Tashara Shonta Brown v. State of Florida

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA
TASHARA SHONTA BROWN, NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
Appellant, DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
v. CASE NO. 1D13-2540
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
_____________________________/
Opinion filed September 10, 2014.
An appeal from the Circuit Court for Escambia County.
J. Scott Duncan, Judge.
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Kathleen Stover and Glen P. Gifford,
Assistant Public Defenders, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Lauren Brudnicki, Assistant Attorney
General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
CLARK, J.
The jury convicted Tashara Brown of conspiracy to traffic in 28 grams or
more of cocaine. As evidence, the State admitted both chemically tested cocaine
and “untested white powder” that an officer testified was consistent with cocaine.
Because the State did not use the officer’s testimony regarding the untested white
powder to evidence the necessary weight requirement for trafficking, we affirm
Appellant’s judgment and sentence. 1
The Florida Supreme Court has made clear the State may not comingle
white powder prior to testing and then use that comingled substance to prove the
necessary weight for trafficking. Greenwade v. State, 124 So. 3d 215, 215, 227
(Fla. 2013) (explaining if the State “fail[s] to independently chemically test each
individual packet, . . . the State [has] failed to meet its burden to prove the essential
element of weight”). The court’s focus was weight. See id. at 220-28.
And the court’s holding was solely limited to proving “the statutory
threshold for weight”:
[W]e hold that to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that
individually wrapped packets of white powder meet the statutory
threshold for weight in trafficking prosecutions, the State must
chemically prove that each individually wrapped packet contains at
least a mixture of a controlled substance before it may combine the
contents and determine whether those contents meet the statutory
threshold for weight.
Id. at 229; see also id. at 230-31 (“[W]e hold that to satisfy the burden of proving
that the evidence seized meets the statutory threshold for weight in trafficking
prosecutions beyond a reasonable doubt . . . .”) (emphasis added).
Here, Ms. Brown asserts Greenwade requires every white powder, in every
case, be chemically tested before it can be admitted for any purpose. This reads
1
Appellant raised two other issues. As to those, we affirm the trial court’s
determinations without comment.
2
Greenwade too broadly. Greenwade addressed one specific issue: weight. The
Greenwade court made one specific holding: applicable to weight. The
Greenwade court mandated one specific thing from prosecutors: “the statutory
threshold for weight in trafficking prosecutions” be evidenced by chemical testing.
In line with this mandate, the State here evidenced 30.3 grams of cocaine
(more than 2 grams above the statutory limit) by chemical testing of a single, non-
comingled bag—as it was required to do. It is of no consequence that the State
furthered its conspiracy case through testimony of a twelve-year, veteran narcotics
officer that other bags of white powder were also cocaine. Testimony to identify a
substance not used to prove a trafficking weight does not implicate Greenwade.
Such testimony should be governed by the traditional rules of evidence, and Ms.
Brown does not assert the officer’s testimony ran afoul of traditional evidence
rules.
Accordingly, the court did not err in admitting the officer’s testimony
regarding the untested white powder, not used as evidence of weight and only used
as evidence of a conspiracy. Ms. Brown’s judgment and sentence are AFFIRMED.
VAN NORTWICK and SWANSON, JJ., CONCUR.
3