McEntyre v. Sams East, Inc

In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: March 8, 2022
S21Q0909. MCENTYRE v. SAM’S EAST, INC.
BETHEL, Justice.
This case involving personal injury claims arising from an
automobile accident is before this Court on three certified questions
from the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Georgia. The questions seek this Court’s interpretation of OCGA §
40-6-248.1 (b), which provides that “[n]o person shall operate or load
for operation, on any public road, any vehicle with any load” unless
the load and any covering thereon is “securely fastened” and
whether this code section applies to a tort claim. Our responses to
the questions certified, as explained more fully below, can be
summarized as follows: (1) OCGA § 40-6-248.1 (b) imposes a duty on
a person assisting the operator of a vehicle with loading
merchandise onto the vehicle to securely fasten the load; (2) a person
assisting in loading a vehicle may be liable in tort for injuries to a
third party resulting from a breach of his or her duty to secure that
load (and any covering thereon); and (3) when serving as the basis
for a civil tort suit, a violation of OCGA § 40-6-248.1 (b) (1) is subject
to ordinary tort principles and defenses. 1
1. The pleadings and discovery materials indicate the
following: On February 22, 2016, Mary Louise McCall purchased
two mattresses and two box springs from the Sam’s Club in Albany,
Georgia, which Sam’s East, Inc. operated. Sam’s East employees
Darion Ponder and Eddie Shorter assisted McCall by physically
placing the mattresses and box springs onto McCall’s pickup truck
bed. McCall did not physically load or handle the mattresses and box
springs when Ponder and Shorter loaded them onto her truck. The
parties dispute whether Ponder and Shorter simply loaded the
mattresses and box springs onto the bed of McCall’s truck or
whether they also tied the mattresses and box springs to the truck
1 In addition to the parties’ briefs and presentations at oral argument,
the Court was assisted in answering the three certified questions by an amicus
curiae brief from Georgians for Lawsuit Reform.
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in an attempt to secure them. Upon leaving Sam’s Club, one of the
mattresses became loose and fell from the bed of McCall’s truck onto
a public roadway. Shortly after the mattress fell onto the road,
Amanda McEntyre’s vehicle struck the mattress, resulting in
serious injuries to her neck and shoulder.
McEntyre filed a lawsuit against McCall, which was later
settled. McEntyre also filed a personal injury lawsuit in the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia against
Sam’s East, alleging negligence and negligence per se and seeking
punitive damages. After Sam’s East filed a motion for summary
judgment and McEntyre filed a cross-motion for partial summary
judgment, the district court stayed the proceedings and certified the
following questions to this Court:
(1) Does OCGA § 40-6-248.1 (b) (1) require a person —
who is assisting the operator of a vehicle to load
merchandise onto said vehicle — to “securely fasten” the
load to the vehicle?
(2) Under OCGA § 40-6-248.1 (b) (1), would a person —
who assists in loading or securing a load to a vehicle but
is not operating the vehicle — be liable to a third party
who is injured while the vehicle is in operation on a public
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road as a result of the load becoming loose, detached, or
in any manner . . . a hazard to other users of the public
road?
(3) Under OCGA § 40-6-248.1 (b) (1), does the occurrence
of a load becoming loose, detached, or in any manner . . .
a hazard to other users of the public road necessarily
mean that the load was not securely fastened? That is to
say, is OCGA § 40-6-248.1 (b) (1) a strict liability statute?
2. The district court’s certified questions call upon us to
interpret the meaning of OCGA § 40-6-248.1 (b) (1), which provides:
(b) No person shall operate or load for operation, on any
public road, any vehicle with any load unless such load
and any covering thereon is securely fastened so as to
prevent such covering or load from: (1) Becoming loose,
detached, or in any manner becoming a hazard to other
users of the public road[.]
In considering the meaning of this statute,
we must presume that the General Assembly meant what
it said and said what it meant. To that end, we must
afford the statutory text its plain and ordinary meaning,
we must view the statutory text in the context in which it
appears, and we must read the statutory text in its most
natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the
English language would.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170,
172-173 (1) (a) (751 SE2d 337) (2013).
