Reeves v. Chris Nocco, as Sheriff of Pasco County, Florida

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING
MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
OF FLORIDA
SECOND DISTRICT
CURTIS J. REEVES, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
v. ) Case No. 2D14-1784
)
CHRIS NOCCO, as Sheriff of Pasco )
County, Florida, )
)
Respondent. )
___________________________________)
Opinion filed July 11, 2014.
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus to the
Circuit Court for Pasco County; Pat
Siracusa, Judge.
Frances E. Martinez of Escobar &
Associates, P.A., Tampa, for Petitioner.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General,
Tallahassee, and John M. Klawikofsky,
Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for
Respondent.
ALTENBERND, Judge.
Curtis J. Reeves petitions this court for a writ of habeas corpus,
contending that the circuit court erred in denying him pretrial release while he is
awaiting trial for second-degree murder and aggravated battery. We conclude that he is
entitled to some relief.
Because Mr. Reeves is charged with second-degree murder, an offense
punishable by life imprisonment, he is one of those exceptional criminal defendants who
is not constitutionally entitled to pretrial release on reasonable conditions under article I,
section 14, of the Florida Constitution so long as the State established at his bond
hearing the proof described in State v. Arthur, 390 So. 2d 717, 720 (Fla. 1980), and
Russell v. State, 71 So. 27, 28 (Fla. 1916). However, even when the State makes this
strong demonstration in such a case, it merely establishes that the defendant has no
constitutional right to pretrial release on reasonable conditions. Under the clear holding
in Arthur, the defendant still has the option of proving certain facts that permit the circuit
court to use its discretion to grant pretrial release under sufficient conditions.
In this case, Mr. Reeves exercised his option to present such proof.
However, due to a procedural irregularity that we explain later, the circuit court reversed
the logical order for this decision-making process. It first heard Mr. Reeves's evidence
that would entitle him to an appropriate bond and then heard the State's evidence to
support its claim that he was not entitled to the constitutional right to pretrial release. At
the end of the hearing, the circuit court ruled that the State had met its burden and
denied pretrial release. It then explained the terms and conditions of the bond that it
would have authorized if the State had not met its burden. It never expressly ruled on
Mr. Reeves's request to receive discretionary pretrial release.
From our review of the record, we are inclined to believe that the circuit
court made an error of law and that it did not realize it had the discretionary power to
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grant release on the terms and conditions that it announced. In other words, it believed
it must deny release if the State met its burden. It appears that the circuit court was
impressed with Mr. Reeves's pretrial release evidence, which unquestionably was
strong. The court never expressed any reason or concern that would have caused it to
deny pretrial release, as a matter of reasoned discretion.
Initially, this court considered merely instructing the circuit court to grant
pretrial release on the conditions that it had announced. But on further review of the
record, we are not completely certain that the trial court made the above-described error
of law. It is at least conceivable that the circuit court silently exercised discretion to
deny release without explaining its reasons for that decision. Accordingly, we grant
relief to the extent that we authorize the circuit court to grant pretrial release on the
conditions that it announced at the conclusion of the hearing on the motion to set bond
or to deny pretrial release in an order that provides a reasoned explanation for that
discretionary decision.
I. THE INITIAL PROCEEDINGS IN CIRCUIT COURT
Mr. Reeves, a seventy-one-year-old retired police officer, is accused of
shooting and killing Chad Oulson in a movie theater on January 13, 2014. The incident
has become a matter of public interest. In ruling on the motion to set bond, the circuit
court declined to discuss its findings concerning the facts of the case for the reasons
explained in State ex rel. Van Eeghen v. Williams, 87 So. 2d 45, 46 (Fla. 1956). We
likewise will refrain from any extensive discussion of the evidence.
According to our limited record, Mr. Reeves was arrested on January 13,
2014, for second-degree murder. He made his first appearance on January 14, 2014,
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before Judge Lynn Tepper. At that hearing, which occurred prior to the filing of an
information, the State had not filed a motion for pretrial detention pursuant to Florida
Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.132. Thus, the circuit court conducted a hearing to
determine pretrial release pursuant to rule 3.131(b). The court denied pretrial release,
finding that proof was evident based only on the content in the criminal report affidavit.
