Sandra Sheridan v. State of Florida, Department of Health

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA
SANDRA SHERIDAN,
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
Appellant, FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
v.
CASE NO. 1D15-91
STATE OF FLORIDA,
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
Appellee.
_____________________________/
Opinion filed January 6, 2016.
An appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County.
James Roy Bean, III, Senior Judge
Marie A. Mattox, James P. Garrity, and Lisa C. Lambert of Marie A. Mattox, P.A.,
Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Richard E. Johnson of the Law Office of Richard E. Johnson, Tallahassee, and
Michelle Erin Nadeau of Kwall, Showers, Barack & Chilson, P.A., Clearwater, for
Amicus Curiae National Employment Lawyers Association, Florida Chapter, for
Appellant.
Linda Bond Edwards and Brian L. Hayden of Rumberger, Kirk, & Caldwell,
Tallahassee, for Appellee.
RAY, J.
In this employment discrimination action, Sandra Sheridan appeals a final
summary judgment in favor of the Florida Department of Health for her failure to
satisfy the administrative prerequisites of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992
before filing her lawsuit against the Department. We agree with the Department
that Ms. Sheridan’s lawsuit was premature because it was filed before the Florida
Commission on Human Relations was afforded the 180 days provided by statute to
investigate the underlying discrimination charge and determine whether there is
reasonable cause to believe that a discriminatory practice occurred. However, final
summary judgment for the Department was not justified, because the passage of
time cured the problem of the prematurely filed lawsuit. Accordingly, we reverse
final summary judgment for the Department and remand for the trial court to
reinstate the action.
I. The Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992
The Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (“FCRA”) is remedial legislation
designed “to secure for all individuals within the state freedom from discrimination
because of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, handicap, or marital
status.” § 760.01(2), Fla. Stat. (2012). By its express terms, the FCRA must be
liberally construed to further its general purposes and the special purposes of the
particular provision involved. § 760.01(3). As a corollary, the FCRA’s
administrative preconditions on an individual’s right of access to courts to seek
redress for unlawful discrimination must be narrowly construed in a manner that
favors access. Woodham v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 829 So. 2d
891, 897 (Fla. 2002).
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Prior to filing a civil action alleging discrimination in violation of the FCRA,
the individual seeking relief must file a complaint with the Florida Commission on
Human Relations (“Commission”) within 365 days of the alleged violation and
exhaust the administrative remedies provided by the FCRA. § 760.11(1), (4);
Woodham, 829 So. 2d at 894. Under a worksharing arrangement between the
Commission and the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”),
each agency has authorized the other to accept discrimination charges or
complaints on the other’s behalf. In this context, the date the complaint is filed
with the Commission is the earliest date of filing with the EEOC or the
Commission. § 760.11(1).
Once this filing occurs, the Commission has 180 days to investigate the
allegations in the complaint and determine if reasonable cause exists to believe that
a discriminatory practice has occurred. § 760.11(3). The FCRA contemplates three
possible scenarios at that point:
(1) If the Commission determines that “reasonable cause” exists, the
claimant has two options: (1) bring a civil action in a court of
competent jurisdiction or (2) request an administrative hearing under
sections 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes. § 760.11(4).
(2) If the Commission determines that “no reasonable cause” exists, it
must dismiss the complaint. § 760.11(7). At that point, the claimant
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may request an administrative hearing before an administrative law
judge. Id. If the administrative process yields a final order that
concludes that a violation of the FCRA did occur, the claimant may
either bring a civil action as if there had been a reasonable cause
determination or accept the relief offered by the final order. Id.
(3) If the Commission fails to conciliate or determine whether there is
reasonable cause within 180 days of the date the complaint is filed,
the claimant may proceed with the remedies provided as if the
Commission determined that there was reasonable cause (i.e., bring a
civil action or request administrative review). § 760.11(8).
A civil action brought under the FCRA must be filed “no later than 1 year after the
date of determination of reasonable cause by the commission.” § 760.11(5). The
“commencement of such action” divests the Commission of jurisdiction over the
complaint. Id.
