DocketNumber: Case No. 6:15-cv-1631-Orl-37KRS
Citation Numbers: 356 F. Supp. 3d 1366
Judges: Dalton
Filed Date: 12/21/2018
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/25/2022
This action arises out of alleged police misconduct following a domestic dispute that resulted in Plaintiff Timothy Allen Davis, Sr. fatally shooting his son. (See Doc. 122 ("Complaint ").) The Court previously granted Defendant City of Apopka's ("City ") motion to dismiss (Doc. 128) and dismissed all of Plaintiff's claims against the City. (Doc. 133 ("MTD Order ").) Plaintiff then appealed the MTD Order to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded ("Opinion "). Davis v. City of Apopka ,
In its Opinion, the Eleventh Circuit pointed out at least two clear errors this Court committed: First, the failure to appreciate Plaintiff's allegations that the City's Chief of Police Robert Manley ("Chief Manley ") was a final policymaker for purposes of
I. BACKGROUND
A. Plaintiff's Allegations
Turning again to the plausible allegations in Plaintiff's Complaint, accepted as true, the Court finds that the relevant *1370facts are as follows:
1. The Altercations
In October 2011, Plaintiff resided in a home with his family-his wife Tarsha Davis ("Mrs. Davis" ), a nine-year-old daughter ("Minor Daughter "), a ten-year-old son ("Minor Son "), and twenty-two-year-old Timothy Allen Davis, II ("Timmy "). (Doc. 122, ¶¶ 21, 22.) Timmy had recently returned to the home after leaving college, where he had played football. (Id. ) Timmy weighed approximately 280 pounds, stood 6'1? tall, and was the father of a young child ("Child "). (Id. )
At the conclusion of a multi-day visit between Timmy and the Child, the Child's mother ("Mother ") arrived at the home to retrieve the Child on October 1, 2011. (Id. ¶¶ 22, 23.) Timmy refused to surrender the Child to the Mother, a dispute ensued, and Plaintiff attempted to reason with Timmy. (Id. ¶¶ 24, 25.) While Timmy argued with Plaintiff, Mrs. Davis placed the Child in the Mother's car. (Id. ¶¶ 26-27.) This action allegedly incensed Timmy, who "charged after Mrs. Davis, yelling and cursing her." (Id. ) To prevent physical harm to Mrs. Davis and the Mother, Plaintiff intervened, and Timmy "walked off down the street" after he threatened to "beat" Plaintiff. (See
Approximately fifteen minutes after the initial altercation, Timmy returned to the home and was advised by Plaintiff and Mrs. Davis that he had to "move out." (Id. ¶ 29.) Timmy responded by going upstairs "angrily" and breaking down in tears. (Id. ) Plaintiff-who was on his way to join his Minor Daughter outside-went upstairs to "calm Timmy down." (Id. ¶ 30.) Timmy was not calmed; rather, he yelled at Plaintiff and "brutally attacked" him by " head-butt[ing]," "football-tackl[ing]," and "slamming" Plaintiff to the tile floor in the upstairs bathroom. (Id. ¶ 31.) Timmy then straddled a "completely defenseless" Plaintiff and repeatedly punched him in the face until Plaintiff bled. (Id. ¶ 32.) During this attack, Plaintiff's head struck the toilet, he landed on the back of his head, his "eyeglasses" were broken and tossed from his face, and his knees were severely injured. (Id. ¶¶ 31-32.)
Mrs. Davis heard this second altercation, ran upstairs, attempted to pull-then eventually coaxed-Timmy off Plaintiff, and finally assisted Plaintiff off the bathroom floor. (Id. ¶¶ 33-34.) Visibly bruised and swollen around his eyes, jaw, and lips, Plaintiff instructed Mrs. Davis to "call the paramedics for his severely injured knees" and face. (Id. ¶¶ 35, 36, 49.) Attempting to distance himself from Timmy and "avoid continued violence," Plaintiff then stumbled downstairs to sit and "wait for the paramedics." (Id. ) Timmy allegedly followed Plaintiff downstairs, so Plaintiff walked to the garage to get away from Timmy. (Id. ¶¶ 36-37.) Because Timmy continued to follow him and was "evidently enraged," Plaintiff then "limped out of the garage" to the driveway where his car was parked. (Id. ¶¶ 37-39.)
