GIVANNI TORRELL PARKS v. State

Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed March 17, 2021.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
________________
No. 3D20-1418
Lower Tribunal No. F96-38947
________________
Givanni Torrell Parks,
Petitioner,
vs.
The State of Florida,
Respondent.
A Case of Original Jurisdiction – Habeas Corpus.
Givanni Torrell Parks, in proper person.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Ivy R. Ginsberg, Assistant
Attorney General, for respondent.
Before LOGUE, LINDSEY, and MILLER, JJ.
MILLER, J.
Petitioner, Givanni Torrell Parks, seeks habeas corpus relief from his
conviction and sentence for second-degree murder, in violation of section
782.04(2), Florida Statutes, burglary with assault, in violation of section
810.02(2)(a), Florida Statutes, and attempted armed robbery, in violation of
section 812.13(2)(b), Florida Statutes. In the instant petition, Parks contends
after he was sentenced pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, he was
deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel while testifying in a
deposition as a cooperating witness against his accomplice. Concluding
Parks has failed to establish the manifest injustice necessary to warrant
relief, we deny the petition.
BACKGROUND
In 1996, Parks was indicted for first-degree murder, burglary with
assault, and attempted armed robbery. He subsequently entered into a
written plea agreement with the State. Pursuant to the terms, Parks pled
guilty to second-degree murder, burglary with assault, and attempted armed
robbery, in exchange for a negotiated sentence of twenty-five years in state
prison. Parks further agreed to testify as a cooperating witness in the
prosecution of his cohort, Rionne Ellery Jackson, consistent with the
contents of his post-Miranda 1 statement to law enforcement. Specifically, he
1
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
2
“agree[d] to give at any and all hearings, depositions, and trials, complete
and detailed truthful statements identifying . . . Rionne Ellery Jackson as
being the person with the firearm who shot the victim . . . All such truthful
statements [were required] to be factually consistent with his sworn
statement.” Any material breach of the plea agreement endowed the State
with “the right to move the Court to vacate the Defendant’s sentence of
twenty-five (25) years and sentence the Defendant to life in prison.”
After Parks began serving his sentence, Jackson was arrested and
charged with the murder. The State listed Parks as a witness, and Jackson’s
criminal defense attorney noticed him for deposition. At the beginning of the
deposition, Parks requested counsel. Jackson’s lawyer and the prosecutor
initially agreed to recess the proceedings in order to apprise the trial court of
the issue, but, ultimately, moved forward with the deposition. Parks was
reluctant and combative, and repeatedly claimed to have little memory of the
events surrounding the homicide. Although he was furnished with a copy of
the plea contract and his sworn statement, he refused to implicate his “co-
defendant as the shooter.” Parks v. State, 863 So. 2d 382 (Fla. 3d DCA
2003).
3
Following the deposition, the State sought to declare Parks in violation
of the plea agreement. The trial court found him in breach, vacated his
twenty-five-year sentence, and resentenced him to life in prison.
Parks appealed the resentencing order and this court reversed, finding
Parks was denied the right to conflict-free counsel. Parks v. State, 782 So.
2d 968 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001). Upon remand, new counsel was appointed.
Parks was again found in violation of the agreement and sentenced to a term
of life. A direct appeal and ensuing collateral attacks on the judgment and
sentence proved unfruitful. See Parks v. State, 252 So. 3d 367 (Fla. 3d DCA
2018); Parks v. State, 194 So. 3d 1034 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016); Parks v. State,
178 So. 3d 413 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015); Parks v. State, 151 So. 3d 1227 (Fla.
2014); Parks v. State, 126 So. 3d 352 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013); Parks v. State,
84 So. 3d 325 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012); Parks v. State, 68 So. 3d 246 (Fla. 3d
DCA 2011); Parks v. State, 963 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007); Parks v.
State, 932 So. 3d 193 (Fla. 2006); Parks v. State, 940 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 3d
DCA 2006); Parks v. State, 863 So. 2d 382 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003); Parks v.