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The common and customary usages of the words are
important, but so is their context. For context, we may
look to other provisions of the same statute, the structure
and history of the whole statute, and the other law —
constitutional, statutory, and common law alike — that
forms the legal background of the statutory provision in
question.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Mobley v. State, 307 Ga. 59, 69
(4) (a) (834 SE2d 785) (2019).
(a) The first question the district court asked is whether OCGA
§ 40-6-248.1 (b) (1) requires a person to “securely fasten” the load
when he or she is merely assisting the operator of a vehicle in
loading it. We conclude that under the plain language of the statute,
a person assisting the operator of a vehicle with loading has a duty
to “other users of the public road” to “securely fasten[ ]” the load.
The question posed by the district court assumes that the
person assisting with the loading is not also the operator of the
vehicle. The phrase “[n]o person shall . . . load for operation” does
not limit the duty imposed by the statute to secure a load and any
covering thereon to the operator of the vehicle or a person primarily
responsible for loading. “No person” is an expansive term, and the
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background law generally provides that those who assist others in
violating a statute can be held individually liable for their actions.
See OCGA §§ 16-2-20 (establishing party to a crime criminal
liability); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Loudermilk, 305 Ga. 558, 572-
574 (2) (826 SE2d 116) (2019) (discussing “concerted action” as the
basis for tort liability). Contrary to Sam’s East’s argument, OCGA §
40-6-248.1 (b) (1) does not contain any language restricting the duty
it sets out only to those who have “control” over the operation of the
vehicle. And no such language appears in the case principally relied
on by Sam’s East, which considered only whether the operator – a
person who undoubtedly does have at least some control over the
vehicle – violated the statute. See Semones v. State, 200 Ga. App. 3(406 SE2d 483) (1991). Rather, the statute imposes the duty to
securely fasten loads and coverings on any person who “operate[s]”
a vehicle on a public road or “load[s]” a vehicle for operation on a
public road. People who assist one another in loading items onto a
vehicle that will be operated on a public road are all engaged in
loading the vehicle, and therefore would all have a duty to secure
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the load and any covering thereon under the statute. That duty is
owed to “other users of the public road.” OCGA § 40-6-248.1 (b) (1)
(providing that such duty is “to prevent such covering or load from
becoming a hazard to other users of the public road”).
Sam’s East and its amicus contend that interpreting the
statute to impose on individuals who lack complete control a duty to
secure a load on a vehicle will result in liability for well-meaning
and helpful neighbors who assist operators in loading their vehicles
or companies that offer such assistance with loading as a “courtesy.”
As an initial matter, we note that it is not for this Court to expand
or contract the scope of the General Assembly’s legislative
enactments, unless the policy choices it makes by enacting statutes
exceed its constitutional authority. See Woodward v. State, 296 Ga.
803, 814 (3) (b) (771 SE2d 362) (2015) (“If a law enacted by the
General Assembly is not unconstitutional[,] . . . the obligation of this
Court is to apply the law by its terms, whether we like it or not.”).
Accordingly, the policy concerns raised by Sam’s East and its amicus
about the extent to which liability may be imposed by OCGA § 40-6-
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248.1 (b) (1) are properly addressed not by this Court exceeding its
constitutional authority to impermissibly limit the duty imposed by
the plain language of the statute, but by petitioning the General
Assembly and advocating for a change in the law. Moreover, as
discussed further in Division (2) (b) below, Sam’s East and its
amicus’s concerns about the practical consequences that may flow
from the plain text of the statute enacted by the General Assembly
may be mitigated by application of traditional tort principles of
proximate cause.
(b) The remaining questions posed by the district court asked
whether OCGA § 40-6-248.1 (b) (1) is a “strict liability” statute such
that the occurrence of a load becoming loose, detached, or in any
manner a hazard to other users of the public road necessarily means
that the load was not securely fastened, and whether a person who
assists in loading or securing a load to a vehicle but who is not
operating the vehicle would be liable to a third party who is injured
as a result. We conclude that because ordinary principles of
negligence apply to this civil tort case, a load becoming loose,
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detached, or in any manner a hazard to other users of the public
road does not necessarily mean in every instance that the load was
not securely fastened, and a person assisting in loading a vehicle
may be liable only for injuries to a third party proximately caused
by a breach of his or her duty to secure that load and any covering
thereon.