Hoping that the mere sight of a firearm "would scare [Timmy] from attacking him again," Plaintiff retrieved a firearm from his car. (Id. ¶ 39.) From less than ten yards away, Plaintiff observed Timmy pace back and forth inside the garage, remove his sweatshirt, throw it to the ground in a *1371"fighting gesture," and then walk "aggressively" toward Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 40.) Panicked, Plaintiff fired a shot in Timmy's direction to "scare him off," but "Timmy continued to advance toward" him. (Id. ¶ 41.) In "self-defense" Plaintiff fired again, and the second shot struck Timmy in the chest. (Id. ¶ 42.) Plaintiff then saw "blood coming from Timmy's upper chest area." (Id. )
Plaintiff called to Mrs. Davis for help and attempted to escort Timmy to Plaintiff's car for transport to the hospital; however, when they neared the car, "Timmy collapsed to the ground." (Id. ¶¶ 43, 44, 48, 53.) Timmy's collapse caused Plaintiff's injured knees to buckle, and Plaintiff "lost his balance," fell on top of Timmy, and was "unable to move because of his injured knees." (Id. ) Mrs. Davis then called 9-1-1 to report Plaintiff's "confrontation with" Timmy where "she believed" Plaintiff had "shot." (Id. ¶¶ 45, 46.) Some of Plaintiff's neighbors-who came to the home in response to the loud noises-allegedly witnessed Plaintiff's position on top of Timmy and the "visible injuries" to Plaintiff's face. (Id. )
2. Police Response
A few minutes after Mrs. Davis's 9-1-1 call, Officers Mark Creaser and Rafael Baez of the Apopka Police Department ("APD ") arrived at the home, followed a few minutes later by Chief Manley. (See
At the direction of Chief Manley: (a) Officers Creaser and Baez lifted Plaintiff up and took him to the garage; and (b) Timmy, Mrs. Davis, and the Minor Daughter were transported to the Orlando Regional Medical Center ("ORMC "), where Timmy died at 12:36 a.m. on October 2, 2011. (See
While Plaintiff and Timmy were hospitalized, and Mrs. Davis and the Minor Daughter were at ORMC, the individual Defendants allegedly: (1) conducted a warrantless and illegal search of the home and selectively seized evidence ("Warrantless Search ") (see
After Timmy died but before Plaintiff was informed of his death, Plaintiff alleges several other instances of misconduct. First, Officer Creaser advised Plaintiff that he was "under arrest" at FHA for "Attempted First Degree Murder"
Plaintiff remained hospitalized and underwent knee surgery as a result of the altercations, and he was discharged by October 7, 2011. (Id. ¶¶ 141-42.) By the time of his discharge, the individual Defendants allegedly knew that Plaintiff had acted in self-defense and no reasonable officer could have concluded that probable cause existed to charge Plaintiff for the murder of Timmy. (See
3. The Plan
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants devised a plan in the front yard of his home on the day of the shooting to improperly charge and prosecute Plaintiff for Timmy's murder even though any reasonable officer responding to the shooting would have concluded that Plaintiff was an innocent victim of domestic violence who lawfully shot Timmy in self-defense ("Plan "). (See
(1) declining "to classify [Plaintiff] as a victim of domestic violence" even though Officers Creaser and Baez could see that Plaintiff had suffered severe physical injuries as a result of Timmy's relentless violent attack in the home (id. ¶¶ 21-22, 68-71, 86, 99, 102);
(2) refusing to photograph Plaintiff's injuries (id. ¶¶ 69-70, 99, 105, 106);
(3) conducting the Warrantless Search, editing the Search Tape, and obtaining the False Warrant (id. ¶¶ 67, 73-80, 82-85);
(4) arresting Plaintiff before interviewing available witnesses, such as Timmy, Mrs. Davis, Minor Daughter, and Plaintiff's neighbors (seeid. ¶¶ 99-104 ; see alsoid. ¶¶ 133, 134, 137, 140 );
(5) failing to advise Plaintiff of his Miranda rights "upon his arrest" or before conducting improper custodial interrogations of Plaintiff (id. ¶¶ 98, 118, 122-24); and
(6) obtaining the Recorded Statement by manipulating Plaintiff with the False Charge Statement and during the Parkinson Interrogation, and then improperly editing the Recorded Statement (id. ¶¶ 108-27).