State, 812 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002). The instant petition ensued.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
“Article I, Section 13 of the Florida Constitution mandates the
availability of the writ of habeas corpus.” 2 Fla. Prac., Appellate Prac. § 9:6
4
(2019); see Art. I, §13, Fla. Const. “The great writ has its origins in antiquity
and its parameters have been shaped by suffering and deprivation.” Henry
v. Santana, 62 So. 3d 1122, 1127 (Fla. 2011) (citation omitted). By way of
the writ, courts are afforded a speedy method of conducting a “judicial inquiry
into the cause of any alleged unlawful custody of an individual or any alleged
unlawful, actual deprivation of personal liberty.” Porter v. Porter, 60 Fla. 407,
410, 53 So. 546, 547 (1910).
Although “judicial review in the form of habeas proceedings serves as
a backup plan” to guard against such erroneous deprivations, J.R. v.
Hansen, 736 F.3d 959, 969 (11th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted), the writ “may
not be used to . . . raise issues which would be untimely if considered as a
motion for postconviction relief under rule 3.850.” Barnard v. State, 949 So.
2d 250, 251 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (citing Baker v. State, 878 So. 2d 1236,
1245-46 (Fla. 2004)). Nevertheless, as Parks correctly urges, and we have
previously held, “to prevent a manifest injustice and a denial of due process,
relief may be afforded even to a litigant raising” an untimely or procedurally
barred claim. Stephens v. State, 974 So. 2d 455, 457 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)
(citations omitted); see Johnson v. State, 226 So. 3d 908, 910 (Fla. 4th DCA
2017) (Appellate courts have “inherent authority to grant a writ of habeas
corpus to avoid incongruous and manifestly unfair results.”) (citation
5
omitted); Harris v. State, 12 So. 3d 764, 765 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (“An
appellate court should correct manifest injustice in habeas corpus
proceedings.”) (citation omitted). Thus, we turn to the merits of the petition
on review.
I. Manifest Injustice
The term “manifest injustice” eludes judicial consensus or precise
definition. Nonetheless, this “exceptionally narrow concept” envisions “more
than just a clear and certain prejudice to the moving party, but also a result
that is fundamentally unfair in light of governing law.” Slate v. Am. Broad.
Cos., Inc., 12 F. Supp. 3d 30, 35-36 (D.C. Cir. 2013). Accordingly, in defining
the term, “several courts have applied the Black’s Law Dictionary definition,
which states that ‘manifest injustice’ is an ‘error in the trial court that is direct,
obvious, and observable, such as a defendant's guilty plea that is involuntary
or that is based on a plea agreement that the prosecution rescinds.’” In re
Roemmele, 466 B.R. 706, 712 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2012) (quoting Manifest
Injustice, Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed. 1999)). Others have determined
the error must be “apparent to the point of being indisputable.’” Id. at 712(citation omitted). These principles guide our analysis today.
II. Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel
6
The right to effective assistance of counsel, as guaranteed by the Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article I,
Section 16 of the Florida Constitution, is among those “immutable principles
of justice which inhere in the very idea of free government.” Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68, 53 S. Ct. 55, 64, 77 L. Ed. 158 (1932) (citation
omitted); see also Amend. VI, U.S. Const. (“In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right. . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence.”); Art. I, §16(a), Fla. Const. (“In all criminal prosecutions the
accused shall, . . . have the right . . . to be heard in person, by counsel or
both.”). “[O]nce the adversary judicial process has been initiated, . . . a
defendant [has] the right to have counsel present at all ‘critical’ stages of the
criminal proceedings.” Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 786, 129 S. Ct.
2079, 2085, 173 L. Ed. 2d 955 (2009) (citations omitted); see also Owen v.
State, 596 So. 2d 985, 989 (Fla. 1992) (“[A]n accused is entitled to
assistance of counsel at each ‘critical stage’ of the prosecution.”) (citation
omitted). The Amendment requires not merely the provision of counsel to
the accused, but “[a]ssistance,” which is to be “for his [or her] defence.”
Amend. VI, U.S. Const. Thus, the core “purpose of the . . . counsel
guarantee—and hence the purpose of invoking it—is to ‘protec[t] the unaided
layman at critical confrontations’ with his [or her] ‘expert adversary,’ the
7
government, after ‘the adverse positions of government and defendant have
solidified’ with respect to a particular alleged crime.” McNeil v. Wisconsin,
501 U.S. 171, 177-78, 111 S. Ct. 2204, 2208-09, 115 L. Ed. 2d 158 (1991)
(second alteration in original) (citation omitted).
