DocketNumber: Case No. 17–cv–22370–KMM
Citation Numbers: 286 F. Supp. 3d 1352
Judges: Moore
Filed Date: 12/12/2017
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/25/2022
THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon Defendants Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd. ("Princess"), Steiner Transocean Limited, Steiner Leisure Limited, and Steiner Transocean U.S., Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss and Compel Arbitration (ECF No. 8) (the "Arbitration Motion") and Plaintiff Michelle Haasbroek's Response in Opposition and Motion for Remand (ECF No. 12) (the "Remand Motion" or "Opp."). Both motions are now ripe for review. For the reasons that follow, both motions are GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
I. BACKGROUND
Michelle Haasbroek ("Plaintiff"), a South African citizen, was a spa facialist employed by Steiner Transocean Limited, Steiner Leisure Limited, and/or Steiner Transocean U.S., Inc. (collectively, the "Steiner Defendants"). See Notice of Removal Ex. 1 (ECF No. 1-1) (the "Complaint") ¶¶ 6, 8. On April 4, 2014, Plaintiff and Steiner Transocean Limited, a Bahamas company, executed an agreement labeled the Shipboard Employment Agreement (the "SEA"). See Notice of Removal Ex. 2 (ECF No. 1-2) ("SEA").
The SEA is governed by the laws of the Bahamas. See SEA at Article 16(a) (p. 11). The SEA also contains an arbitration *1355clause (hereinafter, the "Arbitration Clause"), which reads in relevant part:
[A]ny and all disputes, claims or controversies whatsoever, whether in contract, regulatory, tort or otherwise, including but not limited to, constitutional, statutory, common law, intentional tort and equitable claims, as well as Jones Act and Wage Act claims, claims for negligence, unseaworthiness, maintenance and cure, failure to provide prompt, proper and adequate medical care, personal injury, death or property damage and whether accruing prior to, during or after the expiration of this Agreement (collectively "Disputes"), shall be resolved by final and binding arbitration. In addition, Employee agrees to arbitrate any and all disputes regarding the existence, validity, termination or enforceability of any term or provision in this Agreement. All arbitration between the parties shall be referred to and finally administered and resolved in Nassau, The Bahamas and administered by the American Arbitration Association ("AAA") under its international dispute resolution procedures....
Id. at Article 16(b) (p. 11).
On or about June 9, 2014, Plaintiff was employed as a spa facialist aboard the M/S Crown Princess (the "Vessel"). See Complaint ¶¶ 6-8. The Vessel was owned, operated, managed, maintained, and/or controlled by Princess. See Complaint ¶ 6. During the course of her employment, Plaintiff lived aboard the Vessel. Id. ¶ 10. On or about June 9, 2014, Defendant Eddie Yamile Santa Cruz Reyes, a Princess employee working aboard the vessel, allegedly raped Plaintiff. Id. ¶¶ 10-13, 42. As a result of the rape, Plaintiff became pregnant and gave birth to a child. Id. ¶¶ 14-15.
On or about May 17, 2017, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit in the Circuit Court for the 11th Judicial Circuit in and for Miami Dade County, Florida. See generally id. at 1-2. The action was originally titled Michelle Haasbroek v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., et al. , case number 2017-011830-CA-01. Id.
In the Complaint-which is still the operative complaint in this action-Plaintiff lodges eight claims against Princess, the Steiner Defendants, and Reyes (collectively, "Defendants"). See id. These claims arise under the Jones Act,
*1356On June 26, 2017, the Steiner Defendants timely removed the action to federal court on the grounds that this matter is subject to arbitration pursuant to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the "Convention").