In the civil tort context, there is “no general rule of strict
liability in Georgia[,]” Reeves v. Bridges, 248 Ga. 600, 602 (284 SE2d
416) (1981), and strict liability typically applies only to certain
circumstances involving abnormally dangerous activities 2 or where
the General Assembly has recognized a need to explicitly impose
strict liability in tort for the protection of the public. See, e.g., OCGA
§ 51-1-11 (b) (establishing strict liability in a products liability
2 Historically, this has included activities like owning vicious animals or
explosive blasting, though the statute pertaining to vicious animals was
amended to clarify that the standard for liability is negligence, not strict
liability. See OCGA § 51-2-7; Steagald v. Eason, 300 Ga. 717, 718 n.2 (797 SE2d
838) (2017) (noting the change). See also Berger v. Plantation Pipeline Co., 121
Ga. App. 362, 363 (6) (173 SE2d 741) (1970) (one who sets off an explosive blast
“is absolutely liable to the injured party, despite the exercise of due care”).
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context).3
Here, the provisions of OCGA § 40-6-248.1 (b) do not explicitly
provide for strict liability in the context of a civil tort action, but
rather provide the basis of the underlying duty. More specifically, as
explained above and pertinent to this case, the statute imposes a
duty owed to users of public roads on all persons who assist in
loading a vehicle for operation on a public road to secure the load
and any covering thereon. When a person is allegedly injured by
such a load or covering falling on a public road, ordinary principles
of negligence apply, meaning that the plaintiff must establish a
3 We recognize that a violation of OCGA § 40-6-248.1 (b) is also a
misdemeanor criminal offense. See OCGA § 40-6-249 (providing that violations
of OCGA § 40-6-248.1 are misdemeanors and shall be punished as set forth in
OCGA § 16-7-43); see also OCGA §§ 16-7-43 (b) (1) & (2) (providing that
violations of OCGA § 16-7-43 (a) are misdemeanors and that violators may be
directed by the court to pick up and remove litter, subject to certain conditions,
as part of their sentence); 17-10-3 (a) (1) (providing that, except as otherwise
provided by law, misdemeanor offenses are to be punished by a fine not to
exceed $1000, 12 months in jail, or both). And these sorts of “Rules of the Road”
offenses are sometimes referred to as “strict liability” crimes. See State v.
Ogilvie, 292 Ga. 6, 8 (2) (a) (734 SE2d 50) (2012); see also Semones, 200 Ga.
App. at 3-4 (trial court did not err in determining that violation of the
predecessor to OCGA § 40-6-248.1 (b), when defendant failed to secure chairs
in his vehicle before operating it on a public roadway, was a strict liability
criminal offense). But strict liability criminal offenses are not the same as strict
liability torts.
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breach of this statutory duty, proximate causation, and damages in
order to establish liability. 4 See Johnson v. American Nat. Red
Cross, 276 Ga. 270, 272 (1) (578 SE2d 106) (2003); see also OCGA §
51-1-6 (“When the law requires a person to perform an act for the
benefit of another or to refrain from doing an act which may injure
another, although no cause of action is given in express terms, the
injured party may recover for the breach of such legal duty if he
suffers damage thereby.”).
Nothing in the statute or in the background of civil tort law
permits a trial court to skip over these traditional tort principles. A
trial court cannot presume that in every instance where a load has
become loose, detached, or in any manner a hazard to other users of
the public road that the load was not securely fastened and that any
4 Because the question is not posed to us, we need not answer whether a
violation of duty imposed by OCGA § 40-6-248.1 (b) may provide the basis for
asserting a claim of negligence per se. See Murphy v. Bajjani, 282 Ga. 197, 200
(2) (647 SE2d 54) (2007) (“[N]egligence per se arises when a statute is violated,
the person injured by the violation is within the class of persons the statute
was intended to protect, and the harm complained of was the harm the statute
was intended to guard against.” (citation omitted)); see also Amick v. BM &
KM, Inc., 275 FSupp.2d 1378, 1381 (II) (A) (N.D. Ga. 2003) (“In Georgia,
negligence per se arises when a defendant violates a statute or ordinance,
satisfying, as a matter of law, the first two elements of a negligence claim.”).
