ALPHA RANSOM v. KITREANA GRANT-VAN BROCKLIN

Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed August 11, 2021.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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No. 3D20-1799
Lower Tribunal No. 19-17028
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Alpha Ransom,
Appellant,
vs.
Kitreana Grant-Van Brocklin, et al.,
Appellees.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Maria
Espinosa Dennis, Judge.
Shook, Hardy & Bacon, L.L.P. and Sergio E. Pagliery, for appellant.
Stephanie C. Zimmerman (Bradenton) and Rachel Batten
(Brooksville), for appellee Department of Children and Families.
Before FERNANDEZ, C.J., and GORDO, and LOBREE, JJ.
FERNANDEZ, C.J.
Alpha Ransom (“Ransom”) appeals the trial court’s order granting a
motion to dismiss in favor of the State of Florida Department of Children and
Families (“DCF”). Because the trial court violated due process by entering
an involuntary dismissal without affording Ransom the opportunity to present
his full case-in-chief, including the opportunity to present evidence to
establish standing, we reverse the order and remand for further proceedings.
On August 1, 2019, Ransom filed a pro se Petition for the
Determination of Paternity, Parental Responsibility, Parenting Plan, Time
Sharing Schedule, and Child Support in order to gain custody of A. V-G., an
eight-year-old boy who Ransom claims is his biological son. Ransom named
as respondents Kitreana Grant (“Grant”), the boy’s mother, and David Van
Brocklin (“Van Brocklin”), who was married to Grant at the time of A. V-G.’s
birth. Ransom’s petition alleges that prior to Van Brocklin’s death, both Grant
and Van Brocklin acknowledged Ransom as the child’s biological father.
Following Van Brocklin’s death, Grant’s parental rights over A. V-G. were
involuntarily terminated on April 26, 2019. DCF, who then took custody of A.
V-G., moved to intervene and subsequently filed a motion for involuntary
dismissal of Ransom’s petition.
In DCF’s Amended Motion to Dismiss, DCF alleged that Ransom
could not meet his burden to establish standing to bring his petition. DCF
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contended that Ransom failed to establish that he has manifested a
substantial and continuing concern for the child and that he did not care for,
provide for, or have a relationship with the child due to his incarceration from
approximately July 25, 2012 until his release on June 5, 2019. DCF further
highlighted his extensive criminal history. Additionally, DCF stated that
Ransom’s petition failed to comply with the pleading requirements of Florida
Family Law Rule 12.110(b), and Ransom failed to name DCF as an
indispensable party and failed to serve DCF in compliance with Florida
Family Law Rule 12.140.
The trial court scheduled an evidentiary hearing on the motion to
dismiss with the stated purpose of giving the department an opportunity to
present evidence on its motion. Ransom filed an objection to the evidentiary
hearing and requested that if a dismissal is warranted, that it be without
prejudice to grant him an opportunity to cure any pleading defects. The trial
court proceeded with the evidentiary hearing and took judicial notice of
DCF’s exhibits A-H, which included A. V-G.’s birth certificate showing that
Ransom’s name was not listed. Although Ransom’s counsel proffered
evidence during previous hearings such as testimony and photographs
regarding Ransom’s relationship with the child, the trial court concluded the
evidentiary hearing without taking evidence from Ransom.
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The trial court subsequently granted DCF’s Amended Motion to
Dismiss with prejudice, finding that Ransom’s petition failed on its face, and
that Ransom lacked standing to rebut the presumption of legitimacy. The trial
court concluded that Ransom did not care for, provide for, or even have a
relationship with the child, taking language verbatim from DCF’s Amended
Motion to Dismiss. The trial court further held that Ransom’s pro se petition
failed to comply with Florida Family Law Rule 12.110(b) and Florida Family
Law Rule 12.140. This appeal followed.
We have jurisdiction to review orders that strike the entirety of a claim.
Gries Inv. Co. v. Chelton, 388 So. 2d 1281, 1282 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). A trial
court’s order granting a motion to dismiss with prejudice is reviewed de novo.
Chakra 5, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, 254 So. 3d 1056, 1061 (Fla. 3d DCA
2018). Standing is a pure question of law and therefore must be reviewed de
novo. Sanchez v. Century Everglades, LLC, 946 So. 2d 563, 564 (Fla. 3d
DCA 2006).
Upon review of the record, we find that the trial court violated due
process by entering an involuntary dismissal without affording Ransom the
opportunity to present his full case-in-chief, including the opportunity to
present evidence to establish standing.
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Due process requires that a party be given a meaningful opportunity to
be heard. Pena v. Rodriguez, 273 So. 3d 237, 240 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019). A
party may move for involuntary dismissal only “[a]fter a party seeking
affirmative relief in an action has completed the presentation of evidence.”
Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.420(b); Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.420(b). Florida courts have
repeatedly held that an involuntary dismissal may not be entered before the
plaintiff has completed his or her presentation of evidence. See e.g.,
Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co. v. Santiago, 117 So. 3d 1146, 1147 (Fla. 3d
DCA 2016); Lustig v. Garcia, 789 So. 2d 482, 483 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).
Denying plaintiff the opportunity to complete his or her case-in-chief is a
denial of due process. A.N. v. M.F.-A., 946 So. 2d 58, 59-60 (Fla. 3d DCA
2006) (reversing the trial court’s order granting a motion to dismiss with
prejudice and remanding for an evidentiary hearing on the petition because
the plaintiffs were denied the opportunity to complete their case-in-chief). In
the present case, Ransom’s counsel objected to the evidentiary hearing on
the motion to dismiss because the hearing was to be conducted solely on
evidence offered through a request for judicial notice of records and counsel
clearly objected to the trial court entering an involuntary dismissal before
Ransom was permitted to present his case through the presentation of
evidence.
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As to the issue of standing, the Supreme Court of Florida has held that
a “biological father has standing to rebut . . . the ‘presumption of legitimacy,’
when he has ‘manifested a substantial and continuing concern’ for the
welfare of the child.” Simmonds v. Perkins, 247 So. 3d 397, 398 (Fla. 2018)
(quoting Kendrick v. Everheart, 390 So. 2d 53, 61 (Fla. 1980)). The biological
father in Simmonds had standing where the child was given the prospective
father’s last name, the prospective father lived with the child for a period, the
prospective father voluntarily paid child support, the child knew the
prospective father as “daddy,” and the prospective father alleged that the
child knew and loves his mother as the child’s grandmother. Id. at 399, 403.
Here, Ransom’s counsel provided the trial court with an overview of similar
evidence pertaining to standing:
I do have evidence that I want to present that Mr. Ransom has
been involved in the child’s life almost since the day the child was
born. That the child has visited him, even when Mr. Ransom was
in jail. That he has weekly calls with the child. The child calls him
dad. I’ve got photographs of the child with Mr. Ransom and Mr.
Ransom’s family. Mr. Ransom had an account where he sent
money to Ms. Van Brocklin from the jail.
Although this evidence may prove insufficient to rebut the strong
presumption of legitimacy and establish standing, it was error for the trial
court to grant a motion for involuntary dismissal before Ransom was
permitted to present such evidence.
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For the reasons discussed above, we hold that the trial court erred in
granting DCF’s Amended Motion to Dismiss with prejudice. We therefore
reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
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