Plaintiff opposes the Arbitration Motion, primarily on the ground that the Arbitration Clause within the SEA does not cover the subject matter of this action. See Opp. 3-14. Plaintiff concludes that because the Arbitration Clause is inapplicable, the Defendants have no other grounds for removal and this matter should be remanded.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
The Convention requires courts of signatory nations, such as the United States, to give effect to private arbitration agreements and to enforce arbitral awards made in signatory nations. See United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, art. I(1), June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3; see also Sierra v. Cruise Ships Catering & Servs. Int'l, N.V. ,
The Convention Act "generally establishes a strong presumption in favor of arbitration of international commercial disputes." Trifonov v. MSC Mediterranean Shipping Co. SA ,
In ruling on a motion to enforce an arbitration agreement under the Convention, a district court conducts a "very limited inquiry." Bautista v. Star Cruises ,
Beyond that threshold consideration, a district court "must order arbitration" unless the four jurisdictional prerequisites are not met, or one of the Convention's affirmative defenses applies.
III. DISCUSSION
"Subject matter jurisdiction in this case is ultimately dependent on the applicability of the" Arbitration Clause in the SEA.
Plaintiff does not dispute that the Arbitration Clause found in the SEA satisfies the Bautista jurisdictional prerequisites. See Opp. at 1-14 (not addressing the Moving Defendants' arguments regarding Bautista factors); see also Arbitration Motion at 6-7.
Instead, Plaintiff raises two arguments against compelling this action to arbitration. First, Plaintiff argues that she and Steiner Transocean Limited did not agree to arbitrate the claims in this action because the event undergirding her claims (i.e. the rape) is unrelated to her employment. Opp. 2-6. Second, Plaintiff argues that Princess, as a non-signatory to the SEA, cannot compel arbitration based on the Arbitration Clause in the SEA. See Opp. 8-14. The Court considers each argument in turn.
A. The Scope of the Arbitration Clause
Plaintiff argues that her "claims arising out of rape, sexual assault and sexual harassment are beyond the scope" of the Arbitration Clause, Opp. at 14, because the event undergirding her claims (i.e. the rape) lacks a "significant relationship" to her employment.
The Court disagrees. At the outset, the Court notes that independent torts-including those involving rape-do not necessarily fall outside the scope of an *1359arbitration clause in an employment agreement. See, e.g. , Doe v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. ,
In Doe , the plaintiff was an employee aboard the M/S Star Princess, who similarly alleged that she was raped after-hours away from her place of employment aboard the ship,
The Eleventh Circuit found that "the plain language of the arbitration provision imposes the limitation that, to be arbitrable, the dispute between Doe and the cruise line must relate to, arise from, or be connected with her crew agreement or the employment services that she performed for the cruise line."
However, the limitation found in the Doe arbitration provision is clearly absent from the Arbitration Clause in this case. The Arbitration Clause in the SEA reads, in relevant part, as follows:
[A]ny and all disputes, claims or controversies whatsoever, whether in contract, regulatory, tort or otherwise, including but not limited to, constitutional, statutory, common law, intentional tort and equitable claims, as well as Jones Act and Wage Act claims, claims for negligence, unseaworthiness, maintenance and cure, failure to provide prompt, proper and adequate medical care, personal injury, death or property damage and whether accruing prior to, during or after the expiration of this Agreement (collectively "Disputes"), shall be resolved by final and binding arbitration.
See SEA at Article 16(b) (p. 11). Noticeably absent from the Arbitration Clause is any limitation narrowing the scope to only those disputes, claims, or controversies "relating to or in any way arising out of or connected with the Crew Agreement, these terms, or services performed for the Company," Doe ,
Plaintiff's citations to (pre- Doe ) decisions by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and state courts in California, Kentucky, and West Virginia do not persuade this Court to deviate from the Eleventh Circuit's pronouncement. Cf. In re Hubbard ,
Accordingly, Plaintiff has not proffered any meritorious argument that the Arbitration Clause excludes the instant claims because they are premised on allegations of rape. As a party to the SEA, which contains the Arbitration Clause, Steiner Transocean Limited is entitled to compel arbitration of the claims Plaintiff has brought against it. See SEA (ECF No. 1-2) at 11.