Plaintiff further alleges that the individual Defendants continued with the Plan *1373during the state criminal proceedings, when they: (7) tampered with evidence; (8) omitted exculpatory information; (9) provided false deposition and trial testimony; (10) refused to fulfill the crime lab's request for a sample of Plaintiff's blood; and (11) failed to advise Plaintiff's attorney of the crime lab's request for Plaintiff's blood or its analysis of blood splatter evidence found in the bathroom of the home. (See
4. Plaintiff's Claims
Against the City, Plaintiff asserts two § 1983 claims for violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights: (1) "false arrest and unreasonable seizure" (id. ¶¶ 169-77 (Count I ) ); and (2) "unreasonable search" of Plaintiff's home (id. ¶¶ 178-87 (Count II ) ). Plaintiff also asserts three state-law claims against the City: (1) false arrest (id. ¶¶ 349-53 (Count XVIII ) );
B. The City's Motion to Dismiss
The City then sought to dismiss Counts I (false arrest under § 1983 ), II (unlawful search under § 1983 ), XVIII (false arrest), XXVI (malicious prosecution), and XXXV (IIED) for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Doc. 128 ("Motion ").) This Court granted the Motion,
C. Appeal
Plaintiff appealed the MTD Order to the Eleventh Circuit, arguing that the Court erred in dismissing his claims against the City. (Doc. 168); see also Davis ,
Thus, the Complaint as reconfigured following the MTD Order and Opinion now retains Plaintiff's § 1983 unlawful search claim against the City and Plaintiff's § 1983 and state-law false arrest claims against the City. So the Court must determine, as instructed by the Eleventh Circuit, whether Plaintiff's false arrest claims survive.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
In federal court, a viable pleading must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). When a complaint "fails to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face," the defendant may seek dismissal of the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). Ashcroft v. Iqbal ,
III. ANALYSIS
In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the City violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment and Florida law when he was arrested for the murder of his son without probable cause to believe he had engaged in an unlawful use of force. (Doc. 122, ¶¶ 169-77, 349-53.) Specifically, he asserts that there was no probable cause to arrest him for First Degree Murder because he acted in self-defense as the victim of a domestic violence incident. (Id. ¶ 350.) In response, the City argues that it had actual probable cause in effectuating Plaintiff's *1375arrest.
For Plaintiff's false arrest claims to withstand a 12(b)(6) motion, his Complaint must include plausible allegations that a law enforcement officer effectuated an arrest in the face of facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonable police officer to conclude that the conduct was not unlawful. See Lee v. Ferraro ,
Actual probable cause exists "when 'the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge, of which he or she has reasonably trustworthy information, would cause a prudent person to believe, under the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.' " Lee ,
"An arresting officer is required to conduct a reasonable investigation to establish probable cause." See Rankin ,
But an officer "is not required to explore and eliminate every theoretically plausible claim of innocence before making an arrest." Kingsland ,
The probable cause calculus is more complicated when an affirmative defense has been asserted. Under those circumstances, "a police officer should consider a suspect's explanation in evaluating the existence of probable cause," but "he 'is under no obligation to give any credence to a suspect's story nor should a plausible explanation in any sense require the officer to forego arrest pending further investigation if the facts as initially discovered provide probable cause.' " Id. at 888-89 (quoting Criss v. City of Kent ,
To those considerations, Florida's Stand Your Ground law, Florida Statutes §§ 776.012 and 776.032, adds another layer to the probable cause analysis. Under Florida's Stand Your Ground law, "[a] person is justified in using ... deadly force if he or she reasonably believes that using ... such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself."
*1377Davis ,
Here, the question the Court must resolve is whether it violated the Fourth Amendment when law enforcement officers arrested Plaintiff, a homicide suspect, after they were presented with facts and circumstances suggesting the homicide was a justifiable use of deadly force under the Florida Stand Your Ground law. More to the point, procedurally, the question on the motion to dismiss is whether Plaintiff's plausible allegations, taken as true, sufficiently allege an absence of probable cause and, consequently, a Fourth Amendment violation.
