Williams v. State

In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: March 8, 2022
S22A0170. WILLIAMS v. THE STATE.
MCMILLIAN, Justice.
Allen Williams appeals his conviction for felony murder in
connection with the death of his girlfriend, Betty Ranow. 1 Williams
argues on appeal that the trial court erred in admitting evidence
concerning his alleged beating of another person and in failing to
1 Ranow died on the night of December 18 to 19, 2010, and on March 3,
2011, a Gwinnett County grand jury indicted Williams in connection with her
death, charging him with malice murder, felony murder based on aggravated
battery, felony murder based on aggravated assault, aggravated battery,
aggravated assault, and concealing the death of another. Williams was tried
before a jury from March 3 to 14, 2014, and convicted of both counts of felony
murder, aggravated battery, and aggravated assault. The jury acquitted
Williams of malice murder, and the trial court granted the State’s oral motion
at trial to dismiss the charge of concealing the death of another. Williams was
sentenced to life in prison for the count of felony murder based on aggravated
battery, and the remaining counts were merged or vacated.
Williams filed a timely motion for new trial on March 20, 2014, and
amended that motion through new counsel on July 20, 2016. Following a
hearing, the trial court denied the motion for new trial as amended on May 25,
2021. Williams timely appealed that ruling to the Court of Appeals, which
transferred the matter to this Court. The case was docketed to the term of this
Court beginning in December 2021 and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether his
statements to the police in connection with that incident were freely
and voluntarily given before they were introduced at trial. Because
we conclude that any error in the admission of this evidence was
harmless, we affirm.
The evidence presented at trial showed that in 2010, Williams
and Ranow lived together in a house in Lawrenceville. At around
8:15 p.m. on December 18, Ranow approached a woman who was
sitting in her car outside a doughnut shop near the house where
Ranow and Williams lived. The woman, who did not know Ranow,
described her as appearing “frazzled,” intoxicated, and
inappropriately dressed for the cold December weather, as she was
wearing only jeans, a t-shirt, and slippers. Ranow asked the woman
for a ride to downtown Lawrenceville, and the woman, who had just
come from church and who said she felt sorry for Ranow, agreed to
Ranow’s request. They prayed together on the drive, and when they
reached their destination, the woman removed her own yellow coat
and gave it to Ranow to wear. The coat was clean with no stains on
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it at that time.
At around 8:53 that night, Officer Brad Daugherty of the
Lawrenceville Police Department (“LPD”) responded to a call for a
welfare check on Ranow outside a restaurant in downtown
Lawrenceville. Ranow, with whom Officer Daugherty was familiar,
asked him to drive her home. Ranow was wearing a clean “mustard
yellow” coat with no stains, and Officer Daugherty could smell
alcohol on her person. Officer Daugherty drove Ranow to the house
she shared with Williams. He dropped her off in front of the house
but did not see her go inside.
The next morning, at around 5:48 a.m., Williams called 911
from their house to ask for an ambulance. Brent Moss, an LPD
patrol officer, was the first to arrive at the scene. Williams led
Officer Moss inside the house where Ranow’s body was lying on the
floor. Williams placed his hand on Ranow’s chest and told Officer
Moss that Ranow was “barely breathing.” However, Officer Moss
could see that Ranow was not breathing at all, and he directed
Williams outside. Officer Moss smelled alcohol coming from
3
Williams and testified that Williams appeared intoxicated. Williams
told Officer Moss that when Ranow arrived home,2 she had already
been beaten. According to Williams, Ranow told him she had been
drugged and assaulted and that the people who did that put her
clothes in the trash can outside. Williams also told police that Ranow
came home wearing a yellow coat that Williams had never seen
before and that the coat was outside in a trash can. He told one
officer exactly where to find that trash can. Williams further
asserted that whoever gave Ranow the yellow coat also gave her the
drugs and beat her up.
Emergency medical personnel arrived at the house
approximately three minutes after Officer Moss. One of the
paramedics who responded to the scene testified that Ranow was
deceased when he arrived. Her body was cold to the touch and
showed signs of lividity where the blood had settled. There was a
pool of dried blood around Ranow’s head and dried blood around her
2 Officer Meadows said that he dropped Ranow at home sometime after
8:53 p.m. on December 18, but Williams never said what time he saw Ranow
come into the house.
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eyes.
Officer Moss kept Williams from going back inside the house,
and Williams became irate, leading the officer to call for backup. An
LPD watch commander, who arrived at the crime scene in response
to Officer Moss’s call, observed that Williams had blood on his head
and that his right hand was “scuffed up.” The watch commander said
that Williams appeared very nervous and fidgety and was trying to
leave the scene, saying he had “other places to go.” The watch
commander ordered that Williams be secured in the back of a patrol
car and that a security sweep of the house be conducted. No one else
was located inside.
