Truett v. State

In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: April 19, 2021
S21A0162. TRUETT v. THE STATE.
BOGGS, Justice.
Christopher Everett Truett was convicted of malice murder
and related crimes arising out of the beating death of his girlfriend’s
two-year-old son, Wyatt Pruitt. He appeals, asserting as his sole
enumeration of error the trial court’s exclusion of certain character
evidence. For the reasons stated below, we affirm. 1
1 The murder occurred on February 25, 2014. On September 15, 2014, a
Forsyth County grand jury indicted Truett for malice murder, felony murder,
aggravated battery, and child cruelty in the first degree. Truett was tried
before a jury from August 20 to 28, 2015 and found guilty of all charges. On
August 28, 2015, Truett was sentenced to serve life in prison without the
possibility of parole for malice murder, and 20 years to serve concurrently on
the child cruelty charge. The trial court merged the aggravated battery count
into the malice murder conviction, and the felony murder conviction was
vacated by operation of law. On August 31, 2015, Truett’s trial counsel filed a
timely motion for new trial, which was amended by appellate counsel on
December 2 and December 13, 2019. After a hearing, the motion for new trial
was denied on March 6, 2020. Truett’s notice of appeal was filed on March 30,
2020, and the case was docketed in this Court for the term beginning in
1. The evidence at trial2 showed that on February 23, 2014,
Truett and the victim’s mother, Dawn Shutts, had been in a
romantic relationship for several weeks, and he had moved in with
her and her two children. Wyatt, the younger child, was feeling ill
and was “up and down all night.” On February 24, Truett told Shutts
that one of the family dogs had pushed Wyatt down the stairs. He
had a bruise over his eye but otherwise appeared fine, and Shutts
did not think much of it. As she left for work on February 25, she
noticed scratches on Wyatt’s eyes and made a doctor’s appointment
for him. Wyatt was crying and screaming and did not want Shutts
to leave. Truett was the only person with Wyatt that day.
During the morning, Shutts received several text messages
from Truett: that his feelings were hurt because Wyatt didn’t like
him, that Wyatt was “tripping hard,” having temper tantrums,
harming himself, and that he had wet and soiled himself. Shutts
December 2020 and submitted for decision on the briefs.
2 This Court no longer routinely considers sua sponte the sufficiency of
the evidence in non-death penalty cases. See Davenport v. State, 309 Ga. 385,
392 (4) (846 SE2d 83) (2020). But a review of the evidence here is relevant to
Truett’s enumeration of error.
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responded to the messages and told Truett to give Wyatt a bath.
Later, Truett sent still more messages: that Wyatt had fallen in the
tub and hurt himself and that a dog had pushed him down again.
Truett added, “Get home. Something’s wrong.” A few minutes later
Truett sent another message, “Get home now, baby.” Shutts
returned home to find Wyatt lying on the sofa, unresponsive. He was
“cold and stiff,” blood was coming out of his mouth, and he had
bruises all over his face and body that were not there earlier that
morning. Shutts exclaimed to Truett, “What did you do to my kid?”
Truett responded that Wyatt was still breathing, but Shutts saw
that Wyatt was not breathing and told Truett to call 911. Truett
“hesitated,” but then called and handed the phone to Shutts. The
911 dispatcher instructed her on how to perform CPR, and she
continued until the police arrived. When she looked up, Truett had
disappeared.
A sheriff’s deputy took over CPR until paramedics arrived. He
observed that Wyatt’s face appeared “battered.” A paramedic who
arrived a few minutes later testified that Wyatt appeared to be dead,
3
but he and other paramedics still attempted to revive him. They
transported Wyatt to the hospital, where an ER physician continued
attempts to revive him, although he testified that Wyatt was in
“complete cardiac standstill” and rigor mortis had already set in.
