Demetrius C. Cooper v. State

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FIFTH DISTRICT
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
DEMETRIUS CARTER COOPER,
Appellant,
v. Case No. 5D17-2326
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
________________________________/
Opinion filed January 12, 2018
3.800 Appeal from the Circuit
Court for Brevard County,
Jeffrey Mahl, Judge.
Demetrius Carter Cooper, Raiford, pro se.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General,
Tallahassee, Bonnie Jean Parrish and
Douglas Squire, Assistants Attorney
General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
PER CURIAM.
Demetrius Carter Cooper appeals the denial of a “Motion to Correct Illegal
Sentence.” In 2009, Cooper was charged with aggravated battery, a second-degree
felony, and was sentenced under the Youthful Offender Act. See § 958.04, Fla. Stat.
(2009). The Act subjects an offender to a maximum incarceration period of 6 years. See
id. § 958.04(2). Cooper was sentenced to 479 days in the Department of Corrections
(“DOC”), followed by 18 months of community control and a subsequent term of 18
months of probation. After the revocation of his community control for a substantive
violation, the trial court sentenced Cooper to a minimum mandatory term of 20 years with
the DOC pursuant to section 775.087(2)(a), Florida Statutes (the 10-20-Life statute). The
judgment and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. Cooper v. State, 56 So. 3d 783(Fla. 5th DCA 2011). Cooper’s sentence was later amended to reflect that he maintained
his youthful offender status.
Cooper has filed several appeals related to his sentence. In this appeal, he
challenges the denial of his “Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence.” In the motion, he claimed
that the minimum mandatory term was illegal because it exceeded the maximum
sentence he could have received for a second-degree felony. See § 775.082(3)(d), Fla.
Stat. (providing 15-year maximum sentence for second-degree felony).
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) provides, in relevant part:
(a) Correction.
(1) Generally a court may at any time correct an illegal
sentence imposed by it, or an incorrect calculation made by it
in a sentencing scoresheet, when it is affirmatively alleged
that the court records demonstrate on their face an
entitlement to that relief, provided that a party may not file a
motion to correct an illegal sentence under this subdivision
during the time allowed for the filing of a motion under
subdivision (b)(1) or during the pendency of a direct appeal.
Rule 3.800(a) “is intended to balance the need for finality of convictions and sentences
with the goal of ensuring that criminal defendants do not serve sentences imposed
contrary to the requirements of law.” Carter v. State, 786 So. 2d 1173, 1176 (Fla. 2001).
“[A] sentence is ‘illegal’ if it ‘imposes a kind of punishment that no judge under the entire
body of sentencing statutes could possibly inflict under any set of factual circumstances.’”
Id. at 1178 (quoting Blakley v. State, 746 So. 2d 1182, 1186‒87 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)).
2
Section 958.14, Florida Statutes, addresses a youthful offender’s violation of
probation or community control:
A violation or alleged violation of probation or the terms of a
community control program shall subject the youthful offender
to the provisions of s. 948.06. However, no youthful offender
shall be committed to the custody of the department for a
substantive violation for a period longer than the maximum
sentence for the offense for which he or she was found guilty
....
(Emphasis added). Section 958.14 dictates that violations are subject to the provisions of
section 948.06, which provides, in relevant part:
If probation or community control is revoked, the court shall
adjudge the probationer or offender guilty of the offense
charged and proven or admitted, unless he or she has
previously been adjudicated guilty, and impose any sentence
which it might have originally imposed before placing the
probationer on probation or the offender into community
control.
§ 948.06(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added).
In Christian v. State, 84 So. 3d 437 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012), this Court addressed
whether the State was required to file new charges to support a finding of a substantive
violation of probation under the Youthful Offender Act. Concluding the State did not, we
thoroughly analyzed the sentencing options under the Act. 84 So. 3d at 441–45. Included
in that analysis was the applicability of minimum mandatory terms to youthful offenders.
Id. at 442. We explained that Florida’s minimum mandatory statutes did not apply to a
sentence imposed on a youthful offender because a youthful offender sentence is “[i]n
lieu of other criminal penalties authorized by law.” Id. (quoting Mendez v. State, 835 So.
2d 348, 349 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); § 958.04(2), Fla. Stat. (2001)). “[O]nce a defendant is
sentenced as a youthful offender, the sentencing features (and limitations) of the Youthful
3
Offender Act apply to future sentencing proceedings on that same offense . . . .” Id. (citing
State v. Arnette, 604 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 1992)). Thus, we concluded that although the 6-
year maximum youthful offender sentence was inapplicable following a substantive
violation of probation, classification as a youthful offender “is particularly significant in
cases where the charge would carry a minimum mandatory prison term if the trial judge
had not originally opted for a youthful offender sentence.” Id. at 443.
In Eustache v. State, 199 So. 3d 484 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016), the Fourth District
certified conflict with Christian and certified the following question as a matter of great
public importance:
WHERE A DEFENDANT IS INITIALLY SENTENCED TO
PROBATION OR COMMUNITY CONTROL AS A
YOUTHFUL OFFENDER, AND THE TRIAL COURT LATER
REVOKES SUPERVISION FOR A SUBSTANTIVE
VIOLATION AND IMPOSES A SENTENCE ABOVE THE
YOUTHFUL OFFENDER CAP UNDER SECTIONS 958.14
AND 948.06(2), FLORIDA STATUTES, IS THE COURT
REQUIRED TO IMPOSE A MINIMUM MANDATORY
SENTENCE THAT WOULD HAVE ORIGINALLY APPLIED
TO THE OFFENSE?
The Florida Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction, Eustache v. State, SC16-1712, 2017
WL 3484317, at *1 (Fla. Feb. 17, 2017), and recently held oral arguments.
We recognize that in Christian, the question of whether a minimum mandatory term
applied to a sentence imposed on a youthful offender after revocation of probation or
community control was answered in dicta. However, we adhere to the analysis in
Christian, which involved a question of statutory construction at its heart. The sentencing
options for youthful offenders are limited. Section 948.06 does not, on its face, alter the
sentence that the court “might have originally imposed” on a youthful offender. When read
together, sections 958.04, 948.06, and 958.14 permit the trial court to sentence a youthful
4
offender who substantively violates probation or community control to a prison sentence
in excess of 6 years but do not allow the court to impose a minimum mandatory term.
Further, the reasoning in Christian comports with our prior holdings in Hill v. State, 692
So. 2d 277 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (explaining youthful offender would be sentenced in
excess of 6-year cap for substantive probation violation), and Kelly v. State, 739 So. 2d
1164, 1165 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (holding 3-year minimum mandatory term could not be
imposed on youthful offender).
Accordingly, we reverse the denial of Appellant’s motion and certify conflict with
Eustache v. State, 199 So. 3d 484 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016).
REVERSED and REMANDED. CONFLICT CERTIFIED.
COHEN, C.J., and ORFINGER, J., concur.
PALMER, J., dissents without opinion.
5