"[W]hether an officer possesses probable cause ... depends on the elements of the alleged crime and the operative fact pattern." Brown v. City of Huntsville, Ala. ,
The City argues that all the elements of a crime warranting Plaintiff's arrest were satisfied by the fact that when officers arrived at the scene in response to the 9-1-1 call, they found Plaintiff lying on top of his wounded son, with a gun in his pocket, and Plaintiff admitted that he fired the shot. (Doc. 128, p. 7; Doc. 173, p. 4 (citing Doc. 122, ¶¶ 45, 48, 50, 51, 54, 55, 56, 97).) Faced with this, the probable cause calculus seems simple-based on the totality of the circumstances it is objectively reasonable to believe that Plaintiff committed a *1378crime. See Lee ,
So difficulty arises when the Court, as it must, credits Plaintiff's allegations regarding the justification for his use of force: that Chief Manley found Plaintiff "lying on top of his son, unable to move because of his injured knees" with "severe, visible bruises and contusions all over his face resulting from the attack from his son" and that Plaintiff told Officer Creaser that he shot Timmy "because my son beat me up and kept coming at me." (Doc. 122, ¶¶ 48, 49, 51.) Moreover, Plaintiff alleges that all of Chief Manley's actions surrounding his arrest were motivated by ill will and animus toward him. (See
Taking all the facts alleged in the Complaint as true, Plaintiff's plausible, non-conclusory allegations do not establish that Chief Manley or any other officers possessed knowledge of facts or circumstances "conclusively establishing" that Plaintiff was justified in shooting his son. See Williams ,
Probable cause hinges on all the facts known to the officer, not mere assertions of justification. See Williams ,
Plaintiff here has far less weighing in his favor. As in Drew , it is what Chief Manley knew that matters. Plaintiff's lengthy and detailed Complaint conspicuously does not plausibly allege that Chief Manley possessed "knowledge of facts or circumstances conclusively establishing" that Plaintiff's use of force was not unlawful. Williams ,
What is more, the Complaint does not sufficiently allege that Chief Manley disregarded evidence, chose to ignore information offered to him, or elected not to obtain easily discoverable facts that would help him clarify whether Plaintiff was entitled to immunity from arrest under Florida's Stand Your Ground law. See Cozzi ,
To be sure, Plaintiff does also allege in the Complaint that Chief Manley failed to conduct a "meaningful" reasonable investigation into his self-defense claim to determine if probable cause existed prior to arresting Plaintiff, which to him should have included interviewing witnesses *1380and parties involved, searching the home for evidence upon obtaining a valid warrant, initiating the standard domestic violence procedures, and conducting a "Stand Your Ground" investigation (see Doc. 122, ¶¶ 69-72, 99-102)-an investigation that would largely turn on credibility determinations of statements made by parties and witnesses to establish the reasonableness of a seizure or arrest for Fourth Amendment purposes. But such is a strain the limits of the Fourth Amendment won't bear. See, e.g., Rankin ,
Based on the allegations in the Complaint surrounding Plaintiff's witness-less fatal shooting of his son, even in light of Florida's Stand Your Ground law, the Court finds that this is one of the many cases in which "it would be impossible for law enforcement to secure a judicial immunity determination prior to arresting an individual suspected of killing or causing bodily harm to another (or attempting to do so)." Kumar v. Patel ,
As Judge Steele and Judge Howard have recently observed, while the enactment of Florida's Stand Your Ground law "substantially altered the law governing justifiable use of force by abrogating the common law duty to retreat before resorting to deadly force in self-defense" and granting immunity to those who prove entitlement to the defense by the preponderance of the evidence, this immunity does not negate the existence of probable cause at the time of this arrest. See Ermini ,
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
*13821. Defendant City of Apopka's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint (Doc. 128) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART:
a. Counts I, XVIII, XXVI, and XXXV are dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim.
b. In all other respects, the Motion is DENIED.
2. Defendant City of Apopka's Motion for Clarification Regarding Probable Cause and Supplemental Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's False Arrest Claims (Doc. 173) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART:
a. To the extent the Motion requests the Court to dismiss Counts I and XVIII with prejudice, the Motion is GRANTED.
b. To the extent the Motion requests the Court to reject the notion that Florida's Stand Your Ground law upsets the existence of actual probable cause for Plaintiff's arrest, the Motion is GRANTED.
c. In all other respects, the Motion is DENIED.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers in Orlando, Florida, on December 21, 2018.
On appeal the Eleventh Circuit noted that "[t]he district court's order granting in part and denying in part the City and individual officers' motion to dismiss thoroughly sets forth the facts as alleged in Davis's third amended complaint." Davis ,
Plaintiff alleges that his arrest affidavit indicated that he was "arrested for First Degree Murder" when he was still at his home, before any witnesses were interviewed, and while Timmy was still alive. (See Doc. 122, ¶¶ 91-93, 95-97, 100; see also id. ¶ 132.)