The physician testified that, based on the state of the rigor mortis
and lividity in the child’s body, he had been dead for over an hour
when he arrived at the hospital, approximately one-half hour after
the 911 call was placed. He also testified that Wyatt had numerous
bruises, scratches, and ruptured blood vessels in his face, as well as
bruises on his ears, extremities, and abdomen. He testified that the
abdominal injuries indicated bleeding from the liver, which required
a “high-energy force.” He concluded that Wyatt’s injuries were
“completely inconsistent” with a fall down the stairs and that the
injuries were not caused by CPR.
A medical examiner and Director of Pediatric Forensic
Medicine for the Georgia Bureau of Investigation, who was qualified
without objection at trial as an expert in the field of pediatric and
forensic pathology, performed an autopsy on Wyatt’s body. She
4
testified that Wyatt had suffered severe, multiple, wide-ranging
injuries due to beating, squeezing, twisting, and strangulation. She
observed extensive bleeding in the tissues of the head and bruises
and abrasions on his head, face, lips, and ears. She also observed
ruptured blood vessels in his face and marks on his mouth, jaw, and
neck that in her opinion were due to compression of the neck,
indicating an asphyxiation or strangulation event. Bilateral bruises
on the side of his head indicated that his head had been squeezed,
and his brain was markedly swollen. She also observed internal
bleeding in his genitalia, indicative of a twisting or squeezing injury.
In his abdomen, consistent with significant external bruising, she
observed extensive bleeding, primarily due to an 8-centimeter
laceration to his liver that she described as “huge” and “severe”; this
was the immediate cause of Wyatt’s death through loss of blood.
About 20 percent of Wyatt’s blood supply was pooled in the abdomen.
She also observed injuries to his diaphragm, right lung, pancreas,
and soft tissues of the abdomen. She concluded that the cause of
death was multiple blunt force injuries to the abdomen, such as
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punching or kicking, with blunt impact injuries to the head as a
contributing factor. In the medical examiner’s opinion, the injuries
were inflicted deliberately and were not due to falling down stairs,
CPR efforts, or medical intervention. 3
In light of the severity of Wyatt’s injuries and Truett’s sudden
disappearance, the police immediately “pinged” Truett’s cell phone
number; the last location of the phone was in an overgrown, swampy
area behind the subdivision where Shutts lived. Officers set up a
perimeter around the area and began searching; Truett was spotted
“low crawling” in a creek bed, headed away from the subdivision.
Officers shouted for him to come out, but he continued to elude them
in the heavy underbrush and swamp until a K-9 officer brought in
an apprehension dog and announced that he was about to release
3 Former medical examiner Dr. Joseph Burton testified for the defense
that in his opinion Wyatt’s injuries could have been caused by a fall down the
stairs or by efforts at CPR, and that the liver laceration “could. I’m not saying
it would” have occurred up to 24 hours earlier and been exacerbated, but not
caused, by CPR, although he acknowledged that CPR could not have
contributed to Wyatt’s death if he was already in rigor mortis when the first
deputy arrived. Dr. Burton acknowledged, moreover, that he could not explain
all of Wyatt’s injuries and stated, “I’m not telling the jury or the Court that [his
injuries] were caused by that fall. I’m just saying that the fall could cause the
injuries that I saw.”
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the dog and “that she will bite.” Truett then stood up and
surrendered. After he was arrested, the police discovered that at
some point he had removed the battery from his cell phone,
rendering the phone untraceable. During Truett’s police interview,
he gave inconsistent accounts of how the injuries to Wyatt occurred.
When a police sergeant remarked that Truett appeared to have skin
under his fingernails, Truett immediately began “picking” at his
hands and then attempted to urinate on his hands when he was
escorted to the restroom. Wyatt’s DNA was recovered from under
one of Truett’s fingernails.
