DocketNumber: S01A0197
Citation Numbers: 273 Ga. 886, 548 S.E.2d 335
Judges: Sears
Filed Date: 6/11/2001
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/7/2024
The appellant, L. C., is a juvenile who was found to have committed an aggravated assault, a designated felony under OCGA § 15-11-63 (a) (2) (B) (ii). The juvenile court placed L. C. in the restrictive custody of the Department of Juvenile Justice pursuant to OCGA § 15-11-63 (e). The court ordered that L. C. be confined to a youth development center for 12 months, and that L. C. then be placed under intensive supervision for 12 months. On appeal, L. C. raises several constitutionality challenges to the designated felony statute, OCGA § 15-11-63,
1. L. C. contends that OCGA § 15-11-63 is unconstitutional because it does not grant juveniles a right to a jury trial. More specifically, L. C. contends that fundamental fairness requires that juveniles have a right to a jury trial in proceedings under OCGA § 15-11-63 because OCGA § 15-11-63 is designed to punish juvenile offenders and is substantially similar to a criminal proceeding. For the reasons that follow, we disagree.
Both this Court and the United States Supreme Court have held that due process does not require a jury trial in juvenile cases.
L. C. acknowledges the holdings in McKeiver and A. B. W., but contends that § 15-11-63, which was enacted in 1980,
Moreover, we conclude that the central purpose of OCGA § 15-11-63 remains the rehabilitation and treatment of the child and not punishment. For example, OCGA § 15-11-63 (e) (2) (B) provides that, while in a youth development center, a child at any time “may be permitted to participate in all youth development center services and programs and shall be eligible to receive special medical and treatment services.” And, after six months in a youth development center,
a child may be eligible to participate in youth development center sponsored programs including community work programs and sheltered workshops under the general supervision of a youth development center staff outside of the youth development center; and, in cooperation and coordination with the Department of Human Resources, the child may be allowed to participate in state sponsored programs for evaluation and services under the Division of Rehabilitation Services of the Department of Labor and Division of Mental Health, Mental Retardation, and Substance Abuse.12
Furthermore, under OCGA § 15-11-63 (e) (2) (D), the Department of Juvenile Justice is required to report to the court at least every six months regarding the “status, adjustment, and progress of the child.” In addition, in deciding whether restrictive custody under § 15-11-63 is required, a juvenile court is required to consider the “needs and best interests of the child.”
Finally, like the adjudication in A. B. W., an adjudication that restrictive custody is required is not “a conviction of a crime and does not impose any civil disability ordinarily resulting from a conviction nor operate to disqualify the child in any civil service application or
Thus, although OCGA § 15-11-63 has some punitive aspects, one of its primary functions is the treatment and rehabilitation of the child and an adjudication under it is not a criminal conviction. For these reasons, we conclude that an order of restrictive custody under § 15-11-63 is not sufficiently like a criminal adjudication to invoke a constitutional right to a trial by jury. In this regard, we note that numerous courts have considered whether a constitutional right to a jury trial is required under similar statutes and have reached the same result we reach today.
2. As for L. C.’s other constitutional challenges to OCGA § 15-11-63, we conclude that they were not properly raised below, as L. C. did not specify either the particular part or parts of the statute that he was challenging or how those part or parts of the statute violated the constitutional provisions that he claimed were being violated.
Judgment affirmed.
The juvenile court’s order in this case was entered June 21, 2000. At that time, the designated felony statute was OCGA § 15-11-37. Effective July 1, 2000, former OCGA § 15-11-37 was redesignated as OCGA § 15-11-63. See Ga. Laws 2000, p. 20. Other than the redesignation, only minor editorial changes were made to the statute. Accordingly, all references in this opinion are to § 15-11-63.
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U. S. 528 (91 SC 1976, 29 LE2d 647) (1970); A. B. W. v. State, 231 Ga. 699 (203 SE2d 512) (1974).
McKeiver, 403 U. S. at 545-550.
A. B. W., 231 Ga. at 701-702.
See Ga. Laws 1980, p. 1013.
See Ga. Laws 1971, pp. 709, 735, 738.
Id. at 739.
OCGA § 15-11-63 (e) (1) (A).
OCGA § 15-11-63 (e) (1) (B).
OCGA § 15-11-63 (e) (1) (C).
OCGA § 15-11-63 (e) (2) (C).
OCGA § 15-11-63 (e) (2) (B).
OCGA § 15-11-63 (c) (1).
OCGA § 15-11-72.
State v. Hezzie, 580 NW2d 660, 673-674 (Wis. 1998); In the Interest of J.F., 714 A2d 467, 471-473 (Pa. Super. 1998), appeal denied, 734 A2d 395 (Pa. 1998); A C. v. People, 16 P3d 240, 243-245 (Colo. 2001); In re L.A., 21 P3d 952 (Kan. 2001); State v. Schaff, 743 P2d 240, 242-245 (Wash. 1987); United States v. C.L.O., 77 F3d 1075, 1077 (8th Cir. 1996).
Chester v. State, 262 Ga. 85, 88 (414 SE2d 477) (1992); Wallin v. State, 248 Ga. 29, 30 (1) (279 SE2d 687) (1981); DeKalb County v. Post Properties, 245 Ga. 214, 218 (263 SE2d 905) (1980).
Lucas v. Lucas, 273 Ga. 240, 242 (539 SE2d 807) (2000); Bohannon v. State, 269 Ga. 130, 137 (497 SE2d 552) (1998); Hardison v. Haslam, 250 Ga. 59, 61 (3) (295 SE2d 830) (1982).