Francois v. University of Miami

Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed February 17, 2016.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
________________
No. 3D15-64
Lower Tribunal No. 07-3515
________________
Nelson Francois, etc.,
Appellant,
vs.
University of Miami, a Florida Corporation,
Appellee.
An appeal from a non-final order from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade
County, Abby Cynamon, Judge.
Loreen I. Kreizinger and Justine S. Anagnos (Ft. Lauderdale), for appellant.
Fowler White Burnett and Marc J. Schleier and Christopher E. Knight, for
appellee.
Before SUAREZ, C.J., and ROTHENBERG and EMAS, JJ.
SUAREZ, C.J.
Appellant Nelson Francois, as Personal Representative of the Estate of
Caroline Francois (“Francois”) appeals the denial of his Motion for Relief
from
Judgment. We reverse.
This case follows our decision in University of Miami v. Francois, 76 So. 3d
360 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011)1 in which we determined that a settlement agreement
Francois had entered into with defendants Angelica Martinez, R.N. (“Nurse
Martinez”) and Medical Staffing Network Holdings, Inc. (“Medical Staffing”) had
the effect of also releasing his claims against the University of Miami (the
“University”). Id. at 366-67. Importantly, in that prior appeal we specifically
stated:
Francois conceded that he did not plead or seek
reformation of the Release and Settlement Agreement at
the trial court level, nor does he contend on appeal that a
reformation was effectuated when the trial court entered
its final order following rehearing. See, e.g. Rucks v.
Pushman, 541 So. 2d 673 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989). Thus we
do not consider whether reformation could have been
utilized to achieve a different result.
Id. at 363 n. 2.
Following that opinion, Francois filed a separate action in the trial court
captioned Francois as Personal Representative v. Martinez, 12-26993 CA 01. In
1 The factual background of the wrongful death claims at issue in this proceeding
are set forth in that opinion and are not repeated here.
2
that proceeding, an Agreed Final Order was entered which reformed the release to
reflect Francois’, Nurse Martinez’s and Medical Staffing’s actual intent, which was
to settle Francois’ claim against Nurse Martinez and Medical Staffing and to
except the claims against the University from the scope of the release.
Thereafter, Francois filed his Motion for Relief from Judgment in this case,
which the University opposed. After hearing, the trial court entered an order
denying the Motion for Relief from Judgment. In that Order, the trial court found
that:
[T]he Third District determined that [Francois]’s cause of
action against the University of Miami was extinguished
by the clear an unambiguous terms of the Release and
Settlement Agreement. … In doing so, the Third District
held that it was improper for this Court to consider parole
evidence in an attempt to discern an intent which was
already clearly expressed by the terms of the Release and
Settlement Agreement. The Third District’s ruling
constitutes the ‘law of the case’ and must be followed.
This ruling was in error. As in Banks v. Orlando Regional Healthcare, 955 So. 2d
604 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007), the trial court in the independent reformation action,
Francois v. Martinez, supra, “successfully reformed the original release to reflect
the parties’ intent not to release subsequent tortfeasors or transfer any causes of
action against subsequent tortfeasors. That reformation related back to the date of
the original release.” Banks, 955 So. 2d at 608. The trial court’s refusal to
3
consider parole evidence was also error. See, Abernathy v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins.,
717 So. 2d 196, 198 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) and cases cited therein.
The trial court’s conclusion that this Court’s prior ruling precluded
consideration of the reformed settlement agreement based on the law of the case
doctrine was also incorrect. As indicated above, this Court expressly did not
consider what impact a claim of reformation would have on the release at issue.
Consequently, the mandate did not include any ruling on that question and
Francois was free to pursue the remedy of an independent action for reformation of
the release.
As explained in Florida Dept. of Trans. v. Juliano, 801 So. 2d 101 (Fla.
2001):
The doctrine of the law of the case requires that questions
of law actually decided on appeal must govern the case in
the same court and the trial court, through all subsequent
stages of the proceedings. See Greene v. Massey, 384 So.
2d 24, 28 (Fla. 1980) (“All points of law which have
been adjudicated [e.s.] become the law of the case and
are, except in exceptional circumstances, no longer open
for discussion or consideration in subsequent proceedings
in the case.”); Strazzulla v. Hendrick, 177 So. 2d 1, 3
(Fla. 1965). Under the law of the case doctrine, a trial
court is bound to follow prior rulings of the appellate
court as long as the facts on which such decision are
based continue to be the facts of the case. See McGregor
[v. Provident Trust Company], 162 So. [323] at 327
[(Fla. 1935)]. Moreover, even as to those issues actually
decided, the law of the case doctrine is more flexible than
res judicata in that it also provides that an appellate court
has the power to reconsider and correct an erroneous
4
ruling that has become the law of the case where a prior
ruling would result in a “manifest injustice.” Strazzulla,
177 So. 2d at 5.8. As to the scope of the law of the case
doctrine, this Court in U.S. Concrete [Pipe], 437 So. 2d
[1061] at 1063 [(Fla. 1983)], explained that the doctrine
is ‘limited to rulings on questions of law actually
presented and considered on a former appeal.’ [bold
added] (Emphasis supplied.) See also Two M. Dev. Corp.
v. Mikos, 578 So. 2d 829, 830 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). By
reaffirming the principle articulated in earlier decisions
that the law of the case doctrine is limited to questions
of law actually presented and considered on a former
appeal, [e.s.]
