Jimmie B. Ketcher, Husband v. Deirdre E. Ketcher, Wife

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA
JIMMIE B. KETCHER, NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
HUSBAND, FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
Appellant,
CASE NO. 1D15-4769
v.
DEIRDRE E. KETCHER, WIFE
Appellee.
_____________________________/
Opinion filed April 27, 2016.
An appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.
Linda F. McCallum, Judge.
Brian P. North, Fort Walton Beach, for Appellant.
Summer N. Boyd, Jacksonville, for Appellee.
WETHERELL, J.
Appellant, the former husband, challenges three aspects of the final
judgment dissolving his marriage to Appellee, the former wife: (1) the finding that
he was voluntarily underemployed; (2) the adequacy of the alimony award; and (3)
the requirement that he obtain life insurance to secure his obligation to pay a joint
credit card debt as part of the equitable distribution scheme. We summarily affirm
the first issue because competent substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
finding that the former husband was voluntarily underemployed. We reverse and
remand for further proceedings on the second issue because the final judgment
contains insufficient findings to permit meaningful review of the amount of the
alimony award. We also reverse and remand for further proceedings on the third
issue because the amount of life insurance the former husband was ordered to
obtain and maintain far exceeds the amount of the joint credit card debt he is
required to pay, and the judgment fails to explain the discrepancy.
Factual and Procedural Background
In August 2014, the former husband filed a petition for dissolution of the
parties’ nearly 27-year marriage. Shortly after the petition was filed, the parties
agreed upon the distribution of the marital assets and debts and a consent order was
entered incorporating the agreement. Pertinent here, the consent order required the
former husband to pay a joint credit card with a balance of approximately $20,000.
The consent order also required the former husband to sign documents “stating that
he shall be solely responsible for the payment of this joint debt and relieving Wife
from such liability,” but the record does not reflect whether this was done or
whether these documents would relieve the former wife of her legal obligations to
the credit card company that was not a party to this case.
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The consent order reserved jurisdiction on the former husband’s request for
alimony and attorney’s fees 1 and the issue of life insurance. The trial court held an
evidentiary hearing on those issues and thereafter entered a final judgment finding
the former husband to be voluntarily underemployed and awarding him $500 per
month in permanent alimony, rather than the $1,500 per month he requested. The
judgment also required the former husband to obtain and maintain life insurance in
the amount of $100,000 with the former wife as the beneficiary in order to secure
his payment of the marital debt distributed to him in the consent order.
The former husband filed a motion for rehearing in which he raised the
issues that are the subject of this appeal. The motion was denied, and this appeal
followed.
Alimony
An alimony award must be supported by sufficient findings to demonstrate
that the payee spouse has a need for the amount of alimony awarded and the payer
spouse has the ability to pay that amount. See Matajek v. Skowronska, 927 So. 2d
981, 987 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006); O’Connor v. O’Connor, 782 So. 2d 502, 503-04
(Fla. 2d DCA 2001). Here, the findings made by the trial court in the final
judgment establish that the former husband has a need for alimony and that the
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The issue of attorney’s fees was ultimately resolved by a consent order after the
trial court ruled that the former wife was required to contribute to the former
husband’s attorney’s fees.
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former wife has the ability to pay, but the findings are insufficient to allow for
meaningful review of the amount of alimony awarded.
Notably, although the trial court made findings in the final judgment
addressing each of the factors in section 61.08(2), Florida Statutes, the judgment
did not articulate the basis for the court’s implicit determination that the former
husband only needed $500 per month in alimony and/or that the former wife only
had the ability to pay that amount. The basis for the amount of alimony awarded is
not apparent from the face of the final judgment and, in fact, the judgment actually
hampers our review of the award because (1) although it states multiple times that
the former husband is voluntarily underemployed, the judgment does not expressly
impute any income to the former husband or articulate how (and, more
importantly, how much) his underemployment reduced his need for alimony
despite the monthly deficit of $1,967 reflected on his financial affidavit; (2) it
notes (without definitively ruling) that the $732 monthly surplus reflected on the
former wife’s financial affidavit “will most likely be much higher” because the
gross income listed on the affidavit was understated; and (3) it notes (again,
without definitively ruling) that certain expenses listed by the former wife on her
financial affidavit were challenged by the former husband as “duplicative or
superfluous” and that certain expenses listed by the former husband on his
financial affidavit were challenged by the former wife as “not actual expenses
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incurred or are duplicative.” Accordingly, on the present record, we are simply
unable to meaningfully review the alimony award to determine whether the trial
court abused its discretion in awarding the former husband only $500 per month
and we are compelled to remand the case to the trial court for additional findings
and, if necessary based on those findings, reconsideration of the amount of the
alimony award. See Matajek, 927 So. 2d at 988 (reversing alimony award and
remanding for additional findings because the basis for the award was unclear and
the lack of findings hampered meaningful appellate review).
Life Insurance
The trial court had the authority to require the former husband to obtain and
maintain a life insurance policy naming the former wife as the beneficiary in order
to secure his obligation to pay a marital debt. See Hickman v. Hickman, 864 So.
2d 42, 43 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (affirming requirement that former husband
maintain life insurance to secure the former wife’s share of the equitable
distribution of his pension); § 61.075(1), Fla. Stat. (recognizing the court’s inherent
authority “to do equity between the parties” in the equitable distribution of marital
assets and liabilities). However, the amount of the life insurance policy must be
related to the extent of the obligation being secured. See Therriault v. Therriault,
102 So. 3d 711, 713-14 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012). Here, although the balance on the
joint credit card the former husband was obligated to pay was approximately
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$20,000 (and the former husband agreed to obtain life insurance with the former
wife as the beneficiary in that amount), the final judgment inexplicably required
the former husband to obtain and maintain life insurance in the amount of
$100,000. Of course, if the credit card company relieved the former wife of her
legal obligation to pay the joint credit card, then there would be no need for the
former husband to obtain and maintain life insurance to secure this obligation.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion on the alimony award and the former husband’s
obligation to obtain and maintain life insurance to secure his obligation to pay the
joint credit card debt.
REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings.
ROWE and OSTERHAUS, JJ., CONCUR.
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