Police observed blood inside the house around Ranow’s body,
blood smears on the front doorframe, and blood inside the front
screened-in porch; only a few drops of blood were discovered outside
the enclosed porch on the walkway leading to the porch door. There
was no blood trail leading from the street and no blood in the yard,
on the driveway, or on the street itself. The officers also recovered a
yellow jacket with what appeared to be blood stains from an open
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trash container outside the house. At trial, the woman who gave
Ranow a ride to downtown Lawrenceville identified it as the jacket
she had given Ranow, and Officer Daugherty confirmed that the
jacket appeared to be the one Ranow was wearing when he dropped
her off at the house. Later, after Williams was transported to the
police station, officers observed that Williams’s right hand was
swollen, with discoloration to the back of his hand, scuff marks, and
abrasions. He was taken to the hospital for treatment.
The medical examiner who conducted the autopsy found severe
bruising, abrasions, and swelling on Ranow’s body and tread marks
on her face consistent with footwear. She also observed that Ranow
had a “raccoon-eye appearance,” caused by the entrapment of blood
in the soft tissues of the eyes, which, the medical examiner
explained, is indicative of head trauma. The medical examiner
discovered injuries to other parts of Ranow’s body as well and
observed that Ranow had internal injuries corresponding to her
external injuries, including eight broken ribs. She testified that all
the injuries were indicative of blunt force trauma, and the injuries
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to Ranow’s head resulted in brain damage and diffuse bleeding
within the scalp, factors that can lead to immediate loss of
consciousness, concussion, and death. Based on the post-mortem
examination, the medical examiner concluded that Ranow’s manner
of death was homicide caused by blunt force trauma to her head,
neck, and chest. The medical examiner also observed that Ranow’s
body was dressed in clean clothes, indicating that they were not on
her body at the time her injuries occurred and that the placement of
the clothing on the body suggested that someone else had dressed
her because one of Ranow’s arms was not fully in the sleeve of her
sweater and her pants were not pulled over her hips. DNA recovered
from Ranow’s body was tested and determined to match Williams’s
DNA.
At trial, the State presented evidence of Williams’s
involvement in two previous physical altercations: a June 2010
incident involving Ranow and an August 2010 incident involving
Ronald Strode, who lived in the Lawrenceville house with Ranow
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and Williams at the time.3 With regard to the June 2010 incident, a
retired LPD police officer testified that while he was still employed
with the LPD, he came upon an altercation between Williams and
Ranow at a gas station within walking distance of their house.
During the altercation, the officer saw Williams hit Ranow in the
chest a few times, almost causing her to fall down. The officer placed
both Williams and Ranow under arrest for public drunkenness.
The State presented two witnesses to testify about the incident
involving Strode, which occurred on the night of August 12 to 13,
2010. Strode testified that sometime during the night, Williams
came into Strode’s bedroom, asked Strode if he had seen Ranow, and
used his fists to beat Strode in the face, head, and chest. Strode was
able to break away from Williams and walk to the nearby house of a
friend, who called an ambulance. Strode was taken to the hospital
3 The State filed a timely notice of intent to introduce this other-acts
evidence prior to trial, and Williams opposed its admission at an evidentiary
hearing on the matter. The trial court subsequently issued a written order
ruling that the evidence of both incidents was admissible. On appeal, Williams
contests only the introduction of the evidence regarding the Strode incident,
which was admitted to show identity; he does not contest the admissibility of
the June 2010 incident involving Ranow, which the trial court admitted as
showing prior difficulties between the parties.
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for treatment, which included brain surgery. The State also
presented testimony from a uniform patrol sergeant from the
Gwinnett County Police Department who investigated the Strode
incident. He testified that he interviewed Williams after Strode
identified Williams as his assailant. The sergeant testified that
during the custodial interview, Williams said he returned home on
the night of August 12 to 13, and, while still outside, saw Ranow and
Strode through the window. Williams told the sergeant that Strode
and Ranow were on the bed together, with Strode’s hand between
Ranow’s legs. Williams said he went inside and confronted Strode
about the condition of the house, which was in disarray, and Ranow
told Williams that Strode had attempted to rape her. Williams
admitted to the sergeant that, at some point during the night, he
struck Strode once with an open hand, because Williams believed
that he had interrupted an attempted rape. Williams explained that
he was upset because Ranow did not appear to be resisting Strode
and that she had been unfaithful to Williams many times in the
past.