II. Ms. Sheridan’s Case
After being terminated from employment with the Department, Ms. Sheridan
filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, alleging that she had been the
victim of racial discrimination at the hands of Department employees in violation
of “Chapter 760 of the Florida Civil Rights Act and/or Title VII of the Federal
Civil Rights Act.” Ms. Sheridan designated on the EEOC charge form that she
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intended the charge to be dual-filed with the Commission. A few weeks later, the
EEOC mailed Ms. Sheridan a “Dismissal and Notice of Rights,” advising that it
was closing its file because the “charge was not timely filed with the EEOC.” With
respect to the right to sue, the form stated:
You may file a lawsuit against the respondent(s) under federal law
based on this charge in federal or state court. Your lawsuit must be
filed WITHIN 90 DAYS of your receipt of this notice; or your right
to sue based on this charge will be lost. (The time limit for filing suit
based on a claim under state law may be different.)
Within ninety days of receipt of the EEOC’s right-to-sue notice, and forty-
four days after filing her charge of discrimination with the EEOC, Ms. Sheridan
filed a complaint in state court alleging one count of race discrimination under the
FCRA. Limited discovery ensued. The Department thereafter filed a motion for
summary judgment, contending that Ms. Sheridan failed to meet the administrative
prerequisites necessary to bring suit under the FCRA. The Department contended
that Ms. Sheridan’s complaint was premature because it was filed before the
Commission made a reasonable cause determination regarding the validity of the
charge and before the expiration of the Commission’s 180-day statutory
investigatory period. This premature filing, the Department argued, divested the
Commission of jurisdiction to act on the charge and prevented the accrual of Ms.
Sheridan’s claim under the FCRA. Moreover, the Department asserted that the
defect of the prematurely filed lawsuit could not be cured by the filing of a new
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discrimination charge with the Commission because more than 365 days had
passed since the alleged discriminatory act.
The court granted the motion for final summary judgment, adopting the
arguments and reasoning of the Department. Ms. Sheridan moved for rehearing
before a successor trial judge. After hearing arguments of counsel and reviewing
the record, the court denied the motion for rehearing and entered final judgment in
favor of the Department.
On appeal, Ms. Sheridan argues that the court erred in granting final
summary judgment for the Department because, as was argued below, she
complied with the administrative prerequisites of the FCRA by dual-filing her
charge of discrimination with the EEOC and the Commission, and by commencing
her civil action against the Department within the 90-day window set forth in the
EEOC’s right-to-sue notice. She contends that the two agencies speak as one under
their worksharing agreement and that the EEOC’s notice was the legal trigger
requiring her to file her lawsuit when she did, even though the requisite 180 days
under the FCRA had not passed. Alternatively, she argues that a prematurely filed
civil action does not divest the Commission of jurisdiction of the discrimination
charge, so the court should have held her case in abeyance pending the passage of
the 180-day period, or dismissed the case without prejudice. By granting summary
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judgment for the Department, Ms. Sheridan argues, the trial court violated the
FCRA’s mandate for liberal construction and denied her due process.
III. Discussion
The undisputed facts reveal that Ms. Sheridan timely filed a race
discrimination complaint under the FCRA by dual-filing the charge with the EEOC
and the Commission within one year after the alleged discriminatory act. The
Department does not contend otherwise. The parties disagree, however, on whether
Ms. Sheridan’s civil action based on that charge was prematurely filed against the
Department, and if so, whether the premature filing warranted final summary
judgment against Ms. Sheridan. We review the trial court’s order de novo “to
determine whether there are genuine issues of material fact and whether the trial
court properly applied the correct rule of law.” Glaze v. Worley, 157 So. 3d 552,
553-54 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015).
A.