U.S. Concrete was consistent with prior cases from this
Court. See, e.g., Greene, 384 So. 2d at 28; Strazzulla, 177
So. 2d at 3; Finston v. Finston, 160 Fla. 935, 37 So. 2d
423, 424 (1948). Additionally, the law of the case
doctrine may foreclose subsequent consideration of
issues implicitly addressed or necessarily considered by
the appellate court's decision. See Dade County
Classroom Teachers' Ass'n v. Rubin, 238 So. 2d 284, 289
(Fla. 1970); Dicks v. Jenne, 740 So. 2d 576, 578 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1999). A corollary of the law of the case doctrine is
that a lower court is not precluded from passing on issues
that ‘have not necessarily been determined and become
law of the case.’ Greene, 384 So. 2d at 27. As stated in
Wilder v. Punta Gorda State Bank, 100 Fla. 517, 129 So.
865, 866 (1930), the law of the case doctrine ‘has no
applicability to, and is not decisive of, points
presented upon a second writ of error that were not
presented upon a former writ of error and
consequently were not before the appellate court for
adjudication.’ [e.s.]
Id. at 105-106. Thus, not only did this Court not implicitly rule on the issue of
reformation, it expressly did not. Under those circumstances, the law of the case
doctrine had no application and the trial court should have considered and granted
5
Francois’ Motion for Relief from Judgment.2 Likewise, Francois’ reformation
action was not filed “too late,” nor did it constitute an attempt to “evade” this
Court’s prior rulings.
Not only was the “law of the case” inapplicable below, Francois appears to
have followed the exact prescription to obtain reformation which the Fifth District
described in its opinion in Rucks v. Pushman, 541 So. 2d 673 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989)3
2 For the same reason, the language of such cases as Dober v. Worrell, 401 So. 2d
1322, 1324 (Fla. 1981), McAllister v. Breakers Seville Assoc., Inc., 41 So. 3d 405
(Fla. 4th DCA 2010) and Robinson v. Weiland, 8988 So. 2d 1110 (Fla. 5th DCA
2008) and their progeny, including Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Dyess, 588
So. 2d 1045 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991), is simply inapplicable to this case.
3 The Court there stated: “While the summary judgment in this case is procedurally
correct, if in truth and in fact the true settlement agreement between the victim and
the initial tortfeasor was intended by those parties thereto to be only a settlement of
the victim's injuries resulting from the initial tortfeasor and was not intended to
compensate the victim for injuries resulting from the negligence of the health care
providers, and should not in law or in equity result in a transfer to the initial
tortfeasor of the victim's cause of action against the health care providers, the
victim should, in justice and fairness and law, be given an opportunity to establish
that fact. However, consistent with the trial court's decision, we hold that the
victim's motion to reform made in this law action for the recovery of damages was
inadequate for that purpose. The cause of action, if any, the victim may have
against the initial tortfeasor to reform the victim's release should be asserted in a
separate equitable reformation action. If, because of its form, the victim's release
has resulted in an unintended assignment of rights by operation of law, we know of
no reason why the initial tortfeasor cannot merely reassign those rights to the
victim by a properly drawn legal document or, if there is a controversy as to the
intent of those parties, why the victim cannot resolve that controversy in a separate
equitable action against the initial tortfeasor for reformation and, when equitable
relief has been obtained, assert such cause of action against the health care
providers. [e.s.] This opinion is not intended to preclude such action by the victim
if appropriate and desired and otherwise possible. Rucks v. Pushman, 541 So. 2d
673, 676 (5th DCA 1989)
6
and which it affirmed in Banks, 955 So. 2d at 608. Application of those principles
here demonstrates that the trial court’s conclusion that Francois had not shown a
sufficient “mistake” to obtain relief under Rule 1.540, Florida Rules of Civil
Procedure was erroneous. In fact, some cases support the notion that Francois
could simply have moved for reformation of the release in this case and did not
need to file his independent reformation action. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Giesel,
155 So. 3d 411 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (no reason for bank to file entirely new action
to achieve result of reformation when trial court could simply vacate judgment);
Kearney v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 2007 WL 2298031 at *7 (M.D. Fla. 2007) (“In
Florida, an independent action for reformation is not required to obtain relief from
mutual mistake”) 4
As to the position taken by the University, we reconfirm the statement in
Alexander v. Kirkham, 365 So. 2d 1038 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978):
It must be pointed out that the defendants in this case
were neither parties to the release agreement, gave any
consideration for it, or changed their position in any way
in reliance upon its terms. They simply seek to be the
donee beneficiaries of an enormous benefit, freedom
from tort liability, gratuitously placed in their laps
through the inadvertence of third parties. On these facts,
there is therefore no legal or equitable reason to interfere
4 Although not expressly addressed by the trial court, we agree with Francois that
no “permission” from this Court was required for purposes of his claim of
reformation, especially where this Court expressly did not rule on such a claim.
Ohio Casualty Group v. Parrish, 350 So. 2d 466, 468-69 (Fla. 1977).
7
with the effectuation of the conceded intention of the
parties to the agreement themselves.
Id. at 1040-41.
Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
8