DocketNumber: No. 1630
Citation Numbers: 150 Ga. 103, 102 S.E. 827, 1920 Ga. LEXIS 61
Judges: Beck
Filed Date: 4/14/1920
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/7/2024
(After stating the foregoing facts.) While the evidence tending to show the fitness of the respondent for the custody of the minor involved in this controversy is quite strong, there is some evidence tending to show that the mother is also a fit person; and we cannot reach the conclusion under the evidence that the court abused his discretion in awarding the custody of the child to the petitioner. It is true that the mother and father had lived in a state of separation for quite a while before the father’s death, and at the time of his decease a suit for divorce was pending; but no divorce had been granted. The minor whose custody is being considered here was more than fourteen years of age, and her father had appointed the respondent testamentary guardian. But that is not conclusive us against the mother. It is declared in the Civil Code, § 3022: “Upon the death of the father, the mother is entitled to the possession of the child until his arrival at such age that his education requires the guardian to take possession of him. In cases of separation of the parents, or the subsequent marriage of the survivor, the court, upon writ of habeas corpus, may exercise a discretion as to the possession of the child, looking solely to his interest and welfare.” And if the law had remained unchanged by the act of 1913, dealing with the subject of the custody of minor children, which is embodied in section 3022 (a) of Park’s Code, we might have concluded that under the provisions of section 3022 the minor in question here having reached the age of fifteen years, which is such an age that her “education requires the guardian to take
Judgment affirmed.