Ordinarily, to prevail on a claim this right was compromised, the
accused must satisfy the familiar two-prong test imposed under Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).2 Firstly,
he or she “must show that counsel’s performance was deficient.” Id. at 687,
104 S. Ct. at 2064. This involves demonstrating “counsel’s representation
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 688, 104 S. Ct.
at 2064. Secondly, the accused “must show that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense.” Id. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. Worded differently,
2
Prior to Strickland, the applicable effectiveness standard was governed by
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770-71, 90 S. Ct. 1441, 1448-49, 25
L. Ed. 2d 763 (1970), which stated,
In our view a defendant's plea of guilty based on reasonably
competent advice is an intelligent plea not open to attack on the
ground that counsel may have misjudged the admissibility of the
defendant's confession. Whether a plea of guilty is unintelligent
and therefore vulnerable when motivated by a confession
erroneously thought admissible in evidence depends as an initial
matter, not on whether a court would retrospectively consider
counsel's advice to be right or wrong, but on whether that advice
was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in
criminal cases.
8
this requires proof that, “but for counsel’s [deficiencies], the result of the
proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068.
A. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
In United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659-60, 104 S. Ct. 2039,
2047, 80 L. Ed. 2d 657 (1984), decided the same day as Strickland, the
Supreme Court designated three narrow exceptions to the two-prong test,
arising in those circumstances where the reliability of the adversarial process
is so compromised that prejudice is presumed. The exceptions arise when
either (1) the accused is completely denied counsel at a critical stage of the
proceedings; (2) counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to
meaningful adversarial testing; or (3) the surrounding circumstances may
justify the presumption of ineffectiveness without inquiry into counsel’s actual
performance at trial. State v. Trotter, 609 N.W.2d 33, 38 (Neb. 2000).
B. Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249 (1988).
Four years after carving out these exceptions, the Supreme Court was
confronted with the issue of whether the first among them, the denial of
counsel at a critical stage in the proceedings, necessarily gives rise to an
irrebuttable presumption of prejudice. Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249,
108 S. Ct. 1792, 100 L. Ed. 2d 284 (1988). In Satterwhite, the prosecutor
subjected the accused to a pretrial psychiatric examination without providing
9
notice to defense counsel. Id. at 252, 108 S. Ct. at 1795. The psychiatrist
later testified in sentencing proceedings that Satterwhite “was beyond the
reach of psychiatric rehabilitation.” Id. at 260, 108 S. Ct. at 1799. A jury
subsequently sentenced him to death.
Relying upon an earlier high court decision, Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S.
454, 101 S. Ct. 1866, 68 L. Ed. 2d 359 (1981), holding a mental health
examination constituted a “critical stage” of the adversarial proceedings,
Satterwhite appealed his sentence. On appeal, he argued the denial of
counsel at such a critical stage created a structural infirmity warranting
automatic reversal. Id. at 257, 108 S. Ct. at 1798.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals agreed the psychiatric evaluation
violated Satterwhite’s Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel.
However, it concluded the error in admitting the testimony was harmless
“because an average jury would have found the properly admitted evidence
sufficient” to impose a sentence of death. Id. at 253, 108 S. Ct. at 1796(citation omitted).
Citing an ample body of precedent, the Supreme Court distinguished
between cases “[i]n which the deprivation of the right to counsel affected—
and contaminated—the entire criminal proceeding,” and those involving the
erroneous admission of evidence. Id. at 257, 108 S. Ct. at 1798. Compare
10
Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 98 S. Ct. 1173, 55 L. Ed. 2d 426 (1978)
(conflict of interest in representation throughout entire proceeding);
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1967)
(total deprivation of counsel throughout entire proceeding); White v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 83 S. Ct. 1050, 10 L. Ed. 2d 193 (1963) (absence of
counsel from arraignment proceeding affected entire trial because defenses
not asserted were irretrievably lost); and Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52,
82 S. Ct. 157, 7 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1961) (denial of counsel at arraignment
required reversal even where no prejudice was shown); with Buchanan v.
Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 107 S. Ct. 2906, 97 L. Ed. 2d 336 (1987) (applying
harmless error in a noncapital case to an alleged constitutional error in the
use of a psychological evaluation at trial); Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 98
S. Ct. 458, 54 L. Ed. 2d 424 (1977) (applying harmless error analysis to the
admission of post-indictment lineup identification testimony obtained in
violation of the right to counsel); Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 92 S.
Ct. 2174, 33 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1972) (holding the admission of a confession
obtained in violation of Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 84 S. Ct.
1199, 12 L. Ed. 2d 246 (1964), to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt);
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 87 S. Ct. 1951, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1178 (1967)
(finding harmless error applicable in capital case erroneously admitting post-
11
indictment identifications obtained in violated of Sixth Amendment); and
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149(1967) (finding post-indictment lineup was critical stage, but evidence
adduced in the absence of counsel and later introduced could be analyzed
under harmless error). It concluded the former category of cases warrants
automatic relief, whereas the latter requires a harmless error analysis.
Ultimately finding the error in admitting the expert testimony could not be
deemed harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the Court reversed the
affirmance of the death sentence.
C. Post-Satterwhite Jurisprudence
In the aftermath of Satterwhite, most courts have construed the
reference to the absence of counsel from a “critical stage” in Cronic as
reflecting “the Court’s usage, at that time, of the phrase to indicate the stage
of the proceedings ‘both at which the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
attaches and at which the denial of counsel necessarily undermines the
reliability of the entire criminal proceeding.’” Rowsey v. United States, 71 F.
Supp. 3d 585, 606 (E.D. Va. 2014) (quoting United States v. Owen, 407 F.3d
222, 228 (4th Cir. 2005)); see, e.g., United States v. Brown, 956 F.3d 522(8th Cir. 2020); Acosta v. Raemisch, 877 F.3d 918 (10th Cir. 2017); United
States v. Roy, 855 F.3d 1133 (11th Cir. 2017). Thus, they have applied an
12
analysis akin to harmless error in all but the most egregious denials of
counsel. Against this background, we examine the instant claim.
III. Instant Claim
Parks contends the deprivation of counsel during the post-plea
deposition renders the proceedings presumptively unreliable. Concluding he
has failed to demonstrate the deposition constituted both a critical stage in
the proceedings and a point at which the denial of counsel “affected–and
contaminated–the entire proceedings,” we are not so persuaded.
Satterwhite, 486 U.S. at 257, 108 S. Ct. at 1798; see Simmons v. United
States, 390 U.S. 377, 382-83, 88 S. Ct. 967, 970, 19 L. Ed. 2d 1247 (1968).
Although arraignment, plea bargaining, jury selection, trial, and
sentencing have been deemed critical, the Supreme Court has not yet
identified an exhaustive list of all such stages. See McMillian v. State, 214
So. 3d 1274, 1285 (Fla. 2017) (“The Sixth Amendment guarantees a
defendant the right to have counsel present at all ‘critical’ stages of the
criminal proceedings.”) (citation omitted); Dunbar v. State, 89 So. 3d 901,
907 (Fla. 2012) (“[S]entencing is ‘a critical stage of every criminal
proceeding.’”) (citation omitted); Muhammad v. State, 782 So. 2d 343, 351
(Fla. 2001) (“[T]he process of exercising challenges to members of the jury
constitutes a critical stage of the proceedings where a defendant has a right
13
to be present.”) (citation omitted); Sardinia v. State, 168 So. 2d 674, 676 (Fla.
1964) (“[I]n Florida an arraignment now constitutes a critical stage in a felony
prosecution.”); Cottle v. State, 733 So. 2d 963, 965 (Fla. 1999) receded from
on other grounds by Alcorn v. State, 121 So. 3d 419 (Fla. 2013) (“[T]he plea
process [is] a critical stage in criminal adjudication, which warrants the same
constitutional guarantee of effective assistance of counsel as trial
proceedings.”) (citations omitted). Further, as relevant here, no Florida or
Supreme Court decision has yet recognized post-plea cooperation as a
crucial or critical stage of the proceedings. See United States v. Basu, 881
F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2012) (“[T]he Supreme Court . . . [has not] decided
whether the post-plea bargaining cooperation period also constitutes a
critical stage.”).
