JAKELIN EDMONDSON v. TRI-COUNTY ELECTRICAL SERVICES, INC.

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT
JAKELIN EDMONDSON,
Appellant,
v.
TRI-COUNTY ELECTRICAL SERVICES, INC.,
Appellee.
No. 4D23-231
[April 19, 2023]
Appeal from the County Court of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,
Broward County; John Hurley, Judge; L.T. Case No. CONO20-002337.
Michael Garcia of Michael Garcia, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.
Patrick Giunta of Patrick Giunta, P.A., Pompano Beach, for appellee.
PER CURIAM.
Appellant Jakelin Edmondson (“Homeowner”) seeks review of a trial
court order that granted Appellee Tri-County Electrical Services, Inc.’s
(“Contractor”) motion to increase a cash security bond pursuant to section
713.24(3), Florida Statutes (2020). Homeowner contends that the trial
court lacked jurisdiction to increase a cash security bond after the entry
of final judgment. We agree with Homeowner and thus reverse and
remand the order at issue. 1
Background
In the underlying suit, Contractor filed a lien enforcement proceeding
against Homeowner alleging that Contractor had been underpaid for
electrical work which it performed on Homeowner’s property. Contractor
was seeking to foreclose on a claim of lien for $6,780.00 against
Homeowner’s property.
1 Because no judicial labor remains pending in the trial court, we treat
Homeowner’s “petition for writ of certiorari” as an appeal of a final order. See
Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(1)(A).
After Contractor filed suit, Homeowner transferred the claim of lien to
a cash security bond for $9,339.45, pursuant to section 713.24(1), Florida
Statutes (2022). A month later, Contractor moved to increase the cash
security under section 713.24(3), Florida Statutes (2022). The trial court
deferred ruling on that motion.
Thereafter, the case proceeded to a bench trial on the merits, and the
trial court entered a final judgment, finding in Contractor’s favor on all
issues. In its final judgment, the trial court reserved jurisdiction over
attorneys’ fees, costs, and interest. Homeowner did not seek appellate
review of the final judgment.
Subsequently, Contractor moved for attorney’s fees and, within the
motion’s “wherefore” clause, requested an increased cash bond.
Contractor also filed a renewed motion to increase the cash security,
noting that the trial court had deferred ruling on its earlier pre-trial
motion.
The trial court entered an “Agreed Final Judgment” awarding
Contractor pre-judgment interest, attorney’s and expert fees, and costs,
and directing the clerk of the court to close the case. That final judgment
did not address Contractor’s motion to increase the bond. Nor did the final
judgment reserve jurisdiction over any matters. No appeal or collateral
motion followed.
More than a month later, after the time for filing a motion for rehearing
had passed, the trial court held a hearing and granted Contractor’s motion
to increase the cash bond. This timely appeal followed.
Analysis
Homeowner argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant
Contractor’s motion to increase the cash bond, because final judgment
had been entered prior to granting the motion.
It is well settled that after the time for a motion for rehearing has
passed, the trial court no longer has jurisdiction over a final judgment.
See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Smith, 263 So. 3d 134, 136 (Fla. 1st DCA
2018); see also Shelby Mut. Ins. Co. of Shelby, Ohio v. Pearson, 236 So. 2d
1, 3 (Fla. 1970) (“Except as provided by Rules 1.530 and 1.540, Florida
Rules of Civil Procedure, the trial court has no authority to alter, modify
or vacate an order or judgment.”). Here, while the trial court reserved
jurisdiction in its initial final judgment to award fees and costs, the
subsequent “Agreed Amended Final Judgment” resolved those issues and
2
failed to reserve jurisdiction for any purpose. Contractor did not file a
timely motion for rehearing, which would have been the time to raise the
bond increase issue.
Nonetheless, where a rule of civil procedure or statute allows for post-
judgment relief, the trial court’s jurisdiction will be reinstated. See Kippy
Corp. v. Colburn, 177 So. 2d 193, 199 (Fla. 1965) (“[A] trial court has no
authority to modify, amend or vacate a final order, except in the manner
and within the time provided by rule or statute . . . .”).
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540 allows a party to seek relief from
a final judgment based on mistake, inadvertence, excusable neglect, newly
discovered evidence, or fraud. Contractor did not file a rule 1.540 motion
here. Additionally, while this Court looks at the substance of filings over
form, the motion to increase the bond did not challenge the final order on
one of the accepted bases in the rule. See Concept, L.C. v. Gesten, 662 So.
2d 970, 973 n.3 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995).
The trial court here relied on section 713.24 as the basis for its
jurisdiction to increase the security bond. Section 713.24(3) permits a
motion to increase a bond in a “pending” action to enforce a lien:
Any party having an interest in such security or the property
from which the lien was transferred may at any time, and any
number of times, file a complaint in chancery in the circuit
court of the county where such security is deposited, or file a
motion in a pending action to enforce a lien, for an order to
require additional security, reduction of security, change or
substitution of sureties, payment of discharge thereof, or any
other matter affecting said security.
§ 713.24(3), Fla. Stat. (2022) (emphasis added).
The action here was not “pending” under section 713.24(3). “The
general rule is that an action remains pending in the trial court until after
a final judgment and such time as an appeal is taken or time for an appeal
expires.” Wilson v. Clark, 414 So. 2d 526, 530 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). By
the time the trial court had ruled on the motion to increase the bond, the
time for an appeal had passed. Therefore, because the matter was no
longer pending, the trial court lacked authority to consider the motion.
Conclusion
3
The trial court was without jurisdiction to grant Contractor’s motion to
increase the bond. We accordingly reverse and remand this matter to the
trial court for the purpose of vacating its order granting Contractor’s
motion to increase the bond.
Reversed and remanded with instructions.
GROSS, CIKLIN and FORST, JJ., concur.
* * *
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
4