Morgan A. Leppert v. State

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FIFTH DISTRICT
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
MORGAN AMANDA LEPPERT,
Appellant,
v. Case No. 5D16-2238
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
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Opinion filed March 27, 2017
Appeal from the Circuit Court
for Putnam County,
Patti A. Christensen, Judge.
Valarie Linnen, Atlantic Beach, for
Appellant.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General,
Tallahassee, and Pamela J. Koller,
Assistant Attorney General, Daytona
Beach, for Appellee.
PER CURIAM.
Morgan Amanda Leppert appeals her judgment and sentence for first-degree
murder, burglary with assault or battery, and robbery with a deadly weapon. Leppert
raises four issues: 1) her lengthy sentence violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment laid out in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010);
2) the trial court erred in not having a jury determine whether she killed, intended to kill,
or attempted to kill the victim; 3) the trial court erred in finding that she killed, intended to
kill, or attempted to kill the victim; and 4) Leppert’s fifty-year sentences for the burglary
and robbery charges violate the Eighth Amendment because they are de facto life
sentences that fail to provide her with a meaningful opportunity for release and
rehabilitation. We affirm on these issues.
As to the second issue, the trial court made the requisite finding required by section
775.082, Florida Statutes (2016), that Leppert killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill
the victim. Leppert contends that the jury was required to make this finding under the
statute. In a strikingly similar case, this court recently determined that the trial court did
not err in making such a finding. Williams v. State, 42 Fla. L. Weekly D363 (Fla. 5th DCA
Feb. 10, 2017) (“Our supreme court has expressly authorized a trial court to make the
factual determination as to whether a defendant actually killed, attempted to kill, or
intended to kill a victim.” (citing Falcon v. State, 162 So. 3d 954, 963 (Fla. 2015))).
Lastly, we note that the trial court provided in Leppert’s sentence that she was
eligible for a judicial review hearing after twenty-five years for all three charges. Pursuant
to section 921.1402(2)(d), Florida Statutes (2016), Leppert was entitled to a review of her
robbery and burglary convictions after twenty years. § 921.1402(2)(d), Fla. Stat. (2016).
We accordingly reverse that part of the sentencing order and remand this case for entry
of an amended sentencing order consistent with this opinion.
As we did in Williams, we certify the following question to the Florida Supreme
Court as one of great public importance:
DOES ALLEYNE V. UNITED STATES, 133 S. CT. 2151
(2013), REQUIRE THE JURY AND NOT THE TRIAL COURT
TO MAKE THE FACTUAL FINDING UNDER SECTION
775.082(1)(b), FLORIDA STATUTES (2016), AS TO
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WHETHER A JUVENILE OFFENDER ACTUALLY KILLED,
INTENDED TO KILL, OR ATTEMPTED TO KILL THE
VICTIM?
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; REMANDED; QUESTION CERTIFIED.
SAWAYA, BERGER and WALLIS, JJ., concur.
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