MANUEL FERNANDEZ, etc. v. YORDALYS CRUZ, etc.

Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed June 1, 2022.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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Nos. 3D21-1513, 3D21-1514
Lower Tribunal Nos. 19-15345, 19-5017
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Manuel Fernandez,
Appellant,
vs.
Yordalys Cruz,
Appellee.
Appeals from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Peter R. Lopez,
Judge.
Law Offices of Alfaro & Fernandez, P.A., and Elbert Alfaro, for
appellant.
Barrios-Balbin, P.A., and Louis M. Barrios-Balbin, for appellee.
Before FERNANDEZ, C.J., and MILLER, and BOKOR, JJ.
MILLER, J.
Appellant, Daymara Fernandez, a child, by and through her father,
Manuel Fernandez, appeals two adverse final summary judgments rendered
in favor of appellee, her mother, Yordalys Cruz. On appeal, the child
challenges the determination that she was collaterally estopped and
precluded by the doctrine of res judicata from pursuing her constructive trust
claims because of a prior quiet title lawsuit to which she was not a party.
Because the child was a non-party and did not otherwise have her interests
represented in the previous litigation, we conclude that neither doctrine
debars her claims.
BACKGROUND
While suffering from significant health issues, the father transferred
two properties, including a six-unit apartment complex, to the mother. Nearly
a decade later, he filed a quiet title action, alleging the mother had procured
the properties by forgery. The case was actively litigated for over four years,
and a jury ultimately found no forgery occurred.
Following the jury verdict, the child, acting through her next friend, the
father, filed a separate lawsuit against the mother, seeking to quiet title to
the same properties. Various iterations of the complaint ensued, and the
child eventually alleged a single count for imposition of a constructive trust
on the theory that the father signed documents transferring the properties to
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the mother in reliance upon an express promise to convey the property to
the child upon reaching adulthood.
After the child filed suit, the mother initiated an action for ejectment,
eviction, civil theft, and tortious interference against the father and all others
in possession. At that time, the child was purportedly residing with her father.
In her complaint, the mother alleged that, notwithstanding the jury verdict in
the prior litigation, the father continued to occupy a unit within the apartment
complex and collect rents from tenants residing in adjacent units. The child,
again acting through her father, filed a counterclaim alleging the same theory
of constructive trust she had asserted earlier.
The mother moved for summary judgment, contending that both newly
drafted claims were barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral
estoppel. 1 In support of her motion, she adduced affidavits from tenants,
along with the verdict form from the previous suit. The child opposed the
motion, arguing that because she was not a party to the prior suit and her
theory of relief had not yet been litigated, she was entitled to advance her
1
Although a constructive trust is more accurately described as an equitable
remedy than a traditional cause of action, here, the complaint further alleged
the elements of unjust enrichment. See Swope Rodante, P.A. v. Harmon,
85 So. 3d 508, 511 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012).
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claims. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the mother on
both the claim and counterclaim, and the instant appeals ensued.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a trial court order granting summary judgment de novo.
Volusia County v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So. 2d 126, 130
(Fla. 2000). The de novo standard of review further applies to a trial court’s
ruling that relief is barred on the grounds of res judicata or collateral estoppel.
United Auto. Ins. Co. v. L. Offs. of Michael I. Libman, 46 So. 3d 1101, 1103
(Fla. 3d DCA 2010).
ANALYSIS
The courts have developed the companion common law doctrines of
res judicata and collateral estoppel for the three-fold purpose of “reliev[ing]
parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserv[ing] judicial
resources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourag[ing] reliance
on adjudication.” Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980). Although Florida
courts have, on occasion, consolidated the elements comprising each, the
doctrines are distinguishable. A party seeking to invoke res judicata,
otherwise known as claim preclusion, must establish four identities: “(1)
identity of the thing sued for; (2) identity of the cause of action; (3) identity of
persons and parties to the action; and (4) identity of the quality of the persons
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for or against whom the claim is made.” Topps v. State, 865 So. 2d 1253,
1255 (Fla. 2004). Similarly, collateral estoppel, often referred to as issue
preclusion or estoppel by judgment, consists of the following five elements:
(1) the identical issue was presented in a prior proceeding; (2)
the issue was a critical and necessary part of the prior
determination; (3) there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate
the issue; (4) the parties to the prior action were identical to the
parties of the current proceeding; and (5) the issue was actually
litigated.
Marquardt v. State, 156 So. 3d 464, 481 (Fla. 2015).
