RAMLE INTERNATIONAL CORP. v. MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA

Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed October 18, 2023.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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No. 3D20-0114
Lower Tribunal No. 08-22359
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Ramle International Corp.,
Appellant,
vs.
Miami-Dade County, Florida, et al.,
Appellees.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Jose M.
Rodriguez, Judge.
Albert D. Rey, P.A., and Albert D. Rey, for appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Randi E. Dincher, Assistant
Attorney General (Tallahassee), for appellee Florida Department of
Revenue; Geraldine Bonzon-Keenan, Miami-Dade County Attorney, and
Jorge Martinez-Esteve and Daija Page Lifshitz, Assistant County Attorneys,
for appellee Miami-Dade County.
Before EMAS, LINDSEY and LOBREE, JJ.
LOBREE, J.
Ramle International Corporation (“Ramle”) appeals a final order
granting Miami-Dade County’s (“County”) motion for involuntary dismissal of
its complaint. Because Ramle failed to provide sufficient evidence to support
a prima facie case for any of its claims, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
In 2004, Unit 2405 of the Club Atlantis Condominium in Miami Beach,
Florida (“the property”), was sold via a tax deed sale. The sale resulted in
surplus proceeds in the amount of $262,412.08. After receiving no claims to
the surplus proceeds, the Miami-Dade County Clerk, Harvey Ruvin (“the
Clerk”) transferred the funds to the County.
Four years later, Ramle filed a complaint against the County alleging
the former property owners assigned their rights in the property to Ramle
and it was therefore entitled to the surplus proceeds. Ramle later amended
its complaint to assert new claims and add the Clerk, the State of Florida
(“State”), and the Florida Department of Revenue (“DOR”) as parties.
In the 2015 operative second amended complaint, Ramle raised six
claims: (1) damages resulting from failure to pay surplus proceeds to Ramle;
(2) declaratory judgment finding section 197.473, Florida Statutes (2004),1
1
As the statutes at issue were subsequently amended, this case pertains
only to the statutory provisions in effect at the time of the tax deed sale.
2
unconstitutional per se; (3) declaratory judgment finding section 197.473
unconstitutional as applied; (4) declaratory judgment finding section
197.582(2), Florida Statutes (2004), unconstitutional per se; (5) declaratory
judgment finding section 197.582(2) unconstitutional as applied; and (6)
money had and received. The County, DOR and the Clerk filed answers and
affirmative defenses. In 2019, the Clerk was dismissed from the case after
the trial court entered final summary judgment in its favor. Ramle did not
appeal that judgment.
The matter proceeded to a non-jury trial on October 28, 2019. Ramle
called one witness—Maher Ghafir, Ramle’s director—who testified that
Ramle acquired an interest in the surplus proceeds by purchasing an
assignment of rights from the alleged former owners of the property. Ramle
introduced five exhibits at trial: (1) a final judgment in Ramle’s favor in the
foreclosure case of another unit, 2407, of the Club Atlantis Condominium;
(2) an order granting an ex parte motion to redeem unit 2407; (3) bank
records and a statement by one of the former property owners related to an
alleged payment from Ramle for the purchase of unit 2407; (4) the
assignment documents from the prior owners of the property to Ramle; and
(5) a copy of a warranty deed for unit 2407.
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At the close of Ramle’s case, the County raised an ore tenus motion
for involuntary dismissal asserting the evidence presented by Ramle failed
to establish a prima facie case for relief on any claim. The trial court deferred
ruling on the motion and allowed the parties to submit proposed orders and
memoranda in support of their positions. The trial court subsequently
granted the motion. Ramle then filed a motion for rehearing, which was
denied by the trial court. This timely appeal ensued.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Our standard of review of a trial court’s decision on a motion for
involuntary dismissal is de novo. Bank of America, N.A. v. Arevalo, 306 So.
3d 1008, 1011 n.3 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020). Whether a challenged statute is
constitutional is a question of law which this court also reviews de novo. See,
e.g., Caribbean Conservation Corp. v. Fla. Fish & Wildlife Conservation
Comm’n, 838 So. 2d 492, 500 (Fla. 2003). There is, however, a strong
presumption that statutes are constitutionally valid and will not be declared
unconstitutional unless determined to be invalid beyond a reasonable doubt.
Medina v. Gulf Coast Linen Servs., 825 So. 2d 1018, 1020 (Fla. 1st DCA
2002) (citing Todd v. State, 643 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)).