At trial, Truett testified and denied having harmed Wyatt. He
testified that he was a “great father” to his own four-year-old
daughter and that she stayed with him frequently. He presented
seven character witnesses who testified to Truett’s reputation for
positive conduct with children and for peacefulness. Truett further
testified that he ran away from Shutts’ home because he was
frightened when Shutts asked him, “What did you do to my kid?” He
acknowledged smoking marijuana on the day of Wyatt’s death and
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the day before, and that he was “aggravated” with Shutts and
wanted to go home “the whole time.”
2. In his sole enumeration of error, Truett contends that a new
trial is required because the court erroneously prevented him from
asking his character witnesses “if they would be comfortable with
him around their children” or about specific instances of good
character. 4
The relevant section of the Evidence Code is OCGA § 24-4-405,
which provides in its entirety:
(a) In all proceedings in which evidence of character
or a trait of character of a person is admissible, proof shall
be made by testimony as to reputation or by testimony in
the form of an opinion.
(b) In proceedings in which character or a trait of
character of a person is an essential element of a charge,
claim, or defense or when an accused testifies to his or her
own character, proof may also be made of specific
instances of that person’s conduct. The character of the
accused, including specific instances of the accused’s
conduct, shall also be admissible in a presentencing
4 In his brief here, Truett repeatedly asserts that the trial court
erroneously applied Georgia’s former Evidence Code in ruling on this matter.
It is clear from the transcripts of the hearing and the trial, however, that the
parties and the trial court relied upon the current Evidence Code, as well as
commentary and treatises discussing it.
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hearing subject to the provisions of Code Section 17-10-2.
(c) On cross-examination, inquiry shall be allowable
into relevant specific instances of conduct.
(Emphasis supplied.)5 See generally Strong v. State, 309 Ga. 295,
313-314 (3) (845 SE2d 653) (2020) (discussing application of OCGA
§§ 24-4-404 (a) and 24-4-405 (b)).
The trial court held a pretrial hearing on August 17, 2015. The
same day, the State and Truett filed numerous motions addressing
evidentiary issues. Among Truett’s motions was a “Motion for Pre-
Trial Ruling” in which he asked the trial court to allow character
witnesses for the defense to testify under OCGA § 24-4-405 (a) to
“the defendant’s reputation, demeanor and attitude toward and
around children” and to their “opinion as to defendant’s character
including specific, pertinent character traits exhibited by defendant
within the context of the charges against him.” During the argument
on this motion, the court and the parties discussed OCGA § 24-4-405
5The italicized portion of the Georgia rule, among other provisions, does
not appear in the corresponding Federal Rule of Evidence 405.
.
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(a) at some length, but subsection (b) and the exception regarding a
testifying defendant were never mentioned; Truett did not raise that
provision of the Evidence Code, nor was there any indication from
Truett at that time that he planned to testify. 6
The court ruled that Truett could ask the character witnesses
if Truett was “a good father. He’s good around children. That would
be basically the extent. You just can’t get into specific acts of good
character. You can’t let the witness go on and on about, well, I’ve
observed him, you know, the kids.” At the hearing, Truett also
sought leave to ask the character witnesses whether they “would
trust him with their child.” The trial court ruled out that testimony
as going beyond a pertinent character trait, although it observed
that it was implied in the permissible testimony.
At trial, after Truett had testified and his first character
witness had taken the stand, the permissible scope of the character
witnesses’ testimony was discussed again, and defense counsel
6 While the provisions of OCGA § 24-4-405 (b) were discussed at other
points in the hearing, those discussions concerned other pretrial motions by
either the State or Truett.
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asked for “clarification” of the original ruling. Truett asked to
question the witnesses regarding Truett’s “reputation for
peacefulness,” and the trial court stated it would allow that line of
questioning. Once more, however, Truett did not raise the specific
provisions of OCGA § 24-4-405 (b), and there was no discussion of
that subsection with respect to his character witnesses’ testimony.