B. The Claims Against Non-Signatories to the SEA
Defendants Princess, Steiner Leisure Limited, and Steiner Transocean U.S., Inc., and Reyes are not signatories or parties to the SEA. See id. at 13; see also id. at 1 (defining the "Parties" to the agreement as "the Company"-which is defined as Steiner Transocean Limited-and the "Employee," which refers to Plaintiff).
Defendant argues that, even as non-signatories, Steiner Leisure Limited, Steiner Transocean U.S., Inc. (collectively, the "Remaining Steiner Defendants") and Princess, may enforce the Arbitration Clause. See Arbitration Motion at 10; Reply in Further Support of the Motion to Dismiss and Compel Arbitration ("Arbitration Reply") (ECF No. 16) at 8-10.
The Moving Defendants argue that Princess and the Remaining Steiner Defendants may nevertheless enforce the Arbitration Clause for two reasons. See Arbitration Reply at 8-10. First, they argue that equitable estoppel permits these non-signatories to enforce the Arbitration Clause because Plaintiff's claims against Princess and the Remaining Steiner Defendants arise out of the same alleged incident (the sexual assault) and are intertwined with, or mirror, the claims against signatory Steiner Transocean Limited.
Generally "one who is not a party to an agreement cannot enforce its terms against one who is a party" because the "right of enforcement generally belongs to those who have purchased it by agreeing to be bound by the terms of the contract themselves." Lawson v. Life of the S. Ins. Co. ,
The law of the Bahamas governs the SEA and the Arbitration Clause therein. See SEA at Article 16(a) (p. 11) ("This Agreement shall be governed by the laws of The Bahamas"). Accordingly, for purposes of determining whether a non-party could enforce the Arbitration Clause, the Court must apply the law of the Bahamas. See, e.g. , Judge v. Unigroup, Inc. , No. 8:17-CV-201-T-23TGW,
However, the Moving Defendants make "no indication whatsoever that the contract law" of the Bahamas "recognizes the equitable estoppel doctrine in this context." Wexler ,
The Court also rejects the Moving Defendants' argument that the SEA "contemplates a non-signatory vessel owner such as Princess enforcing" the Arbitration Clause, see Arbitration Reply at 9. The Moving Defendants essentially argue that Princess may compel arbitration under the Arbitration Clause because one of the causes of action (unseaworthiness) that is listed as an example claim covered by the arbitration clause can be lodged only against a vessel and the vessel owner, like Princess.
There is no indication in the text of the Arbitration Clause (or the entirety of the SEA) indicating that Princess-or any party other than Plaintiff and Steiner Transocean Limited-are empowered to enforce arbitration. The SEA defines the "Parties" to the agreement as only "the Company"-which is defined as Steiner Transocean Limited-and "Employee," which refers to Plaintiff. See SEA at 1. Similarly, the Arbitration Clause discusses only "arbitration between the parties" and provides only that "[t]he Company and Employee may initiate arbitration ...." See id. at 11.
The unseaworthiness claim listed is merely listed an example of the type of claim that would be subject to arbitration under the Arbitration Clause, which subjects "any and all disputes, claims or controversies whatsoever" to arbitration. See id. Moreover, unseaworthiness is one of over a dozen other examples, including "constitutional" claims. Id. By the Moving Defendants' logic, because constitutional claims-which are levied against governmental bodies-are included on this list, *1363the SEA also contemplates governments enforcing the Arbitration Clause.
Finally, Moving Defendants provide no authority for the proposition that an arbitration clause may implicitly confer the right to enforce arbitration to a third party merely because the clause provides examples of arbitrable claims, and one of those example claims would not apply to the signatory party, but would apply to a third party.
In light of the above, the Court finds that the Arbitration Clause provides the Steiner Defendants the right to compel arbitration because (a) the Arbitration Clause expressly provides Steiner Transcocean Limited the right to compel arbitration and (b) Plaintiff does not dispute or contest in any way the Moving Defendants' assertion that the Remaining Steiner Defendants could compel arbitration based on the same clause. Accordingly, pursuant to
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that
(1) The Motion to Dismiss and Compel Arbitration (ECF No. 8) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
(2) The Motion for Remand (ECF No. 12) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
(3) The Court COMPELS arbitration as to Counts I, VI, and VIII against Steiner Transocean Limited, Steiner Leisure Limited, and Steiner Transocean U.S.