Historically, the scope of both doctrines was strictly limited by the
doctrine of mutuality of the parties. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439
U.S. 322, 326 (1979). Neither party could use a prior judgment as an
estoppel against the opposing party unless both were bound by the initial
decision. Id. at 326–27. Consequently, irrespective of the polices underlying
the application of res judicata and collateral estoppel, unyielding adherence
to the mutuality doctrine allowed a party who had litigated and lost to
potentially relitigate identical issues against new parties. Id. at 327.
In the latter half of the twentieth century, however, “[t]wo influential
decisions first enabled defendants to run issue preclusion against repeat-
plaintiffs who had previously had a full and fair opportunity to litigate an issue,
albeit against a different defendant.” 6 William B. Rubenstein, Newberg on
Class Actions § 18:10 (5th ed. 2021). In Bernhard v. Bank of American
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National Trust & Savings Ass’n, 122 P.2d 892, 895 (Cal. 1942), the Supreme
Court of California reasoned, “No satisfactory rationalization has been
advanced for the requirement of mutuality. Just why a party who was not
bound by a previous action should be precluded from asserting it as res
judicata against a party who was bound by it is difficult to comprehend.”
Consistent with this decision, in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v.
University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 347 (1971), the United States
Supreme Court held that a defendant accused of infringing a patent could
plead non-mutual defensive preclusion where the patent had already been
declared invalid in a separate case that afforded the patent holder a “full and
fair opportunity to litigate his claim.”
Eight years after endorsing the use of non-mutual defensive issue
preclusion, the Supreme Court authorized non-mutual offensive issue
preclusion under limited circumstances. In Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,
the court determined that, given the arguments behind judicial economy and
fairness, the best approach “is not to preclude the use of offensive collateral
estoppel, but to grant trial courts broad discretion to determine when it should
be applied.” 439 U.S. at 331. Thus, “[t]he general rule should be that in
cases where a plaintiff could easily have joined in the earlier action or where
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. . . the application of offensive estoppel would be unfair to a defendant, a
trial judge should not allow the use of offensive collateral estoppel.” Id.Against this landscape, Florida courts “have not strictly adhered to the
identity of parties requirement in all cases when invoking the doctrines of res
judicata or collateral estoppel.” West v. Kawasaki Motors Mfg. Corp., U.S.A.,
595 So. 2d 92, 94 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992). Rather, they have dispensed with
strict mutuality requirements “where special fairness or policy considerations
appear to compel it.” Blumberg v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 790 So. 2d 1061,
1067 (Fla. 2001) (quoting West, 595 So. 2d at 94).
In this vein, the term “‘parties’ has been broadly interpreted to include
more than just record parties—so that, for example, a person in privity with
a record party, as well as a person who controls for his own interest a record
party, may invoke the doctrine of res judicata or collateral estoppel.” West,
595 So. 2d at 94. Privity, in turn, has been defined as “mutual or successive
relationships to the same right of property, or such an identification of interest
of one person with another as to represent the same legal right.” Se. Fid.
Ins. Co. v. Rice, 515 So. 2d 240, 242 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987) (quoting Black’s
Law Dictionary 1079 (5th ed. 1979)). Synthesizing these definitions, “[f]or
one to be in privity with one who is a party to a lawsuit . . ., one must have
an interest in the action such that she will be bound by the final judgment as
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if she were a party.” Stogniew v. McQueen, 656 So. 2d 917, 920 (Fla. 1995).
In other words, one party may be said to be a privy of another where the right
to recover is dependent upon the right of recovery of the plaintiff in the prior
action. Osburn v. Stickel, 187 So. 2d 89, 91–92 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966).
Notions of privity, however, do not extend to bar a party from appearing
in two lawsuits in different capacities. This concept was first explored by the
Florida Supreme Court over six decades ago. In Youngblood v. Taylor, 89
So. 2d 503 (Fla. 1956), the court considered whether a party appearing in an
original action in one capacity, individual or representative, but in a later
action in another capacity, was bound by or entitled to the benefits of res
judicata or collateral estoppel. There, following an accident, the father,
acting as the next friend of his child, filed a negligence suit. Youngblood, 89
So. 2d at 504. After the jury returned an adverse verdict, the father filed his
own action seeking different damages. Id. The trial court granted summary
judgment, finding the second suit was precluded on the grounds of res
judicata and estoppel by judgment. Id.In considering the lower court order, the supreme court first observed
that the core factual circumstances supporting both claims appeared the
same in that “not only was there a single mishap but a lone person was
injured; . . . therefore, one element of res judicata is present; and . . . by the
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same token an element of estoppel by judgment is present because the
‘precise facts’ seem to have been adjudicated.” Id. at 505. The court then
scrutinized the identity prerequisite inherent in any res judicata or collateral
estoppel application. The court observed that the child could only bring suit
through a guardian or next friend. Id. Concomitantly, the father could only
recover his own damages by way of an individual suit. Consequently, “the
father’s right of action was independent of the minor’s and if the minor were
to ‘waive his right to sue, such waiver [would] not bar the father’s right.’” Id.
