DocketNumber: No. AN-37
Citation Numbers: 428 So. 2d 344, 1983 Fla. App. LEXIS 18898
Judges: Joanos, Shivers, Wentworth
Filed Date: 3/22/1983
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/18/2024
There is no statutory authority for the deputy commissioner’s order that the employer and carrier, Milhart Contractors and Auto Owners Insurance Company, respectively, (“E/C”) pay claimant’s attorney’s fee, therefore we reverse that order. In light of this reversal it is unnecessary to discuss the issue raised on cross-appeal.
The injury occurred on February 22,1980, thus the 1979 statute applies. Claimant was injured when he fell from a roof and fractured his skull. He was treated by Dr. Mozingo, who returned claimant to full employment as of May 5, 1980, although he continued to follow claimant, and saw him in July and October 1980. In June and July, 1980, claimant complained of inability to tolerate heat, headaches, and dizziness which prevented him from resuming work. On June 27, 1980, claimant requested further neurological evaluation, however, E/C declined to send claimant to any physician other than Dr. Mozingo unless for some reason Dr. Mozingo’s treatment was ineffective. In July, 1980, claimant was exam
On April 10, 1981, claimant’s attorney wrote a letter informing E/C that on April 8, 1981, claimant again experienced dizziness, nausea, and severe head pain and went to the emergency room because Dr. Mozingo refused to see him.
In the order appealed, the deputy correctly found that the order of April 9,1981, was not affected by the motion for rehearing and became final after 30 days. It is clear the deputy considered E/C’s April 24, 1981, letter to Dr. Brackett to authorize both examination and any treatment found necessary. As a basis for ordering E/C to pay claimant’s attorneys fees, the deputy made the following statements. “I ... cannot ignore the totality of the facts in finding that the authorization finally given by the Carrier was for the care and treatment initially demanded on June 27, 1980, and came as a direct result of the persistence and diligence of counsel for the claimant.” The statutory basis for the award was not stated by the deputy commissioner, however, appellee contends the award was proper under Section 440.34(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1979), which permits an order that fees be paid by an E/C against whom claimant “successfully asserts a claim for medical benefits only, if the claimant has not filed or is not entitled to file at such time a claim for disability, permanent impairment, wage-loss, or death benefits, arising out of the same accident.”
Section 440.34(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1979) does not authorize the award of fees in the present case. On learning of claimant’s need for treatment by the letter of April 10, 1981, E/C on April 24, 1981, authorized examination and treatment by Dr. Brackett. This occurred before the claim of August 4, 1981, was filed. Appel-lee cannot rely on the claim filed in 1980 and the events that occurred and were resolved by the April 9, 1981 order as a basis for this award, since that order, which was not appealed, determined that claimant was not in need of treatment in addition to that provided by Dr. Mozingo in 1980. The 1981 claim was filed after E/C authorized examination and treatment by Dr. Brackett. Thus claimant did not successfully assert a claim for medical benefits. That claimant’s attorney rendered valuable services and is entitled to a reasonable fee is not a basis for assessing a fee against E/C. Pic N Save Drug Co. v. Moore, 412 So.2d 410 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
The order that E/C pay claimant’s attorney’s fee is REVERSED.
. There is evidence in the record indicating Dr. Mozingo did not refuse to render further treatment, but was unavailable when claimant called, however, this evidence is not crucial to resolution of the case.