(4) The remaining claims against Princess and Reyes (Counts II, III, IV, V, VII, and VIII) are REMANDED to the Circuit Court for the 11th Judicial Circuit in and for Miami Dade County, Florida.
(5) All other pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT.
(6) The Clerk of the Court is instructed to CLOSE this case.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, this 12th day of December, 2017.
The Notice of Removal is timely because the Defendants served in the state action were served on or after May 25, 2017. See Michelle Haasbroek v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., et al. , Case No. 2017-011830-CA-01 (Dkt. Nos. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19); see also
"The affirmative defenses authorized by the Convention have a 'limited scope' allowing parties to avoid arbitration only where the arbitration is 'null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed' as those terms are defined within the Convention." Polychronakis v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc. , Civ. No. 08-21806,
The sole ground for the Removal of this action is the Convention Act. See Notice of Removal (ECF No. 1) at 1-5. Moreover, Jones Act claims are generally not removable to federal court unless they properly fall within the scope of an arbitration clause under the Convention. See Trifonov ,
"When a party fails to address a specific claim, or fails to respond to an argument made by the opposing party, the Court deems such claim or argument abandoned." Ramsey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Georgia , No. 1:11-CV-3862-JOF-JSA,
Specifically, Plaintiff contends that six of her eight claims do not "depend[ ] on her employment status." Opp. at 2-6. According to Plaintiff, only two counts-Unseaworthiness as to Princess (Count III) and Failure to Provide Maintenance and Cure as to the Steiner Defendants (Count VI)-are employment-based claims, which are dependent upon the Plaintiff's status as a Steiner employee assigned to work aboard a Princess vessel. See Opp. at 2. The remainder of the claims are "common law tort claims which are not employment based and do not relate in any way to her Employment Contract."
Specifically, Plaintiff had allegedly gone to the cabin of Reyes-whom she had met in church and viewed as a strictly platonic friend-for the purpose of picking up his computer to bring it ashore for repair.
The Doe Plaintiff worked as a bar server aboard the ship, and was raped in a crew cabin, which she entered in order to attend an after-hours birthday party. Id. at 1208-09.
Plaintiff cites to the state court cases for the proposition that sexual assault does not arise out of, or relate to, an employment relationship. See Opp. at 5 (citing Abou-Khalil v. Miles ,
Although the Arbitration Reply contains language stating that "all Defendants can rely on and enforce the arbitration provision," Arbitration Reply at 10, the arguments in both the Arbitration Reply and in the Arbitration Motion are tailored only to Princess and the Remaining Steiner Defendants-not Reyes. See, e.g. , id. at 9 ("the Complaint treats Princess and Steiner as jointly responsible for the very same alleged conduct to justify extending the arbitration clause to all Defendants."); Arbitration Motion at 8 ("Princess and the remaining Steiner entities may also enforce the arbitration provision in the Agreement signed by Plaintiff."). Because "the Court does not have before it a motion to compel arbitration of the claims against" Reyes, "the Court finds no occasion to compel the claims against [Reyes] to arbitration." Wexler ,
Notably, Plaintiff does not contest, or otherwise respond to, Defendant's argument regarding the Remaining Steiner Defendants. Plaintiff does not argue that the Remaining Steiner Defendants lack the right to enforce the Arbitration Clause. As a result, Plaintiff has conceded that all of the Steiner entities have the right to enforce the Arbitration Clause. See Ramsey ,
Moreover, the law appears to contradict this proposition. See, e.g. , Great Lakes Reinsurance (UK) PLC v. Sunset Harbour Marina, Inc. , No. 10-24469-CIV,