In Truett’s motion for new trial, he argued that the trial court
erred in refusing to permit him to ask if the witnesses “would be
comfortable with him around their children” or about specific
instances of good character. He attached affidavits from four of his
trial witnesses providing specific examples of his behavior around
their children and of his peaceful character. The trial court denied
Truett’s motion for new trial on this ground, finding that any error
in excluding the disputed evidence was harmless. We agree, both
because the proffered testimony would have been cumulative and
because the evidence of Truett’s guilt was very strong.
In determining whether the error was harmless, we
review the record de novo and weigh the evidence as we
would expect reasonable jurors to have done so. The test
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for determining nonconstitutional harmless error is
whether it is highly probable that the error did not
contribute to the verdict.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Williams v. State, 302 Ga. 147,
153-154 (3) (805 SE2d 873) (2017); see also OCGA § 24-1-103 (a)
(“Error shall not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or
excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected. .
. .”).
Here, the jury heard testimony from seven character
witnesses, and, despite the trial court’s earlier ruling, most of them
testified to numerous specific examples of Truett’s conduct with
children, including Wyatt and his brother as well as the witnesses’
own children or grandchildren. Tonya Watkins testified that she had
left Truett with her own children and had “never seen any kind of
issue as far as that’s concerned.” Patti Seiber testified that Truett
had interacted with her granddaughter. Jessica Rainwater testified
that she witnessed Truett being “attentive” to the children at a
family gathering, in particular to Wyatt after Shutts put him into a
car and then ignored the child while walking around talking on her
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phone. Rainwater also testified that Truett had watched her
daughter. Paul Walls testified that he observed Truett playing,
laughing, and joking with Shutts’ children “about the same as with
my own kids,” and keeping them from getting into trouble in a
neighbor’s yard when Shutts did not intervene. Walls further
testified that Truett had watched his children as well. Susan Truett,
Truett’s mother, testified that Truett’s interactions with Wyatt were
“normal” and that he had taken the initiative to get both Wyatt and
his older brother away from some “aggressive” dogs when their
mother did not do so. She also testified that she received a text
message from Shutts with two photos of Truett and Wyatt “asleep
on the couch, like a father and son.” The evidence presented by the
witnesses on Truett’s motion for new trial therefore was largely
cumulative of their trial testimony, merely elaborating on their
earlier accounts of Truett’s positive conduct with children and
peacefulness and giving additional specific instances of his conduct.
Moreover, the evidence of Truett’s guilt was very strong. As
noted above, Wyatt suffered multiple severe injuries to many parts
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of his body, including internal organs, inflicted by a variety of
methods including multiple blunt force trauma. Truett’s expert
witness conceded that he could not explain all of Wyatt’s injuries as
possibly due to a fall or medical intervention. Truett was the only
adult present in the home when Wyatt died, he did not seek medical
aid for Wyatt despite his obvious severe injuries, and he was
reluctant to call 911 even after Shutts arrived. He then fled the
scene, disabled his cell phone, and attempted to elude the police. He
also gave conflicting accounts of how Wyatt’s injuries occurred and
made repeated attempts to remove potential evidence from his
hands.
Any error by the trial court in limiting the witnesses’ testimony
therefore was harmless, as it is highly probable that any such error
did not contribute to the verdicts. See Henderson v. State, __ Ga. __
(3), 2021 Ga. LEXIS 7 (Case No. S20A1571, decided Feb. 1, 2021)
(exclusion of victim’s statement that he had been to prison, to the
extent it constituted a threat, was harmless both because
cumulative of other testimony that victim explicitly threatened
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appellant and because evidence of appellant’s guilt was “very
strong”); Keller v. State, 308 Ga. 492, 503 (5) (842 SE2d 22) (2020)
(“[I]n light of the strong evidence of [appellant’s] guilt,” refusal to
allow appellant’s witness to testify was “harmless error, if error at
all,” because it was highly probable that exclusion of evidence did
not contribute to verdict); Mitchell v. State, 293 Ga. 1, 3 (2) (742
SE2d 454) (2013) (exclusion of portions of appellant’s recorded
statement harmless when similar evidence admitted through
another witness).
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
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