at 506 (alteration in original) (quoting Wilkie v. Roberts, 109 So. 225, 227
(Fla. 1926)); see also Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.210(b). Observing these adages, the
court concluded “if, as here, the next friend in one suit happens to be the
father who brings the other suit, the parties cannot be said to be identical
because in one the real party in interest is the minor; in the other the adult.”
Youngblood, 89 So. 2d at 506. Thus, the Youngblood court declined to apply
either claim or issue preclusion to bar the father’s claim.
Section 36 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments (2022) mirrors
this reasoning, providing: “[a] party appearing in an action in one capacity,
individual or representative, is not thereby bound by or entitled to the benefits
of the rules of res judicata in a subsequent action in which he appears in
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another capacity.” 2 This rule is not uniquely relegated to res judicata.
Instead, with respect to collateral estoppel or issue preclusion, “a party
appearing in successive actions in the same capacity is subject to the rules
stated in §§ 27–28 but is not precluded where the capacities in which he
participated are different.” Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 36 cmt. a.
These provisions are consistent with numerous reported Florida decisions in
this arena. See United Auto. Ins. Co. v. Millennium Radiology, LLC, 47 Fla.
L. Weekly D175 (Fla. 3d DCA Jan. 12, 2022); Hill v. Colonial Enters., Inc.,
219 So. 2d 51, 53 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969); Smith v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n,
259 So. 2d 501, 502 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972).
The logic underlying Youngblood and its progeny applies with equal
force to the instant case. Here, the father filed the prior fraud claim in his
individual capacity but initiated the later constructive trust claims in his
representative capacity as the “next friend” of the child. In a suit by a “next
2
This concept is illustrated in the following example:
In a collision between cars driven by A and B, A is injured, B is
killed, and C, who is B’s wife, is also injured. A brings an action
for his injuries against C as administratrix of B’s estate.
Judgment is for A. If C subsequently sues for her own injuries,
she is not precluded from relitigating the issues determined in the
first action.
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 36 cmt. b, illus. 3.
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friend,” the real party plaintiff is the child, not the next friend. See Kingsley
v. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d 780, 784 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993). The contrasting role
of the father in the separate suits and the independence of the respective
damages militate against the application of either res judicata or collateral
estoppel.
Further, regardless of mutuality, for collateral estoppel to apply, “[i]t is
essential that the question common to both causes of action was [a]ctually
adjudicated in the prior litigation.” Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Indus.
Contracting Co., 260 So. 2d 860, 864 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972); see Restatement
(Second) of Judgments § 27 cmt. d (“When an issue is properly raised, by
the pleadings or otherwise, and is submitted for determination, and is
determined, the issue is actually litigated within the meaning of this
[doctrine].”). Similarly, for res judicata to apply, identity of the cause of action
is required. See Topps, 865 So. 2d at 1255. Here, although the mother
contends that the original and current suits stem from a common nucleus of
adjudicated operative facts, our review suggests otherwise. The summary
judgment record establishes that, in the first suit, the father sought to void
the deeds transferring the properties as the product of forgery. In line with
that theory, the testimony concerned whether the signatures were
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fraudulently affixed to the relevant documents, and the jury was solely asked
by way of the verdict form to determine whether the mother forged the deeds.
The record is devoid of any indication that the factual underpinnings of
the constructive trust claim were presented by way of pleading or litigated,
let alone adjudicated, in the original action. See State St. Bank & Tr. Co. v.
Badra, 765 So. 2d 251, 253 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (“Res judicata extends only
to the facts and conditions as they existed at the time the judgment was
rendered, at the time the issues in the first action were made, and to the legal
rights and relations of the parties as fixed by the facts determined by that
judgment.”). Given these factors, it cannot be said that the child had a full
and fair opportunity to litigate her claims.
Accordingly, we conclude summary judgment was entered in error,
and we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
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