Thereafter, Mr. Reeves filed a "motion to release defendant on his own recognizance or
set reasonable bail." Judge Siracusa held a lengthy evidentiary hearing on this motion
immediately following Mr. Reeves's arraignment on the charges contained in the
information. It is his ruling on that motion that we examine in this proceeding.1
After both of these hearings had occurred, this court issued its opinion in
Preston v. Gee, 133 So. 3d 1218 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014). In that case, the defendant filed
a petition for habeas corpus challenging a denial of bond at a hearing comparable to the
first appearance in this case before Judge Tepper. This court held in Preston that the
criminal report affidavit by itself was insufficient to establish the high degree of proof
required under article I, section 14, to deny bond for a robbery charge that was a first-
degree felony punishable by life. Id. at 1221, 1228.
At the first appearance in this case, the circuit court obviously did not have
the benefit of Preston when it denied bond. At least from our limited record, it appears
that had the order denying bond at first appearance been challenged by a petition for
habeas corpus, this court would likely have granted the petition and remanded for an
appropriate hearing.
1Thispetition for writ of habeas corpus is the appropriate means to
challenge the denial of pretrial release. See Greenwood v. State, 51 So. 3d 1278, 1279
(Fla. 2d DCA 2011).
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Fortunately, the extensive hearing before Judge Siracusa approximates
the hearing that we contemplated would occur on remand in Preston. In this opinion we
will not repeat the discussion in Preston that demonstrates the extent to which both the
current rules of procedure and the relevant statutes are designed to handle the typical
case in which pretrial release is treated as a constitutional right under article I, section
14, of the Florida Constitution and are not entirely compatible with the requirements
under Arthur for cases in which the charge is a capital offense or an offense for which
life imprisonment is the penalty. We comment, however, on an unpreserved procedural
error that appears to have contributed to the confusion in the circuit court's announced
decision.
Because the State did not file a motion to detain Mr. Reeves pursuant to
rule 3.132, Mr. Reeves filed his motion seeking release on reasonable bail. Typically,
the party who files a motion has the burden of both proof and persuasion as to the relief
requested in the motion. Thus, without objection, the circuit court required Mr. Reeves
to present his witnesses first at the hearing on the motion and also required Mr. Reeves
to argue the merits of his motion first. But under the holding in Arthur, 390 So. 2d at
720, it was the State that had the initial burden of proof and persuasion to establish its
right to deprive the defendant of pretrial release under the exception in the first
sentence of article I, section 14. Thus, the State should have commenced the evidence
at this hearing. Mr. Reeves's evidence as to conditions and terms of pretrial release
should not have occurred until the circuit court first determined whether he did or did not
have a right to pretrial release.
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Although the circuit court confused the order of events at this hearing, the
State repeatedly recognized that it had the burden of proof at the hearing. It also
presented extensive evidence at the hearing. We are convinced that the circuit court
applied the correct burden of proof and persuasion at this hearing.
II. WHETHER THE STATE MET ITS BURDEN IS
NOT AN ISSUE WE NEED TO REACH
Mr. Reeves argues that the circuit court erred in determining that the State
met its high burden on the issue of whether he had no right to pretrial release under any
terms and conditions. As this court recently explained in Preston, we continue to
require the State in this context to meet the burden described in Russell, 71 So. at 27.
In this case, there really is no dispute that Chad Oulson is dead and that his death is the
result of Mr. Reeves's shooting him with a handgun. The more difficult factual questions
for the circuit court at the bond hearing were whether Mr. Reeves acted in self-defense
and whether the criminal intent associated with this death was the type of intent
necessary for second-degree murder or the type of intent associated with the offense of
manslaughter. Manslaughter is an offense for which article I, section 14, authorizes
consideration of pretrial release as a matter of right.