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ANALYSIS
“An involuntary dismissal . . . is properly entered only when the
evidence considered in the light most favorable to the non-moving party fails
to establish a prima facie case on the non-moving party’s claim.” Luciani v.
Nealon, 181 So. 3d 1200, 1202 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (quoting McCabe v.
Hanley, 886 So. 2d 1053, 1055 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)). “[A] motion for
involuntary dismissal is the proper method by which a defendant may obtain
a judgment in his favor following the presentation of the plaintiff’s case in
chief.” Valdes v. Ass’n I.N.E.D., H.M.O., Inc., 667 So. 2d 856, 856 n.1 (Fla.
3d DCA 1996). “[W]here the evidence offered by the plaintiffs, considered
in the light most favorable to them, does not establish a prima facie case, it
is incumbent on the trial judge to grant the motion.” Day v. Amini, 550 So.
2d 169, 171 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989).
Thus, we address each of the six counts raised in the complaint and
the evidence offered by Ramle in support at trial.2 In counts one and six,
2
On appeal, Ramle also asserts the trial court erred in awarding costs to the
County and DOR under section 194.192, Florida Statutes. In their briefs,
however, both the County and DOR waived entitlement to recover costs in
this action. This issue is therefore moot. A.G. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fam.
Servs., 932 So. 2d 311, 313 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (“An issue is moot when the
controversy has been so fully resolved that a judicial determination can have
no actual effect.” (quoting Merkle v. Guardianship of Jacoby, 912 So. 2d 595,
600 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005))).
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Ramle raised claims against the County for damages resulting from failure
to pay it the surplus proceeds and for money had and received, respectively.
Section 197.582(2) provides the procedure for how surplus proceeds are
distributed after a tax deed sale. Pursuant to the plain language of the
section, “[i]f the property is purchased for an amount in excess of the
statutory bid of the certificateholder, the excess shall be paid over and
disbursed by the clerk.” § 197.582(2), Fla. Stat. (2004) (emphasis added).
Accordingly, Ramle could not establish a prima facie case for either claim
against the County as a matter of law because the Clerk is the sole party
responsible for payment of surpluses. The trial court lacked the authority to
impose a legal obligation to handle distribution of surplus proceeds on the
County where the Florida Legislature declined to do so.
The trial court additionally found that count six was properly dismissed
because Ramle failed to meet the elements of a claim for money had and
received. “An action for money had and received, or the more modern action
for unjust enrichment, is an equitable remedy requiring proof that money had
been paid due to fraud, misrepresentation, imposition, duress, undue
influence, mistake, or as a result of some other grounds appropriate for
intervention by a court of equity.” Hall v. Humana Hosp. Daytona Beach,
686 So. 2d 653, 656 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996) (citation omitted).
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Ramle contends the County is erroneously retaining the surplus
proceeds because it is entitled to collect them based on the assignment from
the former owners of the property. Ramle, however, failed to provide
sufficient evidence that the former owners of the property who assigned their
rights to Ramle were entitled to the surplus proceeds.
Contrary to Ramle’s apparent contention otherwise, prior ownership
alone is insufficient to establish a right to surplus proceeds from a tax deed
sale. Pursuant to section 197.582(2), to be entitled to surplus proceeds a
party must first show that it is one of the persons listed in section 197.522(1),
Florida Statutes (2004). Section 197.522(1)(a) refers to “the persons listed
in the tax collector’s statement pursuant to section 197.502(4)[, Florida
Statutes].” § 197.522(1)(a), Fla. Stat.; see also Rahimi v. Glob. Discoveries,
Ltd., LLC, 252 So. 3d 804, 807 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) (“After the property tax
bill and other government liens are paid off, the court clerk holds the
‘balance’ (or surplus) of the tax deed sale ‘for the benefit of person described
in [the tax collector’s statement].’” (quoting § 197.582(2), Fla. Stat.)). The
persons listed in section 197.502(4) include “the titleholder to the property
up for sale, ‘[a]ny lienholder of record who has recorded a lien against the
property,’ and ‘[a]ny mortgagee of record.’” Id. (quoting § 197.502(4)(a)-(c)).
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Accordingly, “[o]nly those titleholders, lienholders, and mortgagees
that are of record before the tax deed sale are entitled to notice, and those
for whom the clerk is holding the surplus.” Id. Review of the record
demonstrates that Ramle failed to provide sufficient evidence at trial
establishing the alleged former owners were titleholders, lienholders or
mortgagees of record before the tax deed sale. Ramle did not provide a
copy of the Tax Collector’s statement, any title records related to the
property, or any records of the Clerk related to the tax deed sale of the
property. Absent any proof that the alleged former owners were persons
entitled to the surplus proceeds pursuant to section 197.582(2), Ramle could
not establish a prima facie case for money had and received.
