DEVIN TRAVON MAYS v. State

Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed March 10, 2021.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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No. 3D20-1527
Lower Tribunal No. F16-21911B
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Devin Travon Mays,
Appellant,
vs.
The State of Florida,
Appellee.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Dava J.
Tunis, Judge.
Ross Amsel Raben Nascimento PLLC., and Robert G. Amsel, for
appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Magaly Rodriguez, and Brian H.
Zack, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.
Before LOGUE, SCALES, and LINDSEY, JJ.
On Motion to Review Order Denying Post-Trial Release
LINDSEY, J.
On December 28, 2020, this Court reversed the trial court’s unwritten
denial of Appellant Devon Travon Mays’s motion for post-trial release and
remanded “with instructions to reconsider post-trial bail for Appellant
pursuant to the principles enunciated in Younghans v. State, 90 So. 2d 308(Fla. 1956) and in accordance with Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure
3.691(b).”1 On remand, the trial court issued a written order denying post-
trial release. Mays has filed a second motion for review.2 Because we
cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion, we affirm the trial court’s
order denying Mays’s motion for post-trial release.
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.691 authorizes, under certain
circumstances, post-trial release pending review of the conviction. Pursuant
1
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.691(a) requires the trial court to apply
the principles enunciated in Younghans: “A defendant who has been
adjudicated guilty of the commission of any non-capital offense for which bail
is not prohibited under section 903.133, Florida Statutes, may be released,
pending review of the conviction, at the discretion of either the trial or
appellate court, applying the principles enunciated in Younghans v. State, 90
So. 2d 308 (Fla. 1956).” Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.691(b)
requires written findings when a trial court denies post-trial release.
2
We have jurisdiction pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure
9.140(h)(4) (“Review of an order relating to post-trial release shall be by the
court on motion.”).
2
to Rule 3.691(a), “No defendant may be admitted to bail on appeal from a
conviction of a felony unless the defendant establishes that the appeal is
taken in good faith, on grounds fairly debatable, and not frivolous.” See also
Younghans, 90 So. 2d at 310 (“[I]f an appeal is taken ‘merely for delay, bail
should be refused; but, if taken in good faith, on grounds not frivolous but
fairly debatable, in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court, then
petitioners should be admitted to bail.’” (quoting United States v. Motlow, 10
F.2d 657, 662 (7th Cir. 1926))).
In addition, “the trial judge might consider (1) the habits of the individual
as to respect for the law, (2) his local attachments to the community, by way
of family ties, business, or investments, (3) the serverity [sic] of the
punishment imposed for the offense, and any other circumstances relevant
to the question of whether the person would be tempted to remove himself
from the jurisdiction of the court.” Id. Importantly, post-trial release is a
discretionary matter, and our “review is limited to discerning whether the trial
court’s exercise of discretion is arbitrary or capricious.” Baptiste v. State,
134 So. 3d 1025, 1026 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (citing McGlade v. State, 941
So. 2d 1185, 1188 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)).
Here, the trial court found that Mays satisfied the threshold showing
that the appeal was “taken in good faith, on grounds fairly debatable, and not
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frivolous.” The trial court’s order also identifies the three factors set forth in
Younghans and provides some factual findings and reasoning in support of
its decision to deny post-trial release. Cf. McCormack v. State, 338 So. 2d
208, 209 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975) (“[A] mere verbatim recital of the
considerations of Younghans will not suffice to fulfill the requirements of the
rules.”). Although the order under review could have been more detailed, it
correctly applied the principles enunciated in Younghans. See Baker v.
Myers Tractor Srvs., Inc., 765 So. 2d 149, 150 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (“[U]nder
an abuse of discretion standard of review . . . ‘to justify reversal, it would
have to be shown on appeal that the trial court clearly erred in its
interpretation of the facts and the use of its judgment and not merely that the
court, or another fact-finder, might have made a different factual
determination.’” (quoting Mercer v. Raine, 443 So. 2d 944, 946 (Fla.1983))).
We therefore deny Mays’s second motion for review and affirm the order
denying Mays’s motion for post-trial release.
Motion for review denied; order denying post-trial release affirmed.
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