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1. Williams asserts that the trial court erred in admitting
evidence of the Strode incident pursuant to OCGA § 24-4-404 (b)
(“Rule 404 (b)”)4 for the purpose of showing identity.
In order to introduce extrinsic evidence under Rule 404 (b), the
State must show:
(1) that the evidence is relevant to an issue in the case
other than the defendant’s character; (2) that the
probative value of the evidence is not substantially
outweighed by its undue prejudice; and (3) that there is
sufficient proof for a jury to find by a preponderance of the
evidence that the defendant committed the other act.
Strong v. State, 309 Ga. 295, 300 (2) (a) (845 SE2d 653) (2020). And
“[w]hen evidence is offered pursuant to Rule 404 (b) to prove
identity, it must satisfy a particularly stringent analysis.” Moon v.
State, 312 Ga. 31, 53 (3) (c) (iii) (860 SE2d 519) (2021) (citation and
punctuation omitted).
The extrinsic act must be a “signature” crime, and the
4 OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts shall not be admissible
to prove the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other
purposes, including, but not limited to, proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident.
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defendant must have used a modus operandi that is
uniquely his. . . . Evidence cannot be used to prove
identity simply because the defendant has at other times
committed the same commonplace variety of criminal act.
Brooks v. State, 298 Ga. 722, 725 (2) (783 SE2d 895) (2016) (citations
and punctuation omitted).
At an evidentiary hearing, the State proffered the Rule 404 (b)
evidence relating to the Strode incident for the sole purpose of
showing identity, and Williams’s counsel argued that the evidence
was inadmissible for that purpose under Rule 404 (b) because there
was no distinct criminal signature common to that incident and the
charged crime; the two incidents were dissimilar in that Williams
was trying to protect Ranow in the Strode incident, which has
nothing to do with the crimes resulting in Ranow’s death; and in any
event, the evidence was more prejudicial than probative. However,
the trial court determined that the Strode incident was sufficiently
similar to the crime in this case to be relevant to the issue of
identity. 5 The trial court also found that there was sufficient proof
5 In reaching this decision, the trial court noted that the two crimes both
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to enable a jury to find by a preponderance of the evidence that
Williams committed the Strode battery and the probative value of
the evidence was “not substantially outweighed by undue influence.”
Pretermitting whether the trial court abused its discretion in
admitting the Strode-related evidence on the issue of identity, we
conclude that any error in its admission was harmless in light of the
other compelling evidence of Williams’s guilt. “Evidentiary errors
require reversal only if they harm a defendant’s substantial rights.”
Troy v. State, 312 Ga. 860, 862 (866 SE2d 394) (2021). See also
OCGA § 24-1-103 (a). And, a “nonconstitutional error,” as alleged
here, “is harmless if it is highly probable that the error did not
contribute to the verdict.” Davenport v. State, 309 Ga. 385, 389 (2)
(846 SE2d 83) (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted). See also
Boothe v. State, 293 Ga. 285, 289-90 (2) (b) (745 SE2d 594) (2013).
In order to determine whether the disputed evidence contributed to
the verdict, we “review the evidence de novo, after setting aside any
occurred at the same house, involved people with whom Williams was living,
involved the use of Williams’s hands to beat the victim in the same areas of the
body, and occurred only four months apart.
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evidence that was admitted as a result of the error,” and we “‘weigh
the remaining evidence as we would expect reasonable jurors to
have done so as opposed to viewing it all in the light most favorable
to the jury’s verdict.’” Troy, 312 Ga. at 862 (citing Peoples v. State,
295 Ga. 44, 55 (4) (c) (757 SE2d 646) (2014)).
Even apart from the Strode-related evidence, the remaining
evidence that Williams beat Ranow to death was strong. Officer
Daugherty was the last person to see Ranow alive when he dropped
her off at the house she shared with Williams sometime after 8:53
p.m. on December 18, 2010, and there was no evidence that anyone
other than Williams and Ranow were at the house that night.
Williams called 911 early the next morning, and told responding
officers that Ranow had been beaten sometime before she arrived at
the house and that the person who gave Ranow the yellow coat had
provided the drugs and beat her. However, Officer Daugherty saw
Ranow in the yellow coat and she had not been beaten. Also, most of
the blood evidence was confined to the interior of the house. The
evidence indicated that someone had dressed Ranow’s body in clean
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clothing after she was beaten, while the yellow coat Ranow was
wearing when she was last seen alive was found covered in
bloodstains in a trash can right outside the house, and Williams
knew exactly where it was. Although Williams claimed that Ranow
was alive when he called for help, testimony from police and medical
responders indicated that she had been dead for some time when
they arrived. In addition, one officer at the scene observed that
Williams had injuries to his hand, which later required medical
treatment, as well as blood on his head.
