033, 1035 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (citing Russ v. State, 832 So. 2d 901, 906 (Fla.
1st DCA 2002)). We reject the argument that the ten-year mandatory minimum sentence
imposed in this case violates the Eighth Amendment as being inconsistent with Miller’s
direction that a judge must have the flexibility to fashion the appropriate sentence for a
juvenile offender, allowing for the consideration of the juvenile’s age. 132 S. Ct. at 2460,
2466-67. Young was adjudicated guilty of a crime for which he faced a maximum
sentence of up to life imprisonment. Because Young was a juvenile offender, he was
entitled to a separate sentencing hearing pursuant to section 921.1401(1) to determine if
3 Graham specifically recognized that juvenile offenders could remain imprisoned
for life, but held that the Eighth Amendment prohibited states from determining at the
outset that these offenders will never be fit to re-enter society. 560 U.S. at 75.
3
a “term of life imprisonment” is an appropriate sentence. Young, in fact, received this
individualized sentencing hearing. He presented testimony from his two grandmothers
and from an aunt, with each providing the trial court with evidence as to Young’s
background, intellectual capacity, family and home environment, maturity, and his ability
for rehabilitation. Young’s counsel argued for leniency, reminding the court that, for
sentencing purposes, juveniles should be treated differently than adults.
We find no constitutional error in the trial court’s sentence. The court clearly
allowed for the consideration of Young’s age in fashioning its sentence, as evidenced by
Young receiving the lowest permissible sentence for his crime.4 Although we
acknowledge that the ten-year mandatory minimum sentence required here does limit, to
some extent, the discretion of a trial court in sentencing a juvenile offender, we do not
view this modest limitation as a constitutional infirmity.
“Reviewing courts . . . should grant substantial deference to the broad authority
that legislators necessarily possess in determining the types and limits of punishments
for crimes . . . .” Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983). “[T]he length of a sentence
actually imposed for violation of the criminal law is generally a matter of legislative
prerogative.” Morrow v. State, 856 So. 2d 1043, 1044 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (citing Hale v.
State, 630 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 1993)). In sentencing juvenile offenders, the Florida Supreme
Court ruled that the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment under
Graham is implicated when a juvenile’s sentence lacks a review mechanism that does
not afford him a meaningful opportunity to obtain early release during his or her natural
4
And as further evidenced by the fact that, at the time Young committed this crime,
he was on probation on a separate charge of robbery with a firearm.
4
fifteen years before the offender is entitled to a judicial review hearing and possible early
release, did not intend to repeal or otherwise implicate the ten-year mandatory minimum
provisions of section 775.087(2) applicable in this case.
AFFIRMED.
TORPY, J., and JACOBUS, B. W., Senior Judge, concur.
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preserved for review. It is generally inappropriate for a party to raise an issue for the first
time on appeal without first presenting it to the trial court. Sunset Harbour Condo. Ass’n
v. Robbins, 914 So. 2d 925, 928 (Fla. 2005) (citing Dade Cty. Sch. Bd. v. Radio Station
WQBA, 731 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 1999)). “In order to be preserved for further review by a
higher court, an issue must be presented to the lower court and the specific legal
argument or ground to be argued on appeal or review must be part of that presentation if
it is to be considered preserved.” Id. (quoting Tillman v. State, 471 So. 2d 32, 35 (Fla.
1985)).
Moreover, we find that even if this issue had been preserved for review, it lacks
merit. First, the repeal of a statute by implication is not favored. Newell v. Fla. Dep’t of
Corr., 42 Fla. L. Weekly D538 (Fla 1st DCA Mar. 3, 2017) (citing Carcaise v. Durden, 382
So. 2d 1236 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)). Second, “[t]here is a general presumption that later
statutes are passed with knowledge of prior existing laws, and a construction is favored
which gives each one a field of operation, rather than having the former repealed by
implication.” Id. (quoting Oldham v. Rooks, 361 So. 2d 140, 143 (Fla. 1978)). Finally,
although an earlier statute can be impliedly repealed by a later statute, the enactment of
the later statute does not operate to repeal a prior statute by implication unless such is
clearly the legislative intent. Am. Bakeries Co. v. Haines City, 180 So. 524, 529 (Fla.
1938).
Here, there is no clear indication that when it enacted the juvenile sentencing laws
in 2014, the Florida Legislature intended to affect the ten-year mandatory minimum
provision of section 775.087(2) applicable in this case. A more plausible interpretation is
that the Legislature, by requiring that a juvenile offender’s prison sentence be at least
6
fifteen years before the offender is entitled to a judicial review hearing and possible early
release, did not intend to repeal or otherwise implicate the ten-year mandatory minimum
provisions of section 775.087(2) applicable in this case.
AFFIRMED.
TORPY, J., and JACOBUS, B. W., Senior Judge, concur.
7