DEVON A. BROWN v. MIAMI-DADE COUNTY

Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed March 3, 2021.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
________________
No. 3D20-865
Lower Tribunal No. 20-3512
________________
Devon A. Brown,
Appellant,
vs.
Miami-Dade County, et al.,
Appellees.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Valerie R.
Manno Schurr, Judge.
Devon A. Brown, in proper person.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Christopher H. Baisden
(Tallahassee), Assistant Attorney General; Abigail Price-Williams, Miami-
Dade County Attorney, and Sabrina Levin, Assistant County Attorney, for
appellees.
Before EMAS, C.J., and HENDON and LOBREE, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Devon Brown appeals two orders dismissing Brown’s complaint with
prejudice, and a third order that declares Brown a vexatious litigant under
section 68.093, Florida Statutes (2020). Upon our de novo review, we
conclude, without further discussion, that Brown has failed to demonstrate
any error in the trial court’s orders dismissing his complaint with prejudice,
and write further only to address Brown’s remaining claim that the trial court
erred in declaring him a vexatious litigant.
We begin by noting that Brown failed to provide this court with a
transcript of the hearing that resulted in the order on appeal. We have no
record of what evidence was presented, or what arguments were made, at
that hearing. Without a transcript, this court cannot provide meaningful
appellate review of Brown’s claims alleging error in the trial court’s factual
determinations or in the trial court’s exercise of its discretion. Applegate v.
Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 377 So. 2d 1150, 1152 (Fla. 1979) (holding:
“When there are issues of fact the appellant necessarily asks the reviewing
court to draw conclusions about the evidence. Without a record of the trial
proceedings, the appellate court can not properly resolve the underlying
factual issues so as to conclude that the trial court's judgment is not
supported by the evidence or by an alternative theory. Without knowing the
factual context, neither can an appellate court reasonably conclude that the
2
trial judge so misconceived the law as to require reversal.”) See also
Alvarado v. Dep’t of Revenue ex rel. Alvarado, 194 So. 3d 544, 545 (Fla. 3d
DCA 2016).
In light of this, our review is limited to determining whether there is error
apparent on the face of the order declaring Brown a vexatious litigant. See
G&S Dev. Corp. v. Seitlin, 47 So. 3d 893, 895 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010); Whelan
v. Whelan, 736 So. 2d 732 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). Brown has failed to
establish the existence of any such error. We find the trial court complied
with the requirements of section 68.093, and reject Brown’s claim that the
statute violates his right to access to the courts as guaranteed by the Florida
Constitution.
While the Florida Constitution does indeed provide a right of access to
the courts, see Art. I, § 21. Fla. Const. (providing: “The courts shall be open
to every person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered
without sale, denial or delay”), this right is not without limitation. A litigant’s
right to access may be properly restricted if the litigant is abusing the legal
process. State v. Spencer, 751 So. 2d 47, 48 (Fla. 1999) (noting that “any
citizen, including a citizen attacking his or her conviction, abuses the right to
pro se access by filing repetitious and frivolous pleadings, thereby
diminishing the ability of the courts to devote their finite resources to the
3
consideration of legitimate claims”); Jimenez v. State, 196 So. 3d 499 (Fla.
3d DCA 2016); McGrath v. Caron, 8 So. 3d 1253 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009).
Florida courts “have, when deemed necessary, exercised the inherent
judicial authority to sanction an abusive litigant.” Sibley v. Florida Judicial
Qualifications Comm’n, 973 So. 2d 425, 426 (Fla. 2006) (collecting cases).
Indeed, the very law challenged by Brown was enacted by the Florida
Legislature to address such abusive pro se litigants. Florida law defines a
“vexatious litigant” as:
A person . . . who, in the immediately preceding 5-year period,
has commenced, prosecuted, or maintained, pro se, five or more
civil actions in any court in this state, except an action governed
by the Florida Small Claims Rules, which actions have been
finally and adversely determined against such person or entity.
§ 68.093(2)(d)1., Fla. Stat. (2019).1
Should a court determine a person is a vexatious litigant, that court
may
on its own motion or on the motion of any party, enter a prefiling
order prohibiting a vexatious litigant from commencing, pro se,
any new action in the courts of that circuit without first obtaining
leave of the administrative judge of that circuit. Disobedience of
such an order may be punished as contempt of court by the
administrative judge of that circuit. Leave of court shall be
granted by the administrative judge only upon a showing that the
proposed action is meritorious and is not being filed for the
purpose of delay or harassment. The administrative judge may
1
This law is known as the “Florida Vexatious Litigant Law.”
4
condition the filing of the proposed action upon the furnishing of
security as provided in this section.
§ 68.093(4), Fla. Stat. (2019).
This statute has been upheld against constitutional challenges such as
those raised here by Brown. See, e.g., Smith v. Fisher, 965 So. 2d 205 (Fla.
4th DCA 2007). We agree with the analysis of our sister court in Smith which,
in upholding the constitutionality of the Vexatious Litigant Law, concluded it
was narrowly tailored to serve the state’s compelling interest in preventing
vexatious litigants from interfering with the court system’s proper
administration of justice. Id. at 209-10.
Further, a review of the County’s motion, seeking the court to declare
Brown a vexatious litigant, properly set forth the “five or more civil actions”
which had been “commenced, prosecuted or maintained pro se” by Brown
“over the immediately preceding 5-year period,” see section 68.093(2)(d)1.,
and the exhibits attached to the motion established that each of those actions
“have been finally and adversely determined against” Brown. 2 Id.2
Indeed, the County’s motion contained a recitation of at least seven civil
actions commenced, prosecuted or maintained pro se by Brown in the
Florida circuit courts, including five in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida
and two in the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit of Florida. And while the
Vexatious Litigant Law is limited to civil actions in Florida State courts, the
motion noted that Brown has maintained at least eight civil actions in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, where he has
5
The motion and attached exhibits satisfied the statutory requisites for
a declaration under the Vexatious Litigant Law, and the trial court’s order
properly deemed Brown to be a vexatious litigant. Brown has failed to
establish any error in the trial court’s order prohibiting Brown “from any
further pro se filings in any court of the 11th Judicial Circuit in and for Miami-
Dade County, without first obtaining leave of the Administrative Judge and
the furnishing of security.” We therefore affirm the trial court’s orders in all
respects.
Affirmed.
been prohibited from proceeding pro se, except under expressly limited
circumstances.
6