Moreover, there was evidence of prior difficulties between
Williams and Ranow from a prior incident a few months before when
Williams had been observed, in public, hitting Ranow in the chest,
and almost knocking her down, which demonstrated the nature of
Williams’s relationship with Ranow and supported his motive to
harm her. See Flowers v. State, 307 Ga. 618, 621 (2) (837 SE2d 824)
(2020). Thus, to the extent that the State relied on the Strode-
related evidence to prove identity, that evidence was largely
cumulative of the much more probative evidence showing that
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Williams killed Ranow. See Virger v. State, 305 Ga. 281, 296 (8) (b)
(824 SE2d 346) (2019) (where Rule 404 (b) evidence was cumulative
of other properly admitted evidence, any error in its admission was
harmless); Douglas v. State, 303 Ga. 178, 183 (3) (811 SE2d 337)
(2018) (same).
Further, the trial court, using a charge approved by the parties,
instructed the jury that the Strode-related evidence could not alone
support a finding that Williams committed the acts alleged, and that
the jurors “could not convict a person simply because [they] believe
he may have committed the alleged similar acts in the past.” The
trial court gave a version of this instruction four times: in its pretrial
charge to the jury, before the introduction of the evidence of the June
2010 incident with Ranow, before the evidence of the Strode
incident, and in the final jury charge. Because “[w]e ordinarily
presume that jurors follow such instructions,” any unfair prejudice
from the admission of the Strode-related evidence was reduced. See
Bentley v. State, 307 Ga. 1, 8 (2) (834 SE2d 549) (2019). See also
Howell v. State, 307 Ga. 865, 875 (3) (838 SE2d 839) (2020) (same).
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Therefore, we conclude that, under the circumstances of this
case, it is highly probable that the admission of the evidence
concerning the Strode incident did not contribute to the jury’s
verdict. See Howell v. State, 307 Ga. 865, 875-76 (3) (838 SE2d 839)
(2020) (404 (b) evidence erroneously admitted harmless in light of
otherwise strong evidence of defendant’s guilt); Jackson v. State, 306
Ga. 69, 81 (2) (c) (829 SE2d 142) (2019) (same); Scott v. State, 357
Ga. App. 289, 295 (1) (b) (850 SE2d 477) (2020) (erroneous admission
of 404 (b) evidence to show identity harmless in light of other
evidence of defendant’s guilt).
2. Williams also contends that the trial court erred by
admitting his statements to police about the Strode incident without
first conducting a Jackson-Denno 6 hearing to determine whether
those statements were voluntary. We need not decide whether the
6 Under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
“[a] defendant who objects to the admission of [his] statements to the police is
‘entitled to a fair hearing in which both the underlying factual issues and the
voluntariness of [his] confession are actually and reliably determined.’” Reid v.
State, 306 Ga. 769, 773 (2) (a) (833 SE2d 100) (2019) (quoting Jackson v. Denno,
378 U.S. 368, 380 (III) (84 SCt 1774, 12 LE2d 908) (1964)).
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trial court erred, though, because we determine that any error in the
admission of the evidence was harmless. “Even an error of
constitutional magnitude may be considered harmless if the State
can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not
contribute to the verdict[.]” Dunn v. State, 312 Ga. 471, 480 (3) (863
SE2d 59) (2021) (citation and punctuation omitted). See also
Armstrong v. State, 310 Ga. 598, 605 (3) (852 SE2d 824) (2020).
In the statements at issue, Williams denied that he inflicted
serious injury on Strode – admitting only that he slapped him once
open-handed – and attempted to justify this action by asserting that
Strode had attempted to rape Ranow. We have determined that the
admission of the Strode-related evidence, which would include the
statements Williams made justifying the attack, was harmless
under the standard for nonconstitutional error. We further conclude
under the standard for assessing errors of constitutional magnitude
that the record shows beyond a reasonable doubt that the evidence
of Williams’s self-serving statements to the Gwinnett County Police
sergeant did not contribute to the verdict and thus that any error
17
was harmless.7
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
7 Williams does not argue that the errors we have assumed and
determined to be individually harmless resulted in cumulative prejudice
mandating a new trial, and in light of the other evidence in the case, and from
our review of the record we discern no cumulative prejudice warranting
reversal under either of the applicable harmless error standards. See State v.
Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 17 (1) (838 SE2d 808) (2020) (“[E]ven in the evidentiary
context, a defendant who wishes to take advantage of the [cumulative error
rule] should explain to the reviewing court just how he was prejudiced by the
cumulative effect of multiple errors.”).
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