Plaintiff advises that he intended to designate Count XVIII as a state-law claim against the City for false arrest, but that Count did not appear in the Complaint during Plaintiff's scanning process. (See Doc. 130, p. 19.) The basis of Plaintiff's claim is evident from the allegations contained in the Complaint. (See Doc. 122, p. 64.) As such, the Court will follow the parties' lead and construe Count XVIII as a claim against the City for false arrest. (See, e.g. , Doc. 129, p. 3.)
The MTD Order also addressed a motion to dismiss filed by other Defendants in this case (see Doc. 133), but the City is the only Defendant that was a party to the appeal. Davis ,
Regarding Plaintiff's IIED claim against the City, the Eleventh Circuit stated only, "The district court dismissed another claim against the City, one for intentional infliction of emotional distress, on the ground that under Florida law the City is immune in actions arising out of the malicious acts of its police officers." Davis ,
Following the Eleventh Circuit's Opinion, the City filed a Motion for Clarification Regarding Probable Cause and Supplemental Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's False Arrest Claims (Doc. 173), to which Plaintiff responded (Doc. 187). Throughout these filings, the parties dispute in detail the existence of actual probable cause and the impact, if any, of Florida's Stand Your Ground law on that determination. (See Docs. 173, 187.) So the Court considered those arguments as well as the arguments in the original motion to dismiss (Doc. 128) and response (Doc. 130).
Previously, the Court applied to the City the arguable probable cause standard to determine if the arrest was unconstitutional. (Doc. 133, pp. 12-15, 18.) That standard was incorrect for the City because it only applies to individual officers asserting a qualified immunity defense. (Id. at 12-15.) In applying that standard, the Court found that arguable probable cause was present. (See
While unpublished opinions are not binding precedent, they may be considered as persuasive authority. See 11th Cir. R. 36-2 ; see also United States v. Almedina ,
Of course this is easier said than done, as the Court must now tease out how this law impacts the probable cause calculus. If, as the City contends, deciding whether the facts support a defense of justified force under the Stand Your Ground law for probable cause purposes is a post-arrest evidentiary analysis (see Doc. 173, pp. 5-9), then the statutory protection against being "arrested, detained, or charged" as a result of the use of legally justified force would be effectively written out of the statute. See
While admittedly determined against the backdrop of a qualified immunity analysis and the arguable probable cause standard as opposed to the actual probable cause standard, in Drew the court stated:
Here, Drew alleges that Davis "physically, repeatedly, and forcefully" struck Drew "with closed fists [on] his face and body." In response, Drew "pulled a gun that he had been possessing in a side-holster and fired one (1) shot into Mr. Davis' face." Based on these initial facts alone, a reasonable officer in the same circumstances as Shouse could have concluded that probable cause existed to arrest Drew for attempted murder. When Drew shot Davis in the face, Drew engaged in an "imminently dangerous [act] to another, and evinced a depraved mind regardless of human life ...."
Drew ,
While Plaintiff undoubtedly and understandably wanted a more thorough investigation into his claim of self-defense prior to arrest, the Court must also consider that probable cause for an arrest "is a fluctuating concept; its existence depends upon 'factual and practical considerations of everyday life.' " BeVier v. Hucal ,
Notably, the Florida Supreme Court goes on to say:
The law is clear that we expect officers to temporarily detain a person encountered under circumstances creating a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Then, if there is probable cause to believe that the person committed a felony, law enforcement is authorized to immediately effectuate the arrest ... and should clearly do so when there is probable cause to believe that a person has committed a serious crime of violence against another. Probable cause to arrest for a crime of violence would include probable cause to believe that the suspect was not acting in self-defense; and, suspects will often claim self-defense even when the facts would not appear to support such a claim. This means that in most potential self-defense cases, a post-arrest and post-charging immunity determination, made when a defendant's counsel requests that determination, will be the best that we can do-procedurally-considering the well-established body of law detailing the responsibilities of law enforcement officers, prosecutors, and judges.
Kumar ,
Plaintiff relies heavily on the case of Cozzi for the relatively unremarkable proposition that "in evaluating probable cause, an officer may not 'unreasonably disregard[ ] certain pieces of evidence' by 'choos[ing] to ignore information that has been offered to him or her' or 'elect[ing] not to obtain easily discoverable facts' that might tend to exculpate a suspect."