THE STATE OF FLORIDA v. MICHAEL CLAYTON WOODRUFF

Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed July 20, 2022.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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No. 3D19-561
Lower Tribunal No. 13-319-A-K
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The State of Florida,
Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
vs.
Michael Clayton Woodruff,
Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Monroe County, Mark H. Jones,
Judge.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Michael W. Mervine, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, and Brian H. Zack, Former Assistant Attorney
General, for appellant/cross-appellee.
McLain Law, P.A., and Matthew R. McLain (Longwood), for
appellee/cross-appellant.
Before EMAS, GORDO, and BOKOR, JJ.
BOKOR, J.
The State challenges a grant of postconviction relief under Florida Rule
of Criminal Procedure 3.850(b) directing a new trial on one count of lewd and
lascivious molestation of a child under the age of twelve. 1 Because the
postconviction court erred in concluding that defense counsel’s failure to
object to evidence of uncharged collateral crimes satisfied the prejudice
prong of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), where the evidence
did not relate to the only charge that resulted in a conviction, we reverse.2
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Woodruff was originally charged with one count of sexual battery on a
child and three counts of lewd and lascivious battery on a child under the
age of twelve. All four charges stemmed from three incidents that occurred
between July 10and August 29, 2009, when the victim was nine years old
and staying with Woodruff and his wife. The State’s case relied entirely on
the victim’s testimony and Woodruff’s statements to investigators.
Two of the lewd and lascivious molestation charges (Counts 2 and 4)
stemmed from an incident that occurred late one night while Woodruff’s wife
1
We have jurisdiction. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(k); Fla. R. App. P.
9.140(c)(1)(C).
2
Woodruff cross-appeals the denial of several other grounds for
postconviction relief. We affirm as to the cross-appeal without further
discussion. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(f)(4).
2
was away. Woodruff allegedly came into the victim’s room at around
midnight and carried her into his room. He then undressed himself and
asked her to undress, purportedly so he could explain anatomy to her. He
gave her a hand mirror so she could see “the hole where the baby comes
out” and directed her to spread her labia so she could get a better look.
During this event, he allegedly touched the victim’s vagina, forming the basis
for Count 4. He also asked the victim if she wanted to touch his penis, which
she did, causing it to become erect and forming the basis for Count 2.
Woodruff acknowledged asking the victim to undress and explaining
anatomy to her, purportedly in response to her questions about reproduction,
but denied ever exposing his penis (Count 2) or touching her vagina (Count
4).
The other molestation charge (Count 3) was based on events
occurring immediately after the incident described above. Woodruff
allegedly had the victim take a shower with him, during which he touched her
breasts, genital area, and buttocks. He also directed her to wash his body,
including touching his penis. Woodruff denied ever showering with or
touching the victim. The State also presented evidence of a second,
uncharged shower incident that occurred sometime thereafter, during which
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Woodruff purportedly also touched the victim’s genitals and had the victim
touch his penis.
The sexual battery charge (Count 1) was based on a separate incident
in which Woodruff and the victim swam together naked. The victim alleged
that Woodruff briefly put his penis in her vagina while hugging her and
playing games in the pool. Woodruff acknowledged swimming naked with
the victim and conceded the possibility that his penis brushed against her,
but otherwise denied the allegation.
Following a jury trial, Woodruff was convicted of only Count 4, which
related to touching the victim’s vagina during the bedroom incident. He
challenged that conviction on direct appeal. Woodruff v. State, 208 So. 3d
1265 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (affirming conviction). Woodruff subsequently filed
a rule 3.850 motion for postconviction relief, alleging, in pertinent part, that
his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the admission of
collateral crimes evidence. Specifically, he alleged that the State proffered
evidence of at least seven discrete acts of molestation or battery occurring
during those same events, though he was only charged with four. He
claimed that these additional acts related to his propensity to commit similar
crimes or improper bolstering of the victim’s credibility, amounting to
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prohibited Williams rule evidence. 3 Therefore, Woodruff argued, his
counsel’s failure to object constituted prejudicial and ineffective assistance
of counsel. The State argued in response that the testimony was not
Williams rule evidence because it was inextricably intertwined with the
charged acts, as the uncharged acts all took place during the same
sequence of events and were necessary to explain the charges. See, e.g.,
§ 90.404(2)(a), Fla. Stat.4 After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted
the motion in part and directed a new trial on Count 4. This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
Appellate review of a postconviction motion alleging ineffective
assistance of counsel presents a mixed question of law and fact, whereby
3
Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1959).
