CITY OF MIAMI v. FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, MIAMI LODGE NO. 20

Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed April 5, 2023.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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No. 3D21-2229
Lower Tribunal No. 19-17725
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City of Miami,
Appellant,
vs.
Fraternal Order of Police, Miami Lodge No. 20,
Appellee.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Carlos
Guzman, Judge.
Victoria Méndez, City Attorney and Kerri L. McNulty, Senior Appellate
Counsel, and Stephanie K. Panoff, and Bryan E. Capdevila, Assistant City
Attorneys, for appellant.
Buschel Gibbons, P.A., and Robert C. Buschel and Eugene G.
Gibbons (Fort Lauderdale), for appellee.
Before SCALES, GORDO and BOKOR, JJ.
BOKOR, J.
In the action below, the City of Miami sought a declaration barring the
Fraternal Order of Police, Miami Lodge No. 20 (FOP), from arbitrating a
grievance based on Adrian Rodriguez’s termination as a City of Miami police
officer. Both the City and the FOP sought summary judgment. The trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of the FOP and against the City,
determining that the FOP correctly sought arbitration of its grievance filed on
behalf of Rodriguez. 1 Because we find that Rodriguez waived his right to
arbitrate and that, alternatively, Rodriguez is collaterally estopped from
arbitrating this issue, we reverse.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Rodriguez, a City of Miami police officer, challenged a prior termination
of employment at arbitration. The arbitration resulted in an order reinstating
him “with no loss of service credit for the purposes of determination of
benefits to which he [was] entitled.” The City sought relief from the arbitral
award in circuit court. The trial court upheld the arbitration award, and this
court affirmed such decision. City of Miami v. Fraternal Ord. of Police Lodge
1
We have jurisdiction pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure
9.030(b)(1)(A).
2
#20, 252 So. 3d 221 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018). Accordingly, the City reinstated
Rodriguez.
Soon after, the City relieved Rodriguez of duty without pay because
his Florida Department of Law Enforcement retraining requirement, which
required him to submit to drug testing, lapsed during his absence. Rodriguez
didn’t submit to drug testing and instead sought relief in circuit court with an
“emergency amended motion for order to show cause why the chief of police
and city manager should not be held in contempt for failing to follow this
court’s order,” arguing that the City failed to comply with the arbitration order
reinstating him. The trial court denied Rodriguez’s motion finding that
Rodriguez’s placement back on the City’s payroll, even though he was not
returned to active-duty status, satisfied its obligations pursuant to the
arbitration order. Notably, the trial court did not decide the issue of the
propriety of the City’s requirement that Rodriguez submit to a drug test,
finding that “[t]he purported misconduct upon which the City relies to justify
termination of Rodriguez did not occur until after the original arbitration.
Thus, the City’s actions would, at best, constitute an independent basis for
grievance.” Rodriguez appealed the trial court’s decision to this court, raising
extensive argument as to the propriety of the required drug test. This court
issued an opinion which determined, in pertinent part:
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Rodriguez interprets the Arbitration Order to mean
that there was no break in service, and, as a result,
his two-year absence from the force should be
considered a continuous employment relieving him
of any obligation to comply with FDLE rules
regulating reinstatement and recertification. That is
not what the order says. It says: “Mr. Rodriguez shall
be reinstated forthwith to his position as a police
officer with no loss of service credit for the purposes
of determination of benefits to which he is entitled.”
Rodriguez’s City benefits are thus considered
uninterrupted by his two year break in service, but the
Arbitration Order says nothing about his FDLE
certifications. The record indicates that Rodriquez’s
FDLE certifications lapsed during his two-year break
in service. The City was unable to reinstate
Rodriguez to active duty without FDLE approval.
When Rodriguez refused to fulfill the toxicology
requirement, the City was within its rights to
terminate him under the CBA.
Fraternal Ord. of Police Lodge #20 v. City of Miami, 276 So. 3d 881, 883–84
(Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (boldface added).
Rodriguez filed a grievance for “improper termination” and “violation of
drug policy,” which the City denied. Later, the City filed a complaint for
declaratory relief seeking clarification on the interpretation of the collective
bargaining agreement (CBA) regarding the arbitrability of Rodriguez’s
grievance, in which the City argued that the filing of the grievance violated
the election of remedies provision of the CBA since Rodriguez already raised
the pertinent issue of the propriety of the drug test in prior litigation.