In the absence of any such express precedent, the term “critical stage”
has traditionally denoted a “step of a criminal proceeding . . . that [holds]
significant consequences for the accused.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 696,
122 S. Ct. 1843, 1851, 152 L. Ed. 2d 914 (2002) (citations omitted); see Van
v. Jones, 475 F.3d 292, 312 (6th Cir. 2007) (“A critical stage presents a
moment when ‘[a]vailable defenses may be irretrievably lost, if not then and
there asserted,’ . . . one ‘where rights are preserved or lost,’ . . . [one where
the] ‘potential substantial prejudice to defendant’s rights inheres in the . . .
14
confrontation and ability of counsel to help avoid that prejudice,’ [or one that]
. . . holds ‘significant consequences for the accused.’”) (citations omitted)
(first and fifth alterations in original). Given this expansive standard, several
federal courts have assumed “without deciding,” and still others have
determined, “the potential cooperation phase is a ‘critical stage’ of criminal
proceedings to which the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies.”
Tinajero–Ortiz v. United States, 635 F.3d 1100, 1105 n.4 (8th Cir. 2011); see
also Wingo v. United States, 341 F. App’x 132, 134 (6th Cir. 2009)
(“assum[ing] for [the] purpose[] of [the] appeal that [the defendant’s] first
debriefing . . . was a critical state of the proceedings”); United States v.
Leonti, 326 F.3d 1111, 1120 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Because the period of
cooperation is an adversarial confrontation ‘in which potential substantial
prejudice to the defendant's rights inheres and in which counsel may help
avoid that prejudice,’ it is a critical stage of a criminal proceeding.”) (citation
omitted); United States v. Ming He, 94 F.3d 782, 790 (2d Cir. 1996) (“Since
sentencing is adjourned until defendant’s side of the bargain has been
performed, the defendant's rights have not been fully adjudicated and the
government remains the cooperating witness's adversary . . . [Further,]
constitutional ramifications of the debriefing session [are] serious, and their
seriousness strongly supports the [defendant’s need to] have the aid of
15
counsel when the government interviews him.”); State v. Yarrell, 2009 WL
937216, at *4, 2009 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 993, at *12 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. April 9, 2009) (“Assuming, as we do, that defendant had the right
to counsel throughout the post-plea interviews and testimony, particularly
because he had not been sentenced and the sentence was dependent on
his cooperation.”) (citations omitted). These decisions all arise in the context
of post-plea, presentencing debriefing sessions which were “neither
standardized nor governed by set rules.” Ming He, 94 F.3d at 785.
The procedural posture presented in the instant case is
distinguishable, rendering this line of authority inapposite. In each of the
above cases, sentencing was adjourned pending the outcome of debriefing
and negotiations. The potential sentence remained heavily dependent upon
the reliability of the information supplied in the debriefing and the accused
was actively represented by counsel. Nonetheless, each accused was
deprived of counsel in the debriefing.
Conversely, here, Parks waived counsel during his post-Miranda
statement. Later, when represented by counsel, he pled guilty, stipulated to
the veracity of his earlier statement, and agreed to cooperate. Consequently,
Parks first waived counsel and then was advised on the crucial threshold
decision of whether to adopt the statement and assent to the essential terms
16
governing cooperation and breach, as embodied within the contract.
Therefore, unlike the potential cooperation phase cases, there was no
deprivation of counsel involved in his “debriefing” and the contours of his
cooperation and sentencing exposure were well-defined.
Further, by the time he was deposed in Jackson’s case, all pretrial
procedures had concluded, his “guilt or innocence of the charged crime” had
been decided, “his vulnerability to imprisonment” had been determined, and
his attorney had been discharged. Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 674,
122 S. Ct. 1764, 1776, 152 L. Ed. 2d 888 (2002); see also Gerstein v. Pugh,
420 U.S. 103, 122, 95 S. Ct. 854, 867, 43 L. Ed. 2d 54 (1975) (“The Court
has identified as ‘critical stages' those pretrial procedures that would impair
defense on the merits if the accused is required to proceed without counsel.”)
