Charles Hughes v. State

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FIFTH DISTRICT
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
CHARLES HUGHES,
Appellant,
v. Case No. 5D17-687
STATE OF FLORIDA and
WAYNE IVEY, BREVARD COUNTY SHERIFF,
Appellees.
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Opinion filed June 9, 2017
Appeal from the Circuit Court
for Brevard County,
John M. Harris, Judge.
James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and
Nancy Ryan, Assistant Public Defender,
Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
Keith S. Kromash, of Nash & Kromash,
LLP, Melbourne, for Appellee, Wayne Ivey,
Brevard County Sheriff.
No Appearance for State of Florida.
Jeannette L. Estes, Agency for Persons
with Disabilities, Lakeland, Amicus Curiae,
for State of Florida, Agency for Persons
with Disabilities.
PER CURIAM.
Appellant, Charles Hughes, appeals the denial of his habeas corpus petition.
Because the trial court’s order results in a term of detention greater than the statutory
maximum of fifteen days, we reverse and remand for consideration of Baker Act
proceedings.
The State charged Hughes with attempted first-degree murder, arson of an
occupied dwelling, burglary of a dwelling, burglary of a conveyance, and two counts of
arson. However, on April 28, 2016, the trial court adjudicated Appellant incompetent to
proceed and dismissed his charges without prejudice pursuant to section 916.303, Florida
Statutes (2016). The trial court separately found that Hughes posed a danger to himself
and others, thus qualifying for involuntary admission to a secure residential facility. The
court ordered Hughes's involuntary admission, which he appealed, resulting in a stay of
his admission to residential care. See § 393.11(12)(b), Fla. Stat. (2016). On January 5,
2017, Hughes filed an emergency petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging his
continued detention in the Brevard County Jail. The trial court denied relief.
A defendant "who has been adjudicated incompetent to proceed or not guilty by
reason of insanity" may be held in a jail "as an emergency facility for up to 15 days." §
916.107, Fla. Stat. (2017) (emphasis added). Thus, because Hughes's detention
exceeded fifteen days, "[n]o statute or rule of procedure authorize[d] his continued
detention," and the trial court had grounds to grant his petition. See Pangburn v.
Bradshaw, 39 So. 3d 578, 578 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010). However, just as the Fourth District
Court did in Facyson v. Jenne, 821 So. 2d 1169, 1171 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002), we find that,
despite our "power to release individuals who are being detained without legal authority,
we do not deem such to be an appropriate remedy in this case at this time." Instead, we
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recognize the trial court's finding that Hughes posed a danger to himself and others and
grant habeas corpus relief "subject first to consideration of Baker Act proceedings under
Chapter 394 by the trial court if appropriate." Dep't of Child. & Fams. v. B.N., 979 So. 2d
1110, 1112 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).
REVERSED and REMANDED with Instructions.
WALLIS, TORPY and EVANDER, JJ., concur.
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