Rodriguez moved for summary judgment and to compel arbitration and the
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City filed its cross-motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted
summary judgment in Rodriguez’s favor. This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
“We review a trial court order granting summary judgment de novo.”
Fernandez v. Cruz, 341 So. 3d 410, 412 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022). On appeal,
the City argues that Rodriguez waived his right to arbitrate because he
previously litigated the issues (the propriety of the drug test and his
subsequent termination) and further, that the doctrines of res judicata and
collateral estoppel bar arbitration. In response, Rodriguez argues that he
could not have elected a remedy by challenging the order for an illegal drug
test because, at the time he filed his grievance, he had not yet been
terminated.
Preliminarily, section 6.4 of the CBA reads, in pertinent part,
“[s]election of redress other than through the Grievance Procedure
contained herein shall preclude the aggrieved party or parties from utilizing
said Grievance Procedure for adjustment of said grievance.” This provision
of the CBA mirrors section 447.401, Florida Statutes, which governs
grievance procedures between public employers and bargaining agents and
provides, “[a] career service employee shall have the option of utilizing . . . a
grievance procedure established under this section, but such employee is
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precluded from availing himself or herself of more than one of these
procedures.” § 447.401, Fla. Stat. Therefore, if this court determines that
Rodriguez previously elected to pursue a remedy outside of the contractual
grievance procedure, both section 6.4 of the CBA as well as section 447.401,
Florida Statues would bar arbitration of Rodriguez’s grievance.
In considering whether Rodriguez waived his right to arbitrate by
pursuing an inconsistent remedy, we first examine whether Rodriguez
actively participated in litigation pertaining to the issue underlying the
termination. 2 See Sitarik v. JFK Med. Ctr. Ltd. P’ships, 11 So. 3d 973, 974
(Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (“A party who actively participates in the litigation waives
its right to compel arbitration. A party’s responses to the litigation constitute
active participation when they are an attack on the merits.”) (citations
omitted); see also Green Tree, 15 So. 3d at 687 (“[O]nce a party has waived
the right to arbitration by active participation in a lawsuit, the party may not
2
“Generally, whether a party has waived his right to arbitrate is a question
of fact, reviewed on appeal for competent, substantial evidence to support
the lower court’s findings.” Green Tree Servicing, LLC v. McLeod, 15 So. 3d
682, 686 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (citation omitted); see also City of Jacksonville
v. Cowen, 973 So. 2d 503, 507 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (same). Here, the record
is devoid of factual findings from the trial court. Although the record includes
the transcript of the hearing on the cross-motions for summary judgment, the
transcript was limited to argument between the parties and contains no
findings. Similarly, the final order on appeal contains no factual findings.
Where the record does not contain any factual findings, the question of
waiver should be ruled on as a matter of law. Cowen, 973 So. 2d at 507.
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reclaim the arbitration right without the consent of his or her adversary.”).
Rodriguez sought relief from this court based on his arguments regarding
the propriety of the required drug test. This constitutes active participation
on the merits, as contemplated by Sitarik. Rodriguez filed his grievance for
“improper termination” based on “violation of drug policy,” an issue that he
not only previously brought before this court, but which resulted in an opinion
squarely addressing the issue. Rodriguez’s argument that his previous
appeal did not challenge any court order recognizing, reviewing, or upholding
his new second termination misses the point. He elected to have a court
review the very issue he now seeks to present to an arbitrator. This violates
not only election of remedies, but also, because this court considered and
ruled on the issue, violates principles of res judicata. As such, we find that
Rodriguez has waived his right to arbitrate having actively participated in
litigation which has already determined the issues contained in the current
grievance.
Alternatively, we find that Rodriguez is collaterally estopped from filing
a grievance challenging his termination. Collateral estoppel applies when
“the question common to both causes of action was actually adjudicated in
the prior litigation.” Fernandez, 341 So. 3d at 415 (quotation omitted). “The
doctrine of collateral estoppel bars relitigation by parties or their privies of
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issues common both to the present action and to the action previously
litigated.” United Auto. Ins. Co. v. Law Offices of Michael I. Libman, 46 So.
3d 1101, 1104 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) (quotation omitted). Here, it is clear that
the issue of the propriety of the drug test was litigated in the previous action,
and specifically addressed in a prior opinion of this court.
Because we find that Rodriguez has waived his right to arbitrate, and
alternatively, that the doctrine of collateral estoppel applies, both section 6.4
of the CBA as well as section 447.401, Florida Statues bar arbitration of
Rodriguez’s grievance.
Reversed.
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