In the remaining four counts of the operative complaint, Ramle
challenged the constitutionality of sections 197.473 and 197.582(2). This
court, however, is precluded from considering Ramle’s constitutional
challenges because Ramle did not provide any evidence demonstrating it
complied with the procedural requirements to raise a constitutional challenge
to a state statute.
Section 86.091, Florida Statutes, provides that “[i]f the statute, charter,
ordinance, or franchise is alleged to be unconstitutional, the Attorney
General or the state attorney of the judicial circuit in which the action is
8
pending shall be served with a copy of the complaint and be entitled to be
heard.” § 86.091, Fla. Stat. (emphasis added); see also Martin Mem’l Med.
Ctr., Inc. v. Tenet Healthsystem Hosps., Inc., 875 So. 2d 797, 800 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2004) (“The purpose of [section 86.091] would appear from its
language to be relatively clear—to ensure that the state (in the person of the
Attorney General or appropriate state attorney) is aware of any litigation in
which a plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment that any of the enumerated
forms of legislation is unconstitutional, and afforded an opportunity to present
the state’s position.”).
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.071 similarly “requires a party that
files a pleading, written motion, or other document drawing into question the
constitutionality of a state statute or a county or municipal charter, ordinance,
or franchise, to give notice to the Attorney General or the state attorney of
the judicial circuit in which the action is pending.” Yanes v. OC Food &
Beverage LLC., 300 So. 3d 798, 802 (Fla. 5th DCA 2020); see also Fla. R.
Civ. P. 1.071(b) (“A party that files a pleading, written motion, or other
document drawing into question the constitutionality of a state statute . . .
must promptly . . . serve the notice and the pleading, written motion, or other
document drawing into question the constitutionality of a state statute or a
county or municipal charter, ordinance, or franchise on the Attorney General
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or the state attorney of the judicial circuit in which the action is pending, by
either certified or registered mail.”); State v. Fla. Workers’ Advocs., 167 So.
3d 500, 504 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (noting that Rule 1.071 requires “a mailing
by certified or registered mail to the Attorney General when a pleading,
motion, or other paper draws into question the constitutionality of a state
statute”).
Pursuant to section 48.121, Florida Statutes, “process against the
state shall be served on the state attorney or an assistant state attorney for
the judicial circuit within which the action is brought and by sending two
copies of the process by registered or certified mail to the Attorney General.”
§ 48.121, Fla. Stat. When a party fails to provide proper notice to the
Attorney General or state attorney, a court is precluded from considering the
constitutional challenge raised in the complaint. See Lee Mem’l Health Sys.
v. Progressive Select Ins. Co., 260 So. 3d 1038, 1042 (Fla. 2018) (“Failure
to comply with rule 1.071 bars consideration of a claim that would result in
the striking of a state statute as unconstitutional.”); Shelton v. Bank of New
York Mellon, 203 So. 3d 1003, 1005 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (declining to
consider a constitutional issue where the “objection to the notice of sale does
not state that the Attorney General or state attorney was served”); Davis v.
Karr, 264 So. 3d 279, 282 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019) (concluding a constitutional
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challenge to a statute was not properly preserved for review where the
appellant failed to comply with Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.071).
Here, Ramle presented no evidence that it provided the State with the
requisite service. On appeal, Ramle contends the State was properly served
because DOR was served, answered and defended in this action. This
argument is without merit as it improperly conflates DOR with the State.
While both are State entities, service on DOR does not equate service on
the State for purposes of raising a constitutional challenge to a state statute.
Pursuant to the relevant rule and statute, Ramle had to serve a copy of its
complaint on the Attorney General or state attorney of the eleventh judicial
circuit. See § 86.091, Fla. Stat.; Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.071. Ramle failed to do
so. The trial court therefore properly found it was barred from considering
Ramle’s constitutional challenges.
CONCLUSION
As Ramle failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie
case for any of its claims, we find the trial court properly granted the County’s
motion for an involuntary dismissal. Sec. Abstract & Ins. Co. v. Fid. Nat. Title
Ins. Co. of Pennsylvania, 668 So. 2d 658, 658 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (holding
“that the trial court properly granted an involuntary dismissal as to all these
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counts at the close of plaintiff’s case, because [the plaintiff] failed to establish
a prima facie case as to any of them”).
Affirmed.
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