State Farm Mutual Automobile etc. v. Jennifer Ann Hawkinson and Brian Reynolds Peters

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA
STATE FARM MUTUAL NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
COMPANY, DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
Appellant, CASE NO. 1D16-2075
v.
JENNIFER ANN HAWKINSON
AND BRIAN REYNOLDS
PETERS,
Appellees.
_____________________________/
Opinion filed August 11, 2016.
An appeal from an order of the Circuit Court for Duval County.
Tyrie W. Boyer, Judge.
Rhonda B. Boggess and Gina P. Grimsley, of Taylor, Day, Grimm & Boyd,
Jacksonville, for Appellant.
Benjamin E. Richard, William A. Bald and Raymond P. Reid, Jr., of Pajcic &
Pajcic, P.A., Jacksonville, for Appellees.
PER CURIAM.
Appellant’s motion to determine jurisdiction is granted. The Court has
determined that it lacks jurisdiction to review the order on appeal. See Workmen’s
Auto Ins. Co. v. Franz, 24 So. 3d 638, 640 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (concluding that
order awarding summary judgment to insureds on issue of entitlement to uninsured
motorist coverage was not a partial final judgment where related claim for
uninsured motorist benefits remained pending). Accordingly, the appeal is
dismissed. Appellee’s motion to dismiss the appeal is denied as moot.
ROBERTS, C.J. and ROWE, J., CONCUR; MAKAR, J., DISSENTS WITH
OPINION.
2
MAKAR, J., dissenting.
After a separate bench trial, a final judgment was entered on the discrete
claim in this case that the insurer was required to provide coverage under its policy
for injuries occurring to the plaintiff, who was determined to be a “relative” under
her parents’ policy. Pending is a separate trial on liability and damages against the
driver, and possible recovery against the insurer under the policy. The insurer
appeals, claiming the final judgment is appealable as a “partial final judgment”
under Rule 9.110(k), Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. (“A partial final
judgment, other than one that disposes of an entire case as to any party, is one that
disposes of a separate and distinct cause of action that is not interdependent with
other pleaded claims.”). Because the discrete issue of coverage is separate and
distinct from the remaining claim for damages, jurisdiction under subsection (k)
exists. On somewhat similar facts, the Second District has found this issue to be a
close question, holding that jurisdiction was lacking because of the procedural
posture in that case; because the claims for insurance coverage and damages were
included in the same count, the court viewed the coverage and damages issues as
“sufficiently interrelated so that this order cannot be reviewed as a partial final
judgment.” Workmen’s Auto Ins. Co. v. Franz, 24 So. 3d 638, 640 (Fla. 2d DCA
2009). But had a declaratory judgment action “been filed separately” to resolve the
coverage issue, the court concluded that jurisdiction would exist. Id. (“We can only
3
explain that the procedural posture of this case is different.”). It makes little sense
to base jurisdiction on whether two lawsuits are filed versus one; the better
approach is to determine the extent of dependency between the coverage and
damages claims. Here, the coverage and damages issues were deemed to be
independent matters, so much so that a separate bench trial was held first on the
former and a discrete “final judgment” entered; no overlap exists between the
issues and evidence, each focusing on entirely different issues. Accordingly, the
insurer’s appeal should be allowed to proceed.
4