4
In a child molestation case, the rule regarding introduction of collateral
crime evidence under section 90.404(2)(b)1. is broader than collateral crime
evidence admissible in other cases under section 90.404(2)(a); “evidence of
the defendant’s commission of other crimes, wrongs, or acts of child
molestation is admissible and may be considered for its bearing on any
matter to which it is relevant.” § 90.404(2)(b)1., Fla. Stat. However, to invoke
this provision, the State must provide the defendant with a written list
describing with specificity the collateral acts it intends to proffer, the court
must make findings that the prior acts were proven by competent, substantial
evidence and that the danger of unfair prejudice from their admission did not
outweigh the probative value, and the jury must also be instructed on the
limited purpose for which the evidence was received. See id. (2)(d)1.–2.;
McLean v. State, 934 So. 2d 1248, 1256, 1262 (Fla. 2006). The State did
not seek admission under section 90.404(2)(b)(1); therefore, we examine
admissibility under section 90.404(2)(a).
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we defer to the trial court’s findings of fact if supported by competent,
substantial evidence but review the court’s conclusions of law de novo. See,
e.g., Foster v. State, 132 So. 3d 40, 52 (Fla. 2013). “To obtain relief on
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant ‘must show that
his attorney's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance
prejudiced his defense.’” Id. (quoting in part Sochor v. State, 883 So. 2d
766, 771 (Fla. 2004)). To demonstrate such prejudice, “the defendant must
show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence
in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
Here, the State charged Woodruff with four acts of molestation or
sexual battery: (1) touching the victim’s vagina during the bedroom incident
(Count 4); (2) having the victim touch his penis during the same incident
(Count 2); (3) touching the victim’s vagina, breasts, and buttocks in the
shower afterward (Count 3); and (4) putting his penis in the victim’s vagina
in the pool on a separate occasion (Count 1). However, as the trial court
observed, the State presented evidence of at least three other uncharged
acts of molestation, including having the victim wash his penis during the first
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shower incident, as well as touching the victim’s vagina and having the victim
touch his penis during a second, uncharged shower incident.5
We agree that the additional acts during the second, uncharged
shower incident were not, as the State contends, inextricably intertwined with
the acts charged, and therefore do not constitute admissible collateral crimes
evidence under section 90.404(2). Evidence that is necessary to adequately
describe the crimes charged or provide intelligent context of the
circumstances is not barred by section 90.404(2), but rather is admissible as
relevant evidence under section 90.402, Florida. Statutes. See Dorsett v.
State, 944 So. 2d 1207, 1212 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (holding that officer’s
testimony regarding prior drug transaction in drug sale case was inextricably
intertwined with current charges and properly admissible collateral crime
evidence because the reliability of the officer’s identification of the defendant
was a material issue in dispute); cf. Mendez v. State, 271 So. 3d 1093, 1100
(Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (holding that admission of collateral crime evidence as
to alleged grooming of victim in child molestation case was fundamental error
5
The crime of lewd and lascivious molestation occurs when “[a] person []
intentionally touches in a lewd or lascivious manner the breasts, genitals,
genital area, or buttocks, or the clothing covering them, of a person less than
16 years of age, or forces or entices a person under 16 years of age to so
touch the perpetrator.” § 800.04(5)(a), Fla. Stat. If done by a person over
the age of 18 against a person under the age of 12, the crime is punishable
as a life felony. Id. (5)(b).