(citations omitted); Woodward v. State, 992 So. 2d 391, 392 (Fla. 1st DCA
2008) (“A defendant has no absolute right to counsel in post-conviction
proceedings.”) (citations omitted).
Under these circumstances, the deposition constituted a pivotal stage
in the adversarial proceedings against Jackson, not Parks, and the interests
of Parks were closely aligned with those of the State. Hence, although it
cannot be said the State was “transformed into a neutral and impartial ‘arm
of the court,’” Leonti, 326 F.3d at 1120, Parks has not demonstrated the
17
deposition was a continuation of his own “adversarial proceedings where
[his] rights were in danger of being ‘irretrievably lost’ if not safeguarded by
the presence of counsel.” Wingo, 341 F. App’x at 135-36 (citation omitted);
see United States v. Beasley, 27 F. Supp. 3d 793, 810 (E.D. Mich. 2014) (“If
there is no adversarial judicial proceeding, there is no Sixth Amendment right
to counsel and thus no derivative right to effective assistance of counsel.”).
Finally, here, despite having been provided ample opportunity to re-
review his post-Miranda statement and the terms of the plea agreement,
Parks steadfastly maintained he could not recall the details of the homicide
and refused to implicate Jackson. Given this conduct, it is difficult to discern
how the lack of counsel “led to a result that would not otherwise have
occurred.” Yarrell, 2009 WL 937216, at *4, 2009 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS
993, at *12 (citations omitted); see Rowsey, 71 F. Supp. 3d at 608-09
(“Petitioner fully understood his obligation to speak truthfully to the agents
during each debriefing . . . Petitioner has not shown a reasonable probability
that [his counsel’s] presence at the debriefings would have prevented
Petitioner from lying to the agents.”). Hence, Parks has failed to establish
the deprivation of counsel “affected–and contaminated–the entire criminal
proceeding.” Satterwhite, 486 U.S. at 257, 108 S. Ct. at 1798.
18
Accordingly, the record is devoid of any showing of error “so patently
unfair and tainted that [it] is manifestly clear to all who view it,” In re Marinari,
596 B.R. 809, 819 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2019) (citation omitted), or Parks “is
being illegally restrained of his liberty.” Anglin v. Mayo, 88 So. 2d 918, 919
(Fla. 1956). Thus, we deny the petition.
Petition denied.
LOGUE, J., concurs.
19
Parks v. State,
3D20-1418
LINDSEY, J., dissenting.
With limited exceptions, which are not applicable here, Florida Rule of
Criminal Procedure 3.850 is the mechanism through which those convicted
of noncapital crimes “must file collateral postconviction challenges to their
convictions and sentences.” Baker v. State, 878 So. 2d 1236, 1245 (Fla.
2004); see also La-Casse v. Inch, 307 So. 3d 921, 923 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020)
(“A petition for writ of habeas corpus may not be used to challenge the
legality of a defendant’s judgment of conviction. A defendant must seek such
relief, if at all, through the procedure established in rule 3.850. Nor may
habeas corpus be used as a substitute for an otherwise procedurally barred
motion for postconviction relief under rule 3.850.”); Welch v. State, 245 So.
3d 862, 863 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018); Buss v. Reichman, 53 So. 3d 339, 344-45
(Fla. 4th DCA 2011); Philip J. Padovano, 2 Fla. Prac., Appellate Practice §
30:6 (2019 ed.) (“Presently, the exclusive method of asserting a claim of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel or any other collateral challenge to a
judgment or sentence is to file a motion under [Rule 3.850].”).
Because “[t]he remedy of habeas corpus is not available in Florida to
obtain the kind of collateral postconviction relief available by motion in the
sentencing court pursuant to rule 3.850[,]” Baker, 878 So. 2d at 1245, I would
20
dismiss the petition without addressing its merits. Though Parks invokes
manifest injustice–“an exception to procedural bars to postconviction claims
in only the rarest and most exceptional of situations[,]” Cuffy v. State, 190
So. 3d 86, 87 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015)–“[t]he mere incantation of the words
‘manifest injustice’ does not make it so.” Beiro v. State, 289 So. 3d 511, 511
(Fla. 3d DCA 2019).
21