DocketNumber: Case No. 17–cv–21820–GAYLES
Citation Numbers: 288 F. Supp. 3d 1327
Judges: Gayles
Filed Date: 12/27/2017
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/25/2022
THIS CAUSE comes before the Court on Carrington's Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint [ECF No. 21]; Carrington's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction [ECF No. 27]; Carrington's Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 53]; Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Liability only on Counts I, III, and IV of the First Amended Complaint [ECF No. 55]; and Defendant's Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions [ECF No. 65]. The Court has reviewed the Motions and the record and is otherwise fully advised. For the reasons that follow, the Court dismisses this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction as the Plaintiff has no standing to bring his claims.
INTRODUCTION
The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act ("RESPA"),
BACKGROUND
On June 11, 2017, Plaintiff Andres Ocampo ("Plaintiff") and Rosario Sanchez ("Sanchez") purchased a property located at 9419 NW 54th Cir. Lane in Doral, Florida (the "Property"), by executing a $650,000 promissory note (the "Note") and a mortgage (the "Mortgage") in favor of Suntrust Mortgage, Inc. [ECF No. 52-1]. Approximately nine months later, on March 3, 2008, Plaintiff transferred his ownership interest in the Property to Sanchez via a duly recorded quit claim deed. [ECF No. 52-2]. By September 1, 2008, the Note and Mortgage were in default. Suntrust then initiated a foreclosure action against Plaintiff and Sanchez in the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Miami-Dade County, Florida (the "Foreclosure Action") [ECF No. 52-3]. On July 10, 2012, Suntrust dropped Plaintiff as a party from the Foreclosure Action. [ECF No. 52-5].
In 2013, Plaintiff filed a petition for bankruptcy in the Eastern District of New York. On November 18, 2013, Plaintiff obtained a discharge of personal indebtedness for the Note. [ECF No. 52-5]. On December 10, 2013, after Plaintiff no longer had a legal interest in the Property or an obligation under the note and after Plaintiff had been dismissed from the Foreclosure Action, the Florida Circuit Court entered a final judgment of foreclosure on the Property.
In 2015, Plaintiff filed a second bankruptcy petition, this time in the Southern District of Florida, where he listed the Property as an asset of the estate [ECF No. 52-7].
On May 17, 2017, Plaintiff filed this action against Defendant alleging that Defendant violated several provisions of RESPA. [ECF No. 1]. On August 10, 2017, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint, adding a claim for negligence per se under Florida law. [ECF No. 14].
*1330On August 22, 2017, Defendant moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint arguing that Plaintiff failed to state a RESPA claim because Defendant is not a servicer and Plaintiff suffered no damages as a matter of law. Defendant also argued that it owed no duty to Plaintiff to support a claim for negligence per se . On September 1, 2017, following a status conference wherein the Court questioned whether the Plaintiff had standing to bring his claims, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Before the Court resolved the motions to dismiss, on November 17, 2017, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment raising the same arguments from its motions to dismiss and the new argument that Plaintiff's loan modification review was governed exclusively by the Bankruptcy Court's order and not RESPA. On November 27, 2017, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment as to liability on Counts I, III, and IV of the Amended Complaint. On December 12, 2017, Defendant filed a Motion for Sanctions arguing that Plaintiff should be sanctioned for filing a frivolous lawsuit.
LEGAL STANDARD
The Court reviews Plaintiff's claims pursuant to both Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction relating to Plaintiff's Article III standing and 12(b)(6) based on Plaintiff's lack of statutory standing and failure to adequately state a claim for relief.
Rule 12(b)(6) Motion for Failure to State a Claim
"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' " Ashcroft v. Iqbal ,
Pleadings must contain "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly ,
*1331Maxcess, Inc. v. Lucent Techs., Inc. ,
Rule 12(b)(1) Motion for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction
A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may present either a facial or a factual challenge to the complaint. See McElmurray v. Consol. Gov't ,
DISCUSSION
I. STANDING
"[T]he doctrine of standing serves to identify those disputes which are appropriately resolved through the judicial process." Whitmore v. Arkansas ,
A plaintiff must also demonstrate "a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of," and "a likelihood that a court ruling in [the plaintiff's] favor would remedy [his] injury."
In addition to having Article III standing, a plaintiff must establish "whether the statute grants the plaintiff the cause of action that he asserts." Bank of Am. Corp. ,
A. Article III Standing
The Court finds that Plaintiff does not have Article III standing to bring his RESPA claims. Plaintiff asserts that he was injured as a result of Defendant's failure to comply with various RESPA provisions. However, when Plaintiff initiated loan modification proceedings, he no longer had an ownership interest in the Property or any obligation under the Note. As a result, Plaintiff could never obtain the modification he was requesting. Plaintiff contends that there can be a RESPA violation even when a mortgagor is not entitled to a mortgage modification. Plaintiff is twisting the law. To be certain, lenders and servicers are required to comply with RESPA even when a borrower does not ultimately qualify for a mortgage modification due to inadequate income, credit, or other factors. This case is different. Plaintiff was never entitled to even begin the process for mortgage modification-his request was an impossibility. Therefore, his "injuries" are conjectural, and quite frankly, a legal fiction. Even if Defendant did fail to meet the requirements of RESPA, Defendant's "bare procedural violations," are simply not enough to create Article III standing for Plaintiff. See Spokeo ,
In addition, even if Plaintiff could establish a concrete injury, he must still establish a causal link between the Defendant's action and his harm. Spokeo ,
*1333B. Prudential/Statutory "Standing"
Even if Plaintiff had Article III standing to bring this RESPA action, the Court finds that he does not have statutory standing as he no longer qualifies as a borrower.
Only a "borrower" may bring a civil claim under RESPA. See
II. NEGLIGENCE CLAIM
The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's negligence per se claim. See Raney v. Allstate Ins. Co. ,
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
1. Carrington's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction [ECF No. 27] is GRANTED. This action is DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
2. Carrington's Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint [ECF No. 21], to the extent it raises issues relating to Plaintiff's lack of standing, is GRANTED.
3. Carrington's Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 53] and Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Liability only on Counts I, III, and IV of the First Amended Complaint [ECF No. 55] are DENIED as MOOT.
4. Defendant's Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions [ECF No. 65] is DENIED. While the Court acknowledges that Plaintiff initiated a case in which he (and his counsel) knew or should have known that Plaintiff had no standing, it does not think sanctions, beyond dismissal, are warranted at this time.
5. This action is CLOSED.
*1334DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, this 27th day of December, 2017.
A foreclosure sale was scheduled for November 28, 2017. As of the date of this Order it was unclear whether the property had been sold.
For purposes of this Order, the Court does not address whether Plaintiff or his bankruptcy counsel committed a fraud on the Bankruptcy Court by listing the Property as an asset of his estate long after he had transferred his interest in the Property to Sanchez and after he had been discharged of the debt.
The Court notes that in his motion for a referral to Mortgage Modification Mediation, Plaintiff first checked the box indicating that the Property was his primary residence, but later checked a box that he intended to modify a Mortgage on a property that was not his primary residence. In addition, Plaintiff represented to the Bankruptcy Court that both he and Sanchez were obligated on the Note and Mortgage, which, by that time, was false.
Because the Court is dismissing this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, it does not analyze the competing motions for summary judgment. The Court does, however, reference some of the uncontested evidence submitted in support of the motions for summary judgment. See Maxcess v. Lucent Techs., Inc. ,
The Eleventh Circuit has adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit rendered before October 1, 1981. Bonner v. City of Prichard ,
Because the Court finds that Plaintiff does not have standing, it need not address Defendant's additional arguments for dismissal.