7
where prior incident occurred the day before the charged events and was
not relevant or inseparable part of charged acts); Griffin v. State, 639 So. 2d
966, 968 (Fla. 1994) (“[E]vidence of uncharged crimes which are inseparable
from the crime charged, or evidence which is inextricably intertwined with the
crime charged, is not Williams rule evidence. It is admissible under section
90.402 because it is a relevant and indispensable part of the act which is in
issue.” (quotations omitted)).
While the victim’s testimony that she also washed Woodruff’s penis
during the first shower incident helped contextualize whether Woodruff
touched her genitals in a lewd or lascivious manner, the testimony as to the
two other acts of alleged molestation occurring during the second,
uncharged shower incident fails either to clarify, explain, or contextualize the
acts Woodruff was charged with, as the second shower occurred days after
the first one. See Mendez, 271 So. 3d at 1100; Downs v. State, 40 So. 3d
49, 52 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) (holding that evidence that defendant molested
victim in the shower two years after charged incident of sexual battery was
not inextricably intertwined and thus should have been barred by Williams
rule). Thus, the testimony regarding the second shower incident was not
admissible under either section 90.402 or 90.404 and should have been
excluded as Williams rule evidence.
8
Because no evidence was presented at the evidentiary hearing to
indicate that Woodruff’s counsel had a strategic reason for failing to object
to this inadmissible collateral crimes evidence, we agree that the evidence
presented at the hearing was sufficient to demonstrate deficient performance
for Strickland purposes. See Botto v. State, 307 So. 3d 1006, 1010 (Fla. 5th
DCA 2020) (finding that failure to object to argument referencing unadmitted
Williams rule evidence in lewd and lascivious molestation case constituted
deficient performance and prejudice under Strickland). However, we find
that under the circumstance present here, Woodruff has failed to satisfy
Strickland’s prejudice prong. While an erroneous admission of Williams rule
evidence is “presumed harmful error because of the danger that a jury will
take the bad character or propensity to crime thus demonstrated as evidence
of guilt of the crime charged,” Straight v. State, 397 So. 2d 903, 908 (Fla.
1981) (emphasis added), the issue of prejudice for ineffective counsel
purposes under Strickland is nonetheless a question of law reviewed de
novo, separate and apart from any determination of error. Bruno v. State,
807 So. 2d 55, 62 (Fla. 2001). Strickland defines prejudice as requiring “a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result
of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” 466 U.S. at
9
694; see also id. at 696 (noting that “the ultimate focus of inquiry must be on
the fundamental fairness of the proceeding” and that “the court should be
concerned with whether, despite the strong presumption of reliability, the
result of the particular proceeding is unreliable because of a breakdown in
the adversarial process that our system counts on to produce just results”).
Here, the record reveals no reasonable probability that the collateral
crimes evidence improperly influenced the jury in convicting Woodruff on one
count. Of the four charges, the jury found Woodruff guilty only of Count 4,
based on the touching of the victim’s vagina in the bedroom, before the first
shower. He had also been charged with having the victim touch his penis
during that same event (Count 2), but the jury distinguished between the two
charges and acquitted him of only one despite both being based on
effectively the same evidence. Importantly, the jury acquitted Woodruff of
Count 3 (the first shower incident) even though the improper collateral crime
evidence (the uncharged second shower incident) served only to bolster the
victim’s credibility (or discredit Woodruff’s denial) as to the charged first
shower incident. We take the fact that the jury was able to weigh the victim’s
credibility against Woodruff’s and make an independent determination about
his guilt as to each individual charge (as opposed to simply deciding that
Woodruff must have been guilty of something by virtue of the volume of
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allegations), coupled with the fact that all of the collateral crimes evidence at
issue related only to acts that Woodruff was ultimately acquitted of and which
occurred after the only act that resulted in a conviction, to indicate that there
is no reasonable probability that counsel’s failure to object to the admission
of the improper Williams rule evidence affected the outcome of this
proceeding.
Accordingly, with the prejudice prong of Strickland unmet, we reverse
the postconviction court’s order granting a new trial based on ineffective
assistance of counsel and remand for reinstatement of the judgment and
sentence.
Reversed and remanded.
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