The circuit court required the State to present extensive testimony on
these issues. This is undoubtedly one of the most thorough hearings on bond that this
court has ever reviewed. Whether the State met its burden on the issue of guilt for
second-degree murder as compared to manslaughter is, as recognized by the circuit
court, a close question. We conclude that there is no reason for this court to reach this
issue at this time. If the circuit court grants pretrial release under the limited relief that
we provide in this decision, then it will make no difference whether the release was a
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matter of right or a matter of discretion. If we have misjudged the circuit court's
reasoning and it actually intended to make a discretionary decision to deny release
despite Mr. Reeves's evidence, it will presumably deny release again when it receives
this decision. At that point, and only at that point, would this court need to resolve this
issue.
III. DISCRETIONARY RELEASE
In this case, the defendant presented exceptionally strong evidence in
support of his request for pretrial release. He presented several character witnesses
whose testimony went largely unchallenged by the State. He is an older defendant with
no prior record. He and his wife have been married forty-six years and have several
generations of relatives in the community. He cares for a mother who is more than
ninety years of age. Prior to this event, he had a long and distinguished career as a
police officer and as director of security for a large local business. There is no evidence
of drug or alcohol issues.
In its written order, the circuit court found that Mr. Reeves possesses
extensive ties to the community and further found, "[w]ithout hesitation . . . , based upon
this testimony and the exhibits that the Defendant is not a flight risk." The court
concluded that it would have "few concerns" that he would be a danger to society if
released pretrial.
The circuit court explained in the written order the terms and conditions of
pretrial release it would have found appropriate "if the State had not met the burden for
pretrial detention."
[T]he bond would have been set at $150,000 with a condition
that the Defendant remain at his residence with the
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exception of attending religious services, for medical
treatment and the grocery store. The Defendant would not
be allowed to have possession of a firearm and all of his
firearms would be surrendered either to the Pasco Sheriff or
another person acceptable to the Court after a hearing. The
Defendant would wear the standard pretrial ankle monitor for
GPS tracking of his location through one of the approved
vendors.
Under article I, section 14, a person charged with an offense for which
pretrial release is a right may nevertheless be denied release "[i]f no conditions of
release can reasonably protect the community from risk of physical harm to persons,
assure the presence of the accused at trial, or assure the integrity of the judicial
process." The decision in Arthur effectively reverses the burden for these factors in a
case involving a capital felony or an offense for which life imprisonment is the penalty.
Thus, even if the State meets its burden under Russell, the circuit court may exercise
discretion to grant pretrial release if the defendant can prove that conditions of release
can effectively protect the public from the risk of physical harm, assure his presence at
trial, and assure the integrity of the judicial process.
In this case, the court clearly found that Mr. Reeves established that he
was not a flight risk. No one seriously argues that detention is needed to assure the
integrity of the judicial process. Indeed, Mr. Reeves was allowed to attend the bond
hearing itself in normal clothing and without handcuffs. Given the singular event at the
theater, one can have some concern for public safety, which is why the circuit court
would essentially require house arrest without firearms and with an ankle monitor for
GPS tracking.
As we explained at the beginning of this opinion, it appears that the circuit
court denied release merely because it believed it had no discretion to do otherwise if
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the State met its burden. All of the usual factors that would be used to authorize pretrial
release in this context were clearly established by Mr. Reeves at this hearing. The
record suggests no special circumstances or other factors that would justify a reasoned,
discretionary decision to deny pretrial release. But we cannot rule out the possibility
that the circuit court had a reasoned, discretionary basis not to grant release.
Given the extensive evidence and the full consideration of the terms and
conditions for release at the recent hearing, we see no reason to compel the circuit
court to conduct another hearing. It is authorized to grant release on its own announced
conditions or to provide an order explaining its discretionary decision to deny release. If
the circuit court determines that circumstances warrant additional testimony before
finalizing any terms and conditions of release, it is not barred by this opinion from
conducting that hearing.
Petition granted to the extent explained within this opinion.
NORTHCUTT and VILLANTI, JJ., Concur.
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