The Department contends, and the trial court agreed, that Ms. Sheridan
prematurely filed her lawsuit against the Department by commencing the action
before the Commission made a cause determination on the discrimination charge
or had the opportunity to utilize the full 180-day investigatory period provided by
the FCRA. Conversely, Ms. Sheridan argues that her lawsuit was timely because
under the worksharing agreement between the Commission and the EEOC, the
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right-to-sue notice issued by the EEOC governed her claims against the
Department under state law as well as federal law. She submits that she was
presented with a Hobson’s Choice of either complying with the 90-day “right to
sue” deadline provided by the EEOC’s notice or waiting for the Commission’s
180-day investigatory period to run. Ms. Sheridan contends that the order granting
summary judgment violated her due process rights because the trial court’s
interpretation of the EEOC’s right-to-sue notice required her to take some other
undefined administrative action to preserve her state law claim.
We find no merit to Ms. Sheridan’s arguments on this point. The EEOC’s
right-to-sue notice is clear that the 90-day window applies only to claims under
federal law brought in federal or state court. No such claim was made in this case.
The right-to-sue notice also put Ms. Sheridan on notice that “[t]he time limit for
filing suit based on a claim under state law may be different.” Nothing on the face
of the notice reasonably suggests that Ms. Sheridan had only 90 days from receipt
of the notice to bring her state law discrimination claim against the Department in
state court.
The express language and import of the notice is consistent with the
provisions of the FCRA and applicable case law. The FCRA clearly delineates
when, and under what circumstances, a civil action may be filed for unlawful
discrimination after a charge is timely filed with the Commission. It is only after
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the Commission determines there is reasonable cause to believe that unlawful
discrimination occurred, or the charge remains unresolved for 180 days, that an
aggrieved party may seek redress in court. § 760.11(4), (8). On the other hand, if
the Commission determines, within the 180-day period, that there is no reasonable
cause, the claimant is limited to review before an administrative law judge under
Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, and cannot file a civil action unless that review is
successful. § 760.11(7). As this Court has previously stated, the framework of the
FCRA “permits those subjected to unlawful workplace discrimination to seek
redress, imposes a preliminary screening procedure to weed out unmeritorious
claims, and avoids having that screening process arbitrarily eliminate the right to
review by allowing those whose charges are not efficiently handled to proceed to
circuit court if no ruling has been rendered in 180 days.” McElrath v. Burley, 707
So. 2d 836, 840 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (upholding the constitutionality of the FCRA
against access-to-courts challenge). It is axiomatic that the carefully crafted
administrative regime of the FCRA is frustrated when a claimant acts contrary to
its express terms.
Because Ms. Sheridan failed to satisfy the administrative preconditions of
the FCRA, she was not authorized by law to commence a civil action against the
Department in the absence of a reasonable cause determination from the
Commission. To hold otherwise would potentially allow a claimant “to
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successfully circumvent the possibility of a dismissal and being locked into the
sole remedy of an administrative hearing.” Ayers v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 941 F.
Supp. 1163, 1167 (M.D. Fla. 1996).
Despite the clear and unambiguous procedural requirements of the FCRA,
Ms. Sheridan appears to argue that under the worksharing agreement between the
Commission and the EEOC, the right-to-sue notice issued by the EEOC operated
as a reasonable cause determination by the Commission, opening the door for her
to file her lawsuit without having to wait the requisite 180 days. Ms. Sheridan does
not point to any provision in the worksharing agreement or the FCRA that dictates
that an EEOC determination on a federal claim binds the Commission for purposes
of determining a claimant’s right to proceed with a cause of action under the
FCRA. Even if that arrangement existed, it is not applicable because the EEOC’s
right-to-sue notice was issued in this case because Ms. Sheridan’s federal claim
was not timely filed with the EEOC. The EEOC did not make a cause
determination on Ms. Sheridan’s claim. Accordingly, the right-to-sue notice did
not abrogate the Commission’s statutory mandate to determine if there is
reasonable cause to believe that a discriminatory practice has occurred in violation
of the FCRA. See § 760.11(3). For the same reason, Ms. Sheridan could not rely
on the 90-day deadline announced in the EEOC’s right-to-sue notice to bypass the
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requirement that she wait 180 days before filing suit in the absence of a reasonable
cause determination from the Commission.
The Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Woodham v. Blue Cross and Blue
Shield of Florida, Inc., 829 So. 2d 891, 897 (Fla. 2002), supports our conclusion.
In that case, the court held that an EEOC dismissal and right-to-sue notice based on
the EEOC’s determination that it was “unable to conclude” that there was a
violation of the FCRA did not amount to a finding by the Commission that “there
is not reasonable cause” to believe that a violation of the FCRA occurred.
Woodham, 829 So. 2d at 897. Had the EEOC’s determination constituted a “no
cause” determination by the FCHR, the claimant’s only recourse would have been
through administrative review, not the courts. Id. The Court reasoned, however,
that the plain language of section 760.11(7) requires a specific determination “that
there is not reasonable cause” to believe a violation occurred before foreclosing
an individual’s ability to sue in court. Id.
In this case, as in Woodham, the EEOC did not pass on the validity of the
discrimination charge by making either a cause or a no-cause determination.
Therefore, the EEOC’s right-to-sue notice cannot operate to circumvent the
administrative prerequisites of the FCRA. Because Ms. Sheridan filed her lawsuit
against the Department before obtaining a reasonable cause determination from the
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Commission or waiting for 180 days to lapse, she failed to exhaust administrative
remedies.
B.
Ms. Sheridan argues alternatively that if her lawsuit was prematurely filed,
the court should have held the case in abeyance to allow the statutory 180-day
period to run or dismissed the complaint without prejudice. Adopting the
arguments of the Department below, the trial court concluded that once Ms.
Sheridan commenced her civil suit, it divested the Commission of jurisdiction over
Ms. Sheridan’s claim and prevented the accrual of a cause of action under the
FCRA. The Department relied primarily on the Third District Court of Appeal’s
reasoning in Sweeney v. Florida Power and Light Co., 725 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1998), to argue that the premature filing of Ms. Sheridan’s complaint was
fatal to her discrimination claim because it made it impossible for the Commission
to have the full 180 days to conciliate and investigate the charge.
Ms. Sheridan relies on a more recent case from the Third District Court of
Appeal, Jackson v. Worldwide Flight Services, Inc., 960 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 3d DCA
2005), as well as a decision from the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit, Webb v. Worldwide Flight Service, Inc., 407 F.3d 1192 (11th
Cir. 2005), both of which flatly reject the position that the premature filing of a
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civil action under the FCRA divests the Commission of jurisdiction. We agree with
Jackson and Webb on this narrow issue.
The debate between the parties concerning the effect of a prematurely filed
complaint on the Commission’s jurisdiction centers on the interpretation of the
following provision of the FCRA:
A civil action brought under this section shall be commenced no later
than 1 year after the date of determination of reasonable cause by the
commission. The commencement of such action shall divest the
commission of jurisdiction of the complaint, except that the
commission may intervene in the civil action as a matter of right.
§ 760.11(5) (emphasis added). The Department contends that, under this provision,
the filing of any civil action under the FCRA divests the Commission of
jurisdiction of the discrimination charge, therefore requiring the plaintiff of a
prematurely filed FCRA lawsuit to restart the administrative process by filing a
new charge with the Commission and then waiting for a cause determination or the
expiration of 180 days before initiating a subsequent civil action. We disagree with
the Department’s interpretation of section 760.11(5).
As Judge Joel F. Dubina wrote for a unanimous panel in Webb v.
Worldwide Flight Service, Inc.:
The term, “commencement of such action,” in section 760.11(5), refers
to a civil action that is timely filed “after the date of determination of
reasonable cause by the commission.” Section 760.11(5) does not
provide that a civil action that is filed prior to a reasonable cause
determination, or the equivalent 180 day filing period set forth in
section 760.11(8), divests the commission of jurisdiction.