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person who assisted in loading or securing the load is liable. “[I]n
order to recover for any injuries resulting from the breach of a duty,
there must be evidence that the injuries were proximately caused by
the breach of the duty.” Goldstein, Garber & Salama, LLC v. J.B.,
300 Ga. 840, 841 (1) (797 SE2d 87) (2017). And the injuries must be
the “probable or natural consequence” of that breach and must
“reasonably have been anticipated, apprehended, or foreseen.” Id. at
843 (1).5 See also Tyner v. Matta-Tronsoco, 305 Ga. 480, 485 (3) (826
SE2d 100) (2019) (“Inextricably entwined with concepts of
negligence and proximate cause is a notion of foreseeability, the idea
that a defendant could reasonably foresee that an injury would
result from his act or omission.” (citations omitted)).
Thus, a defendant who is not an operator of the vehicle but
5 We have recently clarified that
“probable,” . . . in the rule as to causation, does not mean “more
likely than not” but rather “not unlikely”; or, more definitely, “such
a chance of harm as would induce a prudent man not to run the
risk; such a chance of harmful result that a prudent man would
foresee an appreciable risk that some harm would happen.”
(Citation omitted.) Johnson v. Avis Rent A Car System, LLC, 311 Ga. 588, 592
(858 SE2d 23) (2021).
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assists in loading can only be liable for failing to securely fasten the
load in light of the reasonably foreseeable ways in which the load
will be transported on a public road. 6 This may require the factfinder
to assess a variety of factors, including but not limited to the
defendant’s knowledge regarding the nature of the load and the
vehicle, road or weather conditions, the operator’s representations
about the vehicle’s destination, the length of the drive, or anything
else that might affect the loader’s assessment of whether the load
was “securely fastened.” Further, it is possible that a defendant
could satisfy his or her duty to secure the load only for that load to
later become unsecured in some unforeseeable manner or due to
some intervening cause after the defendant is no longer in a position
to ensure the safety of the load. See Ontario Sewing Mach. Co., Ltd.
v. Smith, 275 Ga. 683, 686 (2) (572 SE2d 533) (2002) (“[A]n
intervening and independent wrongful act of a third person
6 Given the questions presented in this case, we need not address the
scope of the duty imposed upon the operator of the vehicle under this statute
and the manner in which traditional tort principles would apply to the vehicle’s
operator in the event a load on the vehicle became loose, detached, or otherwise
hazardous.
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producing the injury, and without which it would not have occurred,
should be treated as the proximate cause, insulating and excluding
the negligence of the defendant[.]” (citation and punctuation
omitted)). For example, the unanticipated actions of a third party or
other external factors could cause to a “securely fastened” load to
become unsecured.
Moreover, the causal chain could be broken in other ways that
would prevent a person assisting with loading from completing the
task of securing the load. By way of example only, the owner of the
load or vehicle might direct the person assisting with loading to stop
securing the load and discontinue contact with the owner’s property.
Or the operator might interrupt the loader’s efforts to secure the
load by driving off or otherwise assuming complete control over the
vehicle and the load before the person assisting with loading could
complete the task of securing the load. Where there is evidence that
a third party was injured as a result of a vehicle’s load becoming
loose, detached, or in any manner a hazard to users of the public
road due to an unforeseeable or unavoidable intervening cause, the
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defendant-loader may not be liable for injuries arising from the load
becoming unsecured. Accordingly, we cannot say that every instance
that a load becomes loose, detached, or in any manner a hazard to
other users of the public road necessarily means that the load was
not securely fastened and that a person who assisted in loading will
be liable.
Certified questions answered. All the Justices concur.
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