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407 F.3d at 1194. Consistent with the reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit, we
conclude that the Commission is not divested of jurisdiction of a timely filed
discrimination charge when the claimant prematurely files a civil action based on
that charge. In the context of section 760.11(5), only a properly filed civil action
divests the Commission of jurisdiction. Id.; see also Jackson, 960 So. 2d at 5
(distinguishing its earlier decision in Sweeney).
C.
While a prematurely filed complaint does not, by itself, divest the
Commission of jurisdiction, it does not necessarily follow that the appropriate
disposition in all such cases is for the trial court to hold the lawsuit in abeyance
pending the conclusion of the administrative process. The appropriate disposition
of prematurely filed actions varies depending on the nature of the premature
element and the circumstances surrounding the premature act. Shuck v. Bank of
America, N.A., 862 So. 2d 20, 24 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). When the premature
element of a claim is curable simply by the passage of time, courts generally
determine that the appropriate disposition is abatement of the action until the cause
matures. Id. (citing Thomas v. Suwannee County, 734 So. 2d 492, 497 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1999)). However, if the action is premature because one of the essential
elements of the claim is contingent upon the occurrence of an event that may or
may not occur, the appropriate disposition is dismissal. Id. at 25.
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By design, the administrative exhaustion requirements of the FCRA involve
more than the mere passage of time. They entail a period of investigation and
efforts at conciliation by the Commission, and the potential that a claimant may be
foreclosed from immediate judicial review if the Commission finds “no cause” as
to the underlying discrimination charge. These factors weigh in favor of dismissal
as opposed to abatement. This Court has previously held that when a claimant
requests and obtains a dismissal of her discrimination charge from the Commission
prior to the expiration of the 180-day period, her prematurely filed complaint based
on that charge must be dismissed. Brewer v. Clerk of Circuit Court, Gadsden
County, 720 So. 2d 602, 604-05 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (citing Ayers, 941 F. Supp. at
1167).
In the case before us, however, the undisputed facts favor a resolution that
would allow Ms. Sheridan’s lawsuit to proceed to a resolution on its merits. At the
summary judgment hearing, the record evidence established that the Commission
had not received the underlying charge of discrimination from the EEOC within
the Commission’s 180-day investigatory window and, as a result, the Commission
had not opened a case file or initiated any investigation of the discrimination
charge. In fact, well over a year after Ms. Sheridan filed her charge of
discrimination, the Commission’s Executive Director swore by affidavit that the
Commission had no record of the charge, nor any record of receiving the charge.
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By the time the Department moved for summary judgment, it was clear from the
record that Ms. Sheridan’s discrimination charge had fallen through the proverbial
cracks of the worksharing arrangement and that the Commission had not and
would not have taken any action on it.
Under the unique facts of this case, the premature filing of Ms. Sheridan’s
lawsuit was indeed cured by the passage of time before the issue of the premature
filing went before the trial court. The premature filing did not deprive the
Commission of the opportunity to fulfill its statutorily mandated responsibilities
under the Act and, due to the timing of the proceedings in the trial court, did not
threaten to circumvent the possibility of a dismissal by the Commission which
would have foreclosed the option of filing an action in court. Since the passage of
time cured the defect of the prematurely filed complaint, the trial court erred in
granting final summary judgment for the Department. See Thomas, 734 So. 2d at
497 (holding that it was improper for the trial court to dismiss a claim for failure to
comply with a statutory condition precedent, since the passage of time had cured
the problem before the trial court acted on the motion to dismiss); Angrand v. Fox,
552 So. 2d 1113, 1115 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (deciding that where the only alleged
defect in the complaint was that it was filed too soon, dismissal would serve no
purpose other than to benefit the clerk by requiring the payment of additional fees).
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IV. Conclusion
Consistent with our charge to liberally construe the FCRA so as not to
unduly restrict a citizen’s constitutionally guaranteed access to the courts, we
reverse the order granting final summary judgment for the Department and remand
for the trial court to reinstate Ms. Sheridan’s complaint.
ROBERTS, C.J